


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24 OCTOBER 1991



JPRS Report

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CONTENTS

24 October 1991

CHINA

Roundup Views Pugwash Science Conference	
[He Chongyuan, Liu Yun; RENMIN RIBAO 25 Sep]	1
Further on Bush Initiative, World Response	2
'Brief Analysis' of Initiative [Zhang Qixin; RENMIN RIBAO 30 Sep]	2
Gorbachev Response 'Shows Strength' [Shih Chun-yu; Hong Kong TA KUNG PAO 7 Oct]	3
UK Views Gorbachev Response to Bush [XINHUA 7 Oct]	4
DPRK Urges U.S. Nuclear Withdrawal [XINHUA 8 Oct]	4
Foreign Minister Opposes N-Arms in Korea [Seoul TONG-A ILBO 5 Oct]	5

EAST ASIA

AUSTRALIA

Prime Minister Hawke Welcomes Bush Initiative [AFP 28 Sep]	6
--	---

BURMA

Foreign Minister Welcomes Bush's Arms Proposal [Rangoon Radio 5 Oct]	6
--	---

JAPAN

Officials Welcome Gorbachev Response to Bush Initiative [KYODO 6 Oct]	6
---	---

NORTH KOREA

Further on Reaction to Bush Nuclear Arms Initiative	7
Foreign Ministry Lauds Soviet Response [Pyongyang Radio 6 Oct]	7
Minister Welcomes Bush Initiative [Tokyo TV 7 Oct]	7

SOUTH KOREA

Foreign Ministry Welcomes Soviet Response to Bush [Seoul Radio 7 Oct]	8
---	---

NEW ZEALAND

Prime Minister Bolger Responds to Bush Initiative	8
Calls for Halt in French Nuclear Tests [AFP 28 Sep]	8
Urges Review of ANZUS Treaty [Melbourne International 30 Sep]	8
Plans To Review Antinuclear Laws [AFP 30 Sep]	9

VIETNAM

Army Paper Comments on Bush's Arms Reduction [Quang Loi; Hanoi Radio 2 Oct]	9
---	---

EAST EUROPE

ALBANIA

Government Welcomes Bush Disarmament Move [Tirana Radio 3 Oct]	12
--	----

BULGARIA

President Zhelev Supports Bush Disarmament Initiative [BTA 2 Oct]	12
---	----

POLAND

Talks on Withdrawal of Soviet Forces Said Successful	12
Deputy Foreign Minister Sees Agreement Soon [PAP 7 Oct]	12
Moscow Agrees To Withdraw by End of 1992 [AFP 8 Oct]	12
General Cited on Troop Pullout [PAP 7 Oct]	13

ROMANIA

Foreign Ministry Greet Bush Arms Initiative [ROMPRES 2 Oct]	13
---	----

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

EGYPT

Editorials Praise Bush Arms Reduction Initiative [MENA 30 Sep]	15
--	----

INDIA

Soviet Response to Bush Proposals Welcomed [Delhi Radio 8 Oct]	15
--	----

IRAN

Foreign Minister Calls Bush Initiative 'Face-Saving' [Tehran TV 3 Oct]	15
Commentary on Bush Initiative, Soviet Response [Tehran Radio 7 Oct]	16

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

Foreign Minister Welcomes Bush's Arms Initiative [Sanaa Radio 5 Oct]	16
--	----

SOVIET UNION

RESPONSE TO BUSH INITIATIVE

Aleksey Arbatov Evaluates U.S. Initiatives [Budapest NEPSZABADSAG 1 Oct]	17
Initiative Seen Prompted by 'Collapse of USSR' [E. Volodin; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 1 Oct]	17
'Reservations' About Bush Proposal, Prospects Eyed [V. Litovkin; IZVESTIYA 2 Oct]	18
Shevardnadze Welcomes Bush Arms Initiative [TASS 2 Oct]	19
General Staff Reacts Positively to Bush Proposals [A. Yakovlev; Moscow International 3 Oct]	20
Gen Ladygin: U.S. Plan 'Step in Right Direction' [Moscow TV 3 Oct]	20
U.S. Plan Renders Nuclear War 'Virtually Impossible' [S. Rogov; TASS 3 Oct]	21
'Point of View' Program Examines Bush Proposal [V. Levin, V. Zagladin; Moscow Radio 3 Oct] .	21
Bovin Calls Nuclear-Free World 'Utopian' [IZVESTIYA 4 Oct]	25
Costs of Nuclear Disarmament Discussed [V. Linnik; PRAVDA 4 Oct]	26
Gorbachev Offers Response to Bush Initiative	27
Addresses Nation [Moscow TV 5 Oct]	27
'Full Text' of Statement [TASS 5 Oct]	28
Officials Comment on Bush Nuclear Arms Initiative	29
Lt Gen Manilov: 'Extremely Positive' [Moscow International 5 Oct]	29
Shevardnadze Praises Initiative [TASS 4 Oct]	30
G. Arbatov Welcomes 'New Approach' [TASS 4 Oct]	30
Kondrashov Views Arms Race, Bush Proposal [IZVESTIYA 5 Oct]	31
Commentator Rebuts Detractors of Bush Plan [A. Golts; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 5 Oct]	32
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Analyzes Bush Proposals [5 Oct]	33
Reports on Bartholomew Mission To Moscow	34
Consultations Begin [TASS 6 Oct]	34
Bartholomew Comments [TASS 8 Oct]	34

General Lobov, Bartholomew Meet [TASS 8 Oct]	35
Yeltsin Said Planing To Present Own Proposals [Vienna DIE PRESSE 8 Oct]	35
RSFSR Foreign Minister Comments [A. Kozyrev; Russian TV 8 Oct]	35
Bartholomew Makes 'Hasty Return Home' [TASS 8 Oct]	36
Chief of Staff on Bush Initiative, Gorbachev Response	36
Calls U.S. Step 'Significant' [V. Lobov; Hamburg DER SPIEGEL 7 Oct]	36
Says U.S. 'Surprised' by Response [V. Lobov; TASS 9 Oct]	37
Bush Reaction to Response on Arms Cuts Noted [V. Gan; PRAVDA 8 Oct]	37
PRAVDA Commentator Remarks on Arms Cut [Ye. Shashkov; 8 Oct]	38
Bovin on Bush Initiative, Gorbachev Reply [IZVESTIYA 9 Oct]	39
PRC Reaction to Reduction Proposals Cited [Yu. Savenkov; IZVESTIYA 9 Oct]	41
Petrovskiy: No 'Closed' Disarmament Topics [TRUD 1 Oct]	41
Concept of UN Nuclear 'Police Force' Contemplated [IZVESTIYA 2 Oct]	42
U.S., Soviet Nuclear Initiatives Spur CSBM Talks [TASS 2 Oct]	42

GENERAL

Ukrainian Defense Minister Disavows Nuclear Weapons [TASS 3 Oct]	42
Belarusan, Ukrainian Officials on Stationing of Nuclear Weapons [Russian TV 3 Oct]	43
Delegation Attends Arms Conference in Italy [TASS 6 Oct]	43
Center-Republic Consultations on Nuclear Arsenal	43
Center To Retain Control [Moscow TV 9 Oct]	43
Guarantees Against Unauthorized Use [V. Manilov; Moscow International 9 Oct]	43

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Lithuania Demands Prompt Soviet Withdrawal	44
Landsbergis Reiterates Stance [Radio Vilnius 1 Oct]	44
Fears Deployment of Nuclear Arms [TASS 8 Oct]	44
Estonia, Moscow Discuss Soviet Troop Withdrawal	45
Council Discusses Organization of Talks [Tallinn Radio 1 Oct]	45
Prime Minister, Fleet Commander Meet [BALTFAX 2 Oct]	45
Withdrawal To Be Negotiated [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Oct]	45
Agreement in Principle Reached [BALTFAX 4 Oct]	46
Discussion of Plans for Withdrawal From Baltics	47
Supreme Soviet's Ochirov Comments [TASS 3 Oct]	47
Soviet Commander Views Deadline [TASS 7 Oct]	47
Lithuanian Radio Comments [E. Butkus; Radio Vilnius 7 Oct]	47
Defense Ministry Spokesman on Timetable [BALTFAX 9 Oct]	48
Calls Deadline 'Unrealistic' [TASS 9 Oct]	48
Latvia, Moscow Discuss Troop Withdrawal	49
Yakovlev, Parliamentarian Meet [BALTFAX 3 Oct]	49
Interior Ministry Troops Begin Withdrawal [BALTFAX 8 Oct]	49
Further Report [Riga Radio 9 Oct]	49
WGF Chief Confirms No Nuclear Arms in Germany [IZVESTIYA 5 Oct]	49
CFE Treaty Implementation Issues Viewed [V. Tatarnikov, I. Usachev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 8 Oct]	50

NUCLEAR TESTING

Arguments for Total Nuclear Test Ban Examined [A. Mokerov, A. Sanin; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 27 Sep]	51
'Secret Laws' Target Kyshtym Nuclear Weapons Pollution [V. Nedogonov; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 3 Oct]	53

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Sverdlovsk 1979 Anthrax Outbreak Revisited	53
Official Version Supported [S. Bogomolov; URALSKIY RABOCHIY 12 Mar]	53
Yeltsin, KGB Roles in Investigation [B. Yarkov; KURANTY 1 Nov]	56

More on Alleged Sverdlovsk Bacteriological Accident [N. Zenova; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 39, 2 Oct]	57
---	----

WEST EUROPE

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

NATO Secretary General on Prospects, Policies [M. Woerner; Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG 5-6 Oct]	61
--	----

AUSTRIA

Speed of Gorbachev Response to Bush Initiative Viewed [Vienna TV 6 Oct]	62
---	----

FINLAND

Foreign Minister Calls Gorbachev Response to Bush Positive [Helsinki Radio 8 Oct]	63
---	----

FRANCE

Gorbachev Response to Bush Arms Proposal Hailed	63
Statement by Presidency [Paris TV 7 Oct]	63
LE MONDE Editorial [8 Oct]	63
Number of Annual Nuclear Tests To Be Reduced [AFP 8 Oct]	63

GERMANY

Bush Disarmament Proposal Examined, Praised [T. Sommer; DIE ZEIT 3 Oct]	64
Officials Praise Soviet Response to Bush Initiative	65
Kohl: 'Further Decisive Step' [ADN 6 Oct]	65
Genscher: Proposals 'Important' [DPA 6 Oct]	66
SDP Welcomes Plan [ADN 6 Oct]	66
Commentators Assess Bush, Gorbachev Initiatives	66
'Disarmament Express' Seen [F. Wirth; DIE WELT 7 Oct]	66
'Epochal Significance' of Soviet Moves [FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU 7 Oct]	67
General Says Soviet Troop Withdrawal on Schedule [ADN 7 Oct]	67
Defense Minister: No Soviet Nuclear Arms in Country [DPA 9 Oct]	67
Expert Views Changing Nature of Arms Control in Europe [Vienna DIE PRESSE 19-20 Oct]	67

NORWAY

Officials Welcome Gorbachev Response to Bush Initiative [AFTENPOSTEN 7 Oct]	68
---	----

SPAIN

Government Welcomes Soviet Arms Initiative [Madrid TV 7 Oct]	68
--	----

TURKEY

Effects of Bush Arms Plan on Turkey Viewed [H. Uluengin; HURRIYET 1 Oct]	68
Foreign Minister Praises Soviet Response to Bush [Ankara Radio 9 Oct]	69

UNITED KINGDOM

Gorbachev Response to Bush Initiative Viewed	69
Prime Minister Major Welcomes Proposals [PRESS ASSOCIATION 6 Oct]	69
Government To Study Implications on Tactical Arms [PRESS ASSOCIATION 5 Oct]	70

Roundup Views Pugwash Science Conference

HK0110135291 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
25 Sep 91 p 7

[Article by staff reporters He Chongyuan (0149 1504 0337) and Liu Yun (0491 9462): "Enhance Friendship, Maintain Peace, Promote Development: Roundup of Beijing Annual Meeting of Pugwash Conference for Science and World Affairs"]

[Text] In the golden fall season, the weeping willows in front of Beijing's new Wanshou Guesthouse and the ancient Chinese scholar trees offer shade and present their varying dark green tones amid the warm sunshine. The green trees form an integral whole with "he" [0735—meaning peace and harmony], the green character emblem of the annual meeting of the 41st Pugwash Conference for Science and World Affairs, thus setting off the annual meeting's theme of "striving for world peace, security, and development."

The annual meeting, sponsored by the Association of the Chinese People for Peace and Disarmament (hereinafter Peace and Disarmament Association), is the first one of the Pugwash Conference for Science and World Affairs (hereinafter Pugwash Conference) held in China. Within the short period of six days from 17 to 22 September, more than 200 scientists, experts, and scholars from over 50 countries carried out thorough discussions on the following eight topics: World peace, regional security, promoting the progress of arms control, moving toward a nuclear-free world, development strategy and world economic order, debts, energy, and the environment. They took the floor or held panel meetings to air their views freely, leaving a deep impression on those present. As Zhu Shanqing, vice president of the Peace and Disarmament Association, pointed out at the closing ceremony: "The annual meeting's theme of 'striving for world peace, security, and development' has profoundly reflected the common aspiration and strong desire of the people of all countries, including the Chinese people."

Promoting the progress of arms control, reducing nuclear weapons, and preventing nuclear war have always been the focus of the Pugwash Conference, as well as an important prerequisite for ensuring world peace. Over the past 30 years, a participant attending the meeting said, the United States and the Soviet Union have rivaled for nuclear superiority. The strategic nuclear arsenals of the two sides have reached a "terrifying balance." Although the United States and the Soviet Union have signed a treaty on reducing offensive strategic weapons this July and even when the treaty is fully put into implementation, the strategic nuclear warheads possessed by each side exceed 6,000, capable of destroying the other side repeatedly. The Pugwash Conference pointed out in its "world peace" report that "the two countries that have the largest nuclear arsenals shoulder special responsibility" for the threat facing the world. The Pugwash Conference proposed eliminating

all tactical nuclear weapons which include cruise missiles; reducing nuclear weapons by a wide margin; accepting the treaty on completely banning nuclear experiments; and vigorously supporting the international nuclear nonproliferation program and establishment of a nuclear-free zone. Calogero, secretary general of the Pugwash Association, said that "China and France announced that they would sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This is the latest achievement attained by the nuclear nonproliferation program." China has taken practical action to make its due contribution to safeguarding world peace and disarmament, particularly to promoting security and development in the Asia-Pacific region.

Security is closely linked to development. Most of those attending the meeting said: "Development is not merely an economic issue. It includes the contents of politics and society." The developing countries should attach importance to investment in human resources, develop education, and carry out technical training rather than follow the beaten path of the West. They pointed out that debts constitute a heavy burden for the developing countries. Apart from the improper use of the aid by the recipient country, the creditor nations also shoulder the main responsibility for the current debt crisis. The high interest rate policy, trade protectionism, and irrational prices for the primary products of creditor nations have further aggravated the environment of the debtor nations for development. A representative of the East European countries pointed out that East Europe, which is facing economic difficulties, is also confronted with the debt problem.

The developing countries are in debt to the developed countries. At the same time, the developed countries are also in "debt in environment" to the developing countries. The population of the developed countries accounts for less than one-third of the world's total, but they have exhausted 80 percent of the world's raw materials and products. Of the carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases released worldwide, the amount released by the United States is more or less the same as that of the Third World. In the face of the increasingly serious worldwide environment problem, scholars from the United States insisted that the "natural debt" of the United States at present is equal to its national debt. For this reason, "the United States and other developed nations should take more responsibility in this regard." The participants held that the developed nations should increase their aid to the developing nations and do not attach any condition to it. (Wudegankar), a scholar from India, proposed that the Pugwash Conference make greater efforts to urge the North to transfer their advanced science and technology to the South. Representatives attending the meeting called on the developed countries to make concerted efforts with the developing countries to stabilize the world population, protect earth resources, and push forward the economies of the developing countries.

Vice President Zhu Shanqing said: "China needs a peaceful international environment for its development." The world also needs a peaceful international environment. At a time when a new structure is replacing the old one in the world today, people are increasingly concerned about future peace, particularly the question of a new world order. Chinese scholars insisted on the establishment of a new international order based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The core of the new international order is that countries—large or small, strong or weak, poor or rich—are independent and equal members of the international community. Most of the participants did not object to strengthening the positive role of the United Nations in establishing a new international order. A scholar from Egypt said the key to enhancing the role of the United Nations lies in the big powers of the North changing their attitude and genuinely improving the status of the Third World rather than enhancing the position of the United States.

The 41st annual meeting of the Pugwash Conference is a grand meeting of the scientists of all countries enhancing unity and jointly consulting on the great cause of maintaining peace. Although there have been disputes and differences at the meeting, they were all for exploring world peace. Through the meeting, Chinese scientists increased understanding and strengthened friendship with friends from other countries. The "Beijing meeting" will be a new starting point for Chinese scientists to carry out exchanges and cooperation with their foreign counterparts.

Further on Bush Initiative, World Response

'Brief Analysis' of Initiative

HK0210122891 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
30 Sep 91 p 6

["News Analysis" by staff reporter Zhang Qixin (1728 6259 2500): "Brief Analysis of Bush's Proposal on Nuclear Arms Reduction"]

[Text] Washington, 28 September (RENMIN RIBAO)—On 27 September, U.S. President Bush put forward a new disarmament initiative. He announced that the United States will unilaterally adopt a series of "major steps," and urged the Soviet Union to reciprocate by taking "similarly bold action" in order to "reduce the world's nuclear arsenals." This was another new nuclear disarmament initiative raised by the United States in recent years since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the treaties on eliminating intermediate-range missiles and reducing strategic weapons.

The new U.S. initiative includes the two parts separately related to tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons. With regard to short-range nuclear weapons, the United States announced that it would withdraw all land-based short-range nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery shells from Europe and Asia to the United States (including short-range cruise missiles carrying nuclear

warheads and nuclear bombs), and part of these weapons would be destroyed after being brought back. Reportedly, the United States now possesses more than 5,000 land- and sea-based tactical nuclear warheads, while the Soviet Union possesses a large number of such tactical nuclear weapons. With regard to strategic nuclear weapons, the United States proposed that both sides ratify the START treaty signed in July as quickly as possible and speed up the pace of eliminating the nuclear weapons specified by the treaty. At present, the United States will remove its bombers and the intercontinental missiles specified by the treaty from day-to-day alert status and will abandon the plans for the development of two types of mobile missiles, namely: the MX and Midgetman missiles. At the same time, the United States urged the Soviet Union to take reciprocal actions. The United States also proposed that talks be held on destroying land-based multiple-warhead intercontinental missiles.

The press here holds that the U.S. initiative represents a major readjustment of U.S. military strategy against the background of changes in the international situation, especially the drastic changes in the Soviet Union. Over the past few years, Soviet troops have been or are being withdrawn from the East European countries, and the Warsaw Pact has disintegrated. The military threat to Europe from the Soviet Union has decreased markedly. The U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe have lost their original targets. The European countries also have been demanding increasingly strongly that such nuclear weapons be removed. Therefore, the question of how to handle the tactical nuclear weapons has been placed on the nuclear disarmament agenda of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The recent changes in the Soviet political situation have brought greater domestic and international disarmament pressure on the U.S. authorities. According to some people's analysis, Bush's initiative not only was aimed at calming domestic criticism, but also included the U.S. assessment of the Soviet situation. The U.S. authorities held that the Soviet Union had shifted attention to its domestic affairs, so such a "historic" opportunity should be used to take certain major actions for the further adjustment of U.S. military strategy in accordance with "post-Cold War reality."

The content of the proposal shows that the current military strategic adjustment stresses two points: First, terminating the longstanding situation in which some strategic weapons were kept in day-to-day alert status, put an end to the debate on mobilizing land-based missiles, closing the "window of vulnerability," and shifting financial resources to more useful nuclear weapons. Second, changing the several-decades-old strategy of using nuclear force to check potential Soviet conventional attacks in Europe, so strength can be concentrated on building a "streamlined and powerful" military force to tackle emergencies in other regions.

However, the latest U.S. nuclear disarmament moves are conditional. That is, they will be contingent on the

response of the Soviet Union. As some senior officials in the United States said: If the Soviet Union does not take reciprocal action, many steps announced by Bush may be reserved.

Moreover, although Bush's initiative covers a wide scope, it will affect only part of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, mainly tactical nuclear weapons, and there is no plan for further reducing long-range strategic nuclear weapons. On the contrary, Bush still stressed the need to guarantee the reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrence, and required that Congress approve appropriations for B-2 strategic bombers and the Strategic Defense Initiative. He also stressed the need to modernize land-based single-warhead missiles. Although the United States proposed to hold U.S.-Soviet talks on eliminating land-based multiple-warhead intercontinental missiles, the proposal did not mention anything about sea-based multiple-warhead missiles, in which category the United States has superiority, but focused on land-based multiple-warhead missiles, in which the Soviet Union has superiority. Obviously, the U.S. initiative on further reducing strategic weapons remained selective and was aimed at a result favorable to the United States itself.

At present, although the Soviet Union has welcomed the U.S. proposal, Moscow has yet to make further comments. To what degree Bush's proposal actually will be put into practice and to what extent this will affect nuclear disarmament will still depend on the development of events.

Gorbachev Response 'Shows Strength'

*HK0710072791 Hong Kong TA KUNG PAO
in Chinese 7 Oct 91 p 2*

["Political Talk" column by Shih Chun-yu (2457 0689 3768): "United States, Soviet Union Deliberate New Nuclear Arms Talks"]

[Text] A week after U.S. President Bush proposed reducing American tactical nuclear weapons by a large scale, Soviet President Gorbachev has made a specific response. He made a counter proposal, kicking the ball back to the United States. The United States and the Soviet Union have crossed swords in the new round of bargaining on nuclear disarmament.

Soviet President Displays Strength

Bush's initiative was announced after the abortive August coup against Gorbachev. The purpose was to prevent the 10,000 tactical nuclear warheads from falling into the hands of the republics, whose national sentiment is running high and who might use the weapons to threaten each other once the Soviet Union splits. Bush actually wanted to take advantage of the trouble in the Soviet Union to press Gorbachev to make concessions and strive for U.S. nuclear superiority. There are comments which say that he has retreated in order to advance.

Gorbachev's reaction was quick, as he used only eight days to respond to the initiative which Bush devised over a month or so. It was indeed difficult for him to do so under the Soviet Union's existing power framework, which is fragmentary. There are comments saying that Gorbachev has taken the opportunity to show to the world that he is still in control of Soviet nuclear weapons and to dispel the worldwide impression that his power has fallen into the hands of others. Gorbachev is likely to seize the opportunity to regain the power he has lost.

During his talks with the United States on disarmament on previous occasions, Gorbachev always ignored the military, which evoked discontent. As the Soviet military and the power of the whole country are undergoing reorganization, it is yet doubtful how much support Gorbachev can obtain for his proposal, though he says that Yeltsin and other republican leaders have backed his plan.

Disarmament Will Not Temporarily Benefit People's Livelihood

At a time when the Soviet economy is facing extreme difficulties, the reduction of nuclear arms will naturally be conducive to shifting limited funds into civilian use and improving the people's livelihood. However, this will only be a long-term effect. From a short-term point of view, because of the difficulties in destroying nuclear weapons, spending will increase rather than decrease. Moreover, as development of more sophisticated weapons, such as the star wars program, is not abandoned, it is unlikely that military spending will be cut on a large scale.

It will also be difficult to drastically reduce troops. There are reports of two disarmament figures from the Soviet Union. One quotes Defense Minister Shaposhnikov saying that the figure will be reduced from 3.75 million to 3 million; while the other quotes a deputy defense minister saying that the figure will be reduced by 50 percent. Apart from taking security into account, employment and housing of the demobilized soldiers should also be considered while reducing the troops. Otherwise, it may cause social turbulence. Now Gorbachev announced that only 700,000 troops will be cut. It seems that he must take the economic factor into account.

Question Still Focused on Strategic Weapons

Following the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, U.S. and Soviet armed forces have disengaged from their frontline confrontation. As there is no more need for tactical nuclear warheads of the range from below 100 km to several hundred km, both sides can generously destroy them (put some in stock). However, it is unlikely that they will give up their continental nuclear weapons which can target the opponent's headquarters located on the other side of the globe. Gorbachev announced that six nuclear submarines of the Soviet Union will be released from service. Superficially, it seems that Gorbachev has made a great concession, which boosts the

submarine nuclear superiority of the United States. Actually, this is also a retreat made in order to advance. It is aimed at forcing the United States to engage in talks in this regard, which the United States has always refused to do. Only 20 percent of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons are deployed on land, while over 60 percent of Soviet weapons are. While relations between the two sides are moving toward relaxation, each side has taken precaution against the other. Gorbachev did not respond hastily to Bush's initiative, nor Bush to Gorbachev's. The two sides will have to carry out official talks to seek an agreement.

The United States can take a calm and composed attitude toward the talks, but the Soviet Union has pressing economic and grain problems. Although the Soviet Union has become an unofficial member of the International Monetary Fund, it can obtain technological aid but not funds. Europe and the United States have always regarded a drastic cut in Soviet military spending as an essential condition for offering financial aid. Gorbachev's initiative has been well-received, but will it be followed by funds?

UK Views Gorbachev Response to Bush

OW0710132591 Beijing XINHUA in English
1231 GMT 7 Oct 91

[Text] London, October 7 (XINHUA)—British Prime Minister John Major last night welcomed Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's weekend offer of sweeping nuclear weapons cuts but reiterated that Britain would keep its Trident nuclear missile program.

The Soviet president's offer was in response to U.S. President George Bush's arms cuts proposals put forward 10 days ago.

Major said that there appeared to be a unique opportunity for a dramatic de-escalation in nuclear weaponry. "I welcome that very much and we will want very carefully to study proposals that have been laid before us".

However, Major said that the superpower arms cuts would not be mirrored by more reductions in Britain's own nuclear arsenal.

"We have made reductions in our nuclear weapons over recent weeks and we have announced this," he said.

"Trident is the essential minimum defence that we need in this country and we must maintain Trident," he stressed.

Major added that the Soviet Union remained an "immense nuclear power, an immense military power."

British officials said that Britain would go ahead with the Trident nuclear submarine force, currently under construction, which is to replace the aging Polaris force by the mid-1990s. Reports said that each of the four Trident submarines will carry 16 missiles, each with eight warheads supplied by the United States.

Britain's opposition parties have accused Major of not going far enough in responding to Gorbachev's offer.

The Soviet leader announced Moscow would not only match Washington's offer, it would exceed it. Moscow would make deeper cuts in long-range strategic nuclear weapons than envisaged in the START Treaty signed in June, he said.

Gorbachev offered to eliminate all nuclear artillery shells and warheads for tactical missiles as well as removing all tactical nuclear weapons from naval vessels.

He said that Moscow would also reduce the four million-strong Soviet Army by 700,000 and order a one-year freeze on nuclear testing. Soviet heavy bombers were to be stood down from alert.

Gerald Kaufman, foreign affairs spokesman of the main opposition Labor Party, said, "It will not be enough for Britain to welcome President Gorbachev's historic announcement with vague words of commendation.

"Britain should now act to show our approval of what both Gorbachev and President Bush are doing to rid the world of nuclear weapons," he said.

"Without any delay, the government should consult the U.S. Administration about matching Soviet suspensions of nuclear tests with a similar suspension of our own," Kaufman added.

Labor Leader Neil Kinnock said that Britain should seize the initiative to push forward the peace process.

"Clearly we should be arguing for an extension of the testing moratorium, and even more effective machinery for preventing proliferation.

"The earlier we are involved the more likely we are to be able to exercise the necessary influence," Kinnock said.

Meanwhile, Sir David Steel, foreign affairs spokesman of Britain's third largest political party, the Liberal Democrats, said that Britain could save up to 500 million pounds (about 870 million U.S. dollars) by limiting the number of Trident warheads to the same firepower as Polaris. Another one billion pounds (about 1.74 billion dollars) could be saved by cancelling the tactical air-to-surface missile project, he added.

DPRK Urges U.S. Nuclear Withdrawal

OW0810062491 Beijing XINHUA in English
0612 GMT 8 Oct 91

[Text] Pyongyang, October 8 (XINHUA)—The United States should "first of all withdraw its nuclear arsenals from the Korean Peninsula where there exists the greatest possibility of a nuclear war," says a leading newspaper in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

The commentary, entitled "Threats Must be Eliminated," is carried in Tuesday's RODONG SINMUN.

It said it was "a pretty remarkable thing" that the United States had admitted its deployment of nuclear arms in South Korea and its intention to withdraw them from the area.

United States military sources revealed that the nuclear weapons in South Korea were also included in U.S. President George Bush's plan to unilaterally withdraw the country's tactical nuclear arsenals from abroad.

If the United States kept its promise to withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea and thus reduce its threats to the DPRK, then it would pave the way for the signing of a nuclear security agreement between DPRK and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and mark a giant step in making the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone, the commentary said.

It also demanded that the U.S. also withdraw its troops from the region.

"The quicker the withdrawal takes place, the better," it said.

Foreign Minister Opposes N-Arms in Korea

*SK0510063791 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
5 Oct 91 p 1*

[Correspondent Choe Maeng-ho in Vienna]

[Text] On 4 October, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, for the first time, officially made plain its

opposition to the controversial issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons development by saying "China wants neither side of the South or the North to possess nuclear weapons."

In a press conference held on 4 October, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen who came to Austria for an official visit, said that "the development of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula is undesirable not only for the peninsula itself, but also for China."

He also said: In the wake of U.S. President Bush's announcement on nuclear policy centered on the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Asia, I believe there will be progress in North Korea's nuclear issue.

By saying that "international inspection of nuclear facilities in North Korea and the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in the ROK are two different things," he indirectly denounced North Korea's linkage policy.

Minister Qian said the same thing in a meeting held on 3 October with Hans Blix, secretary general of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. One IAEA official quoted Qian as saying that "China has never supported North Korea's nuclear development."

On the subject of establishing formal diplomatic relations with the ROK, Qian avoided commenting on the setting up of diplomatic relations, saying, tersely, that "the economic relations between the two countries are being strengthened."

AUSTRALIA

Prime Minister Hawke Welcomes Bush Initiative

BK2809035291 Hong Kong AFP in English 0327 GMT 28 Sep 91

[Text] Canberra, September 28 (AFP)—Australia's Prime Minister Bob Hawke on Saturday welcomed U.S. President George Bush's arms reduction initiative, describing it as "the single most decisive step for world peace since the nuclear age began nearly 50 years ago."

Hawke said in a statement the U.S. decision to reduce its nuclear arsenal constituted the most sweeping act of unilateral disarmament in modern history.

The proposals for further arms reductions "promised to reshape fundamentally the nature of global relationships," he said.

"In an act of great imagination, vision and courage, George Bush has moved the world a step back from the brink of nuclear annihilation," Hawke said. "He has shown us how the nuclear anguish can end.

"Those actions confirm his place among the handful of statesman who change the world immeasurably for the better. And they confirm the greatness of the country he leads," Hawke said.

The prime minister said he had sent a message to Bush this morning congratulating him on his achievement.

He said Australia would now look to the Soviet Union. "I have sent messages to Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin urging them to respond in the same spirit, a spirit worthy of George Bush's proposals and of their own achievements," Hawke said.

"I hope other nuclear powers will also in turn respond in a similar spirit," he said.

BURMA

Foreign Minister Welcomes Bush's Arms Proposal

BK0510131491 Rangoon Radio Burma in English 0700 GMT 5 Oct 91

[Statement by U Ohn Gyaw, foreign minister of Burma and leader of the Burmese delegation, at the 46th United Nations General Assembly held in New York on the morning of 4 October—read by announcer]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Mr. President, the climate of growing confidence and cooperation between the two superpowers presents us with an opportunity to intensify efforts that would result in meaningful agreement in all fields of disarmament, particularly in the fields of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction.

In the nuclear field, a package of measures announced by President Bush last Friday has given a further boost to the momentum generated by the 1987 INF and 1991 START agreements. What is perhaps more significant than the number and types of weapons involved is what seems to be a clean break with the philosophical approach to arms control and disarmament which the United States had perceived during the Cold War era.

A positive Soviet response, both in kind and in spirit, to this unilateral U.S. initiative could, in our view, set in motion a self-generating process that would eventually lead to the elimination of all types of nuclear weapons in the armories of all nuclear-weapon states. [passage omitted]

JAPAN

Officials Welcome Gorbachev Response to Bush Initiative

OW0610134691 Tokyo KYODO in English 1307 GMT 6 Oct 91

[Text] Tokyo, October 6 (KYODO)—Japanese Government officials reacted favorably Sunday to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's nuclear arms reduction proposal.

The officials said they hope the initiative would stabilize U.S.-Soviet relations and contribute to the peace and security of the Far East, Asia, and other parts of the world.

Gorbachev pledged Saturday to drastically cut the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal and begin a one-year moratorium on nuclear weapons tests.

A Foreign Ministry official noted the Japanese Government had pressed the Soviet Union to respond "quickly and responsibly" to U.S. President George Bush's arms reduction plan in September.

"We welcome President Gorbachev's swift response," the official said.

However, he said the Gorbachev proposal requires close scrutiny to determine if it reduces Soviet military strength in the Far East.

"We will closely follow developments in U.S.-Soviet arms reduction talks," the official added.

Other ministry sources said the Gorbachev initiative has gone beyond the Bush plan in some areas, apparently because of the Soviet president's efforts to keep the initiative in military affairs in light of the increased autonomy of the Soviet republics.

NORTH KOREA

Further on Reaction to Bush Nuclear Arms Initiative

Foreign Ministry Lauds Soviet Response

SK0610231691 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 2100 GMT 6 Oct 91

[Statement issued by the spokesman of the DPRK Foreign Ministry on 6 October—read by announcer]

[Text] Pyongyang, 6 October—In order to defend world peace, realizing arms reduction and abolishing large-scale murderous weapons including nuclear weapons are common desires of man.

The most important problem in realizing this is to ban the testing and production of nuclear weapons; reduce the current existing nuclear weapons; and furthermore completely abolish all nuclear weapons.

According to reports, it is said that on 5 October the Soviet President Gorbachev issued a statement on reducing its tactical nuclear weapons on the ground and sea. The statement notes that the Soviet Union will abolish all nuclear bombs and nuclear warheads, and all nuclear weapons dispatched on warships and submarines including the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons that are dispatched on the ground and sea.

The statement also says that in accordance with the principle of mutual agreement, it proposes that both sides of the Soviet Union and the United States abolish all nuclear weapons dispatched in the Navy and Air Force and that the Soviet Union freeze nuclear tests for one year and reduce 700,000 Soviet forces.

It is said that this measure by the Soviet Union is a counter-measure to the recent statement by the U.S. President Bush to reduce nuclear weapons.

We welcome the Soviet Union's statement on reducing tactical nuclear weapons on the ground, sea, air and hope that this will play a positive role in realizing the overall reduction of nuclear weapons of the world-wide range.

Since the two countries of the Soviet Union and the United States announced statements on proposing to reduce nuclear weapons, the possibility of the overall reduction of nuclear weapons on this earth has increased.

The region where the danger of nuclear war is greatest is the Korean peninsula. This is because the U.S. nuclear weapons are concentratedly dispatched in South Korea.

We acknowledge that due to the Soviet Union's measure, the United States has no justification to continue to dispatch its nuclear weapons in South Korea.

As the United States promised, it should not partially but completely withdraw all nuclear weapons dispatched on the ground, sea, and air in South Korea and completely eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons toward us.

If the Soviet Union and the United States will take measures for reducing nuclear weapons at the same time and if the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is agreed upon and declared as we have already proposed, there will be no difficulty for the two countries of the Soviet Union and the United States to guarantee its status.

We have no ability or intention of producing nuclear weapons and will continue to make every effort to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free peace zone [NFZ].

We hope that measures to reduce nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and the United States will lead to the complete abolition of all nuclear weapons and to an overall abolition of armaments.

Minister Welcomes Bush Initiative

OW0710130791 Tokyo NHK General Television
Network in Japanese 1000 GMT 7 Oct 91

[Text] North Korean—DPRK—Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam gave a news conference at a hotel near Narita airport today and reiterated North Korea's position that in order for North Korea to accept nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency—IAEA—nuclear arms of the U.S. forces must be removed totally from South Korea.

The North Korean foreign minister stopped over at Narita airport on his way back home after attending the UN General Assembly session in New York, accompanying Premier Yon Hyong-muk. The premier and the foreign minister met respectively with Makoto Tanabe, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Japan [SDPJ], Hajime Ishii, chairman of the Dietmen's League for the Promotion of Japan-Korea Friendship, and others, who were on hand at the airport to greet them. The meetings took place at a hotel near the airport. Foreign Minister Kim later gave the press conference.

At the news conference, Foreign Minister Kim, discussing the issue of North Korean acceptance of nuclear inspections, said: We welcome President Bush's proposal for nuclear arms reductions. However, there is information that U.S. forces in South Korea are going to deploy some 200 strategic bombers in an emergency action. Hence, we are concerned that the removal of nuclear arms might be only a partial one. In order for our country to accept nuclear inspections, nuclear arms of the U.S. forces must be totally removed from South Korea.

Meanwhile, at a talk held earlier between Premier Yon Hyong-muk and SPDJ Chairman Tanabe, the SPDJ chairman said he hopes that the Japanese-North Korean

talks on the normalization of diplomatic relations will reach an early settlement, bringing about the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

In response, the North Korean premier said: We want to make efforts for the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea because it will be in the interest of both countries and be linked to peace in Asia. However, it is not desirable that questions not directly related to diplomatic relations are brought out, bringing the talks to a deadlock. Thus, he reiterated the North Korean view that the nuclear inspection issue or the question involving a Japanese woman named Yi Un-hye should not be linked to the talks.

SOUTH KOREA

Foreign Ministry Welcomes Soviet Response to Bush

SK0710103491 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean 1000 GMT 7 Oct 91

[Text] On behalf of the ROK Government, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry released a statement today saying that the ROK Government welcomes the decision by Soviet President Gorbachev to abolish and reduce nuclear weapons on a large scale.

Cho Won-il, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, also said that this decision by a nuclear state will reduce the horror and danger of nuclear weapons and greatly contribute to alleviating tension and to promoting peace in Northeast Asia, including the Korean peninsula, and the world.

NEW ZEALAND

Prime Minister Bolger Responds to Bush Initiative

Calls for Halt in French Nuclear Tests

BK2809063291 Hong Kong AFP in English 0627 GMT 28 Sep 91

[Text] Wellington, September 28 (AFP)—New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger said Saturday he hoped France would reconsider its nuclear test programme at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific now that U.S. President George Bush had "opened a new era in international relations."

Mr. Bolger was asked at a press conference here whether he hoped the unilateral disarmament programme announced by the president would mean an end to the tests.

"Yes I do. I would be hopeful that France would reconsider its Mururoa tests," he replied.

"France will have to ask itself what it's aiming to achieve. But that's a question that will be answered further down the track."

Mr. Bolger praised President Bush's announcement as historic and far-reaching.

"The measures constitute a huge step forward in the effort to put an end to the prospect of nuclear war," he said.

"It is a step of global significance."

Bolger said he would also seek new ways to improve his government's relationship with the United States following Bush's announcement which he said had "clear significance" for New Zealand.

"While it's too early to speculate on details, I believe we should use this moment to try to resolve the differences between the United States and New Zealand," he said.

Mr. Bolger would not discuss further the new opportunities but hinted the government would be prepared to make major decisions.

"We should, in some ways, be as bold as Bush," he said.

New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy does not permit U.S. warships to enter the country's ports because the Government does not accept the neither-confirm-nor-deny (NCND) American policy on whether their vessels are nuclear-armed.

Because of that, the U.S. will not co-operate with New Zealand on military or defence matters.

The New Zealand Government has been striving since it came to office in October last year to improve the relationship without compromising its anti-nuclear legislation.

"Clearly, if U.S. Navy surface vessels are not nuclear-armed then the problem that used to exist doesn't exist any longer," Bolger said but added that the new U.S. attitude did not mean New Zealand's anti-nuclear legislation was redundant and it would stay on the statute books.

Bolger has just returned from a trip to New York where he met Bush. "The dialogue is open and progress has been made. I'll work on that," he said.

Urges Review of ANZUS Treaty

BK3009070691 Melbourne Radio Australia in English 0500 GMT 30 Sep 91

[Text] New Zealand had called for a revision of the ANZUS [Australia-New Zealand-U.S. Defense Pact] security alliance linking it with the United States and Australia. New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger said the nuclear weapons cuts announced by President Bush showed it was time for New Zealand to be bold and resolve its differences with the United States.

Speaking in a radio interview, Mr. Bolger emphasized however that New Zealand's nuclear-free policy would not be compromised. Washington broke off military cooperation with Wellington in 1986 in protest of the policy which prevents nuclear-armed or -powered American warships from visiting New Zealand.

In another New Zealand response to the American move towards disarmament, former Prime Minister David Lange has urged the review of an agreement to buy naval frigates from Australia. New Zealand has agreed to buy up to four of the vessels under a deal worth millions of dollars.

Plans To Review Antinuclear Laws

BK3009100891 Hong Kong AFP in English 0942 GMT
30 Sep 91

[by Michael Field]

[Text] Wellington, September 30 (AFP)—The U.S. decision to withdraw nuclear weapons from most of its ships has presented New Zealand with an opportunity to improve ties strained for years by Wellington's anti-nuclear laws.

Prime Minister Jim Bolger said Monday that there would be a review of the anti-nuclear laws, while Disarmament Minister Doug Graham indicated American warships could be back here "fairly soon."

Washington appears to have provided the ruling National Party with a heaven-sent opportunity to dump the anti-nuclear laws inherited from the previous Labour government and reluctantly endorsed in the lead up to last year's general elections.

Over the weekend President George Bush announced big cutbacks to the U.S. nuclear forces, including taking tactical weapons off its warships, and leaving only strategic nuclear weapons aboard submarines, which have never visited ports here.

Former Prime Minister David Lange introduced laws in 1985 banning nuclear weapons and nuclear power from New Zealand from 1987 onwards and in effect requiring visiting warships to declare they did not carry nuclear weapons.

This was seen by Washington as compromising their policy to "neither confirm, not deny" the presence of nuclear weapons on ships and led to a breakup of the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and United States) pact.

High-level contacts between Washington and Wellington were suspended, a move that only ended last week when Bolger and Bush met at the United Nations in New York.

However the anti-nuclear policy has been popular here and last year, before general elections, Bolger promised his party would abide by it.

Speaking at a press conference after his weekly cabinet meeting, Bolger said: "The issue has now changed. There will not be nuclear weapons on U.S. naval ships. At that stage the reasons why they were barred from New Zealand has been removed."

Bolger said he was not going to rush ahead and invite the Americans to send a warship to New Zealand but if Washington were "of a mind to send one, I'd be very happy about that."

Foreign Minister Don McKinnon said Bush's statement represented a rare moment in history "where we have an opportunity to resolve the hard issue blocking a full relationship" between the United States and New Zealand.

"If ever there is a time for New Zealand to reciprocate creatively and positively, that time is now."

Asked when U.S. warships could visit here, Graham replied: "I can't see any reason why they shouldn't arrive fairly soon. They seem to have already started to remove their nuclear warheads from surface vessels. Once that is done I don't see why we shouldn't host a visit." Opposition leader Mike Moore said New Zealand should be celebrating and not retreating from its anti-nuclear laws.

"If the United States is now prepared to change its policy of neither confirming or denying the presence of nuclear weapons on vessels visiting New Zealand, our legislation ought to be safe."

"That's fine, and we would welcome such visits under our existing law. But I suspect Mr. Bolger is taking the matter further than what President Bush has indicated."

VIETNAM

Army Paper Comments on Bush's Arms Reduction

BK0710093791 Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network
in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 2 Oct 91

[QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article by Quang Loi: "Could It Be a Cut of Surplus Force?"—date not given]

[Text] The U.S. plan on reducing nuclear weapons announced by President Bush on 27 September include the total elimination of nuclear warheads and short-range nuclear missiles, removal of strategic nuclear arms including winged cruise missiles installed on warships, canceling the permanent alert order for strategic bombers as well as for intercontinental ballistic missiles which are scheduled for destruction in accordance with the START Treaty, and terminating the development of the deployment plan for long-range MX missiles.

It can be said that Mr. Bush's new plan has been warmly welcomed by public opinion in many countries—a rare U.S. arms reduction plan that promptly received such an honor. At a glance, one may see that this U.S. nuclear

arms reduction plan is a positive move aimed at accelerating the disarmament process, especially the nuclear weapons of mass destruction. However, the real objective of this unilateral nuclear arms reduction plan is not as simple as that. Times will help people understand this issue more profoundly if they carefully study and analyze it from a more perceptive angle, especially against the background of the current international situation, the relations between the East and the West, the Soviet-U.S. relations, and the internal situation of the United States.

After President Bush's announcement, a number of newspapers in the United States promptly commented that Mr. Bush's new plan sounds like a large-scale arms reduction, but in reality, it is just a token reduction plan. Military specialists, however, ironically commented that this is just an elimination of the U.S. surplus arms, mostly the old strategic weapons considered obsolete. In the military point of view, this plan is part and parcel of the U.S. military strategic adjustment in the post cold war period. In the past, during the East-West confrontation period and to serve the strategy of opposing communism, the U.S. installed nuclear missiles with ranges from 30 to less than 1,200 km aimed at the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The nuclear deterrent strategy has fulfilled its historic mission as prescribed by Washington. Now, after the crisis in the Soviet Union and the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, these strategic arms are not necessary for this traditional confrontation. In the current international political situation, while the West has admitted overtly that the Soviet Union is no longer a threat, it is illogical for the United States to maintain a permanent alert order for strategic bombers as well as for intercontinental ballistic missiles. Besides, this is only a termination of the alert order, while the Pentagon still has in its possession these weapons of mass destruction for use at any time. The fact that Washington has terminated the deployment plan for long-range MX missiles carrying 10 nuclear warheads does not mean that they have no such missiles in their possession; on the contrary, they have produced—during the past several years—50 MX missiles or 50 percent of the amount planned, while shifting to the deployment of a long-range Minuteman missile which carries only one nuclear warhead and is smaller yet more mobile than the MX.

It is noteworthy that while the world warmly and highly appraised Mr. Bush's initiative, Washington's top administrative and military officials showed their cautious attitude. To avoid disappointment, U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney advised that optimum results should not be expected. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Powell asserted that the U.S. nuclear arms power has not been reduced, and National Security Council Chairman Scowcroft contended that those who wait for great gains derived from peace will be disappointed. According to figures released by the Pentagon, in the next several years the U.S. arms reduction plan can reduce the budget by only \$18 billion, too small when compared to the U.S. total annual military budget of \$300 billion.

During the past several decades, U.S. military policy has been formulated on the basis of the nuclear deterrent strategy. As a result, Mr. Bush's new nuclear arms reduction plan has not changed the nature and content of this strategy. In reality, while terminating the deployment of the abovesaid weapons which are not necessary for the current world politicomilitary condition, the U.S. is striving to modernize other strategic weapons including the B-2 Stealth aircraft program which requires \$3.2 billion in the coming fiscal year, and continues to implement its SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] program which needs \$4.6 billion in 1992.

It can be said that President Bush's nuclear weapons reduction plan is not only of pure military significance, but also a deliberate political offensive. The U.S. President—a former World War II pilot—has chosen the right time to announce his arms reduction plan. Through this plan, Bush wants to make a triumphant landmark in the foreign policy he has implemented during the past several years.

THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote: This is the first time in his presidency that Bush acted boldly to create an impact for his future. With this proposal, Bush again enhanced his prestige in the international arena. Now that the Soviet Union and socialist countries in Eastern Europe have been disintegrated without a war, the United States, in a strong position, wants to show the world that it is dignifiedly putting the sword back in its scabbard. The United States wants to convey a message that a new world order is being established—of course the new world order in accordance with U.S. intentions.

With this nuclear arms reduction plan, the United States also wants to improve relations with its stubborn allies in Western Europe—especially in countries where people did not welcome U.S. missile installations in their territories. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has showed his delight upon learning of Bush's new plan, while millions of Germans showed gratitude to the U.S. President for his courageous decision.

It can be said that Mr. Bush's nuclear arms reduction plan is not only a political offensive in the international arena, but it is also has direct, concrete implications for U.S. domestic affairs, that is the 1992 presidential election with campaigns being actively organized. It is necessary to mention here that the Bush administration's foreign policy has been strongly criticized by its political opponents and public opinion while political observers contended that the Republican administration is weak in domestic affairs. Bush hopes that his nuclear arms reduction plan will create an image that his administration from now on will be able to concentrate more efforts on resolving pressing socioeconomic issues in the United States such as unemployment, housing, crime, public health, the aged, and homeless problems. Mr. Bush is

calculating that his peace initiative will contribute to creating a new strength for the Republican to knock out the Democrat in the elections next year.

It is necessary to say that the U.S. unilateral nuclear arms reduction plan is merely an intention, not a real act yet,

because the United States is waiting for the Soviet Union to respond reciprocally, otherwise the United States will withdraw its proposal. As a result, it cannot be said that this unilateral nuclear arms reduction plan is unconditional.

ALBANIA**Government Welcomes Bush Disarmament Move***AU0310195091 Tirana Radio Tirana Network
in Albanian 1900 GMT 3 Oct 91*

[Statement by the Government of the Republic of Albania; date and place not given]

[Text] The Government of the Republic of Albania warmly welcomes the initiative of the United States to eliminate very short-range nuclear weapons and the warm response this proposal has received from the Soviet Union. It considers this important measure as a great step toward disarmament and peace, and hopes that it will come into effect as soon as possible.

Apart from the timing of this initiative, when major changes are occurring in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere on the road toward democracy and the establishment of market economies, it represents an important historic step that corresponds well to these changes and to the interests of the peoples of Europe and the entire world.

BULGARIA**President Zhelev Supports Bush Disarmament Initiative***AU0210133291 Sofia BTA in English 1220 GMT
2 Oct 91*

[Text] Sofia, October 2 (BTA)—“The Republic of Bulgaria firmly backs up the initiative of U.S. President George Bush to eliminate land- and sea-based short-range nuclear weapons. We appreciate this initiative as a significant step towards the nuclear-free world mankind has been dreaming of for decades,” it is stated in the declaration of Bulgaria’s President Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev.

The destruction of nuclear shells and nuclear warheads of land- and sea-based short-range missiles and the lower state of alert for a number of strategic nuclear weapons will really diminish the nuclear threat to the world, Europe and especially the Balkans.

It is a well-known fact that nuclear weapons have never been deployed in Bulgaria. But the bloc confrontation between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO led to the deployment of tactical nuclear armament in Greece and Turkey, Bulgaria’s southern neighbors. Although they are under NATO control, they could be a potential threat to the Balkans. President Bush’s initiative creates a very good opportunity for the settlement of this problem to the benefit of all nations in this region.

We are aware of the difficulties to be overcome for the complete materialization of President Bush’s proposal and of the measures inevitably involved that should be taken to ensure political stability in the world in general and Europe in particular. But the important thing is that

the disarmament process is going on and Bulgaria supports it fervently, it is pointed out in Dr. Zhelev’s declaration.

POLAND**Talks on Withdrawal of Soviet Forces Said Successful****Deputy Foreign Minister Sees Agreement Soon***LD0810010791 Warsaw PAP in English 2314 GMT
7 Oct 91*

[“Breakthrough in Polish-Soviet Relations”—PAP headline]

[Excerptst] Moscow, October 7—The deputy foreign ministers of Poland and the USSR, Jerzy Makarczyk and Yuriy Dyeryabin, removed Monday the last barrier on the road to the signing of the Polish-Soviet treaty on cooperation and good neighbourliness. [passage omitted]

Makarczyk expects that the Polish-Soviet pact will be initialled before the end of the month during the planned visit to Warsaw of the foreign minister of the USSR, Boris Pankin.

Before that visit the 13th round of talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland will be taking place in Warsaw where the final decisions on the political aspects of the problem will be made. “I have reasons to believe that all the Soviet Army combat units will leave Poland by the end of the next year,” announced Makarczyk.

Questioned on the greater likelihood of Lech Walesa visiting Moscow because of these developments, Makarczyk replied that the president was always declaring his readiness to go there. However, the possibility of a presidential visit to Moscow depended on settling the question of Soviet troop withdrawal and the signing of the treaty on cooperation, since such a visit would make sense only if it opened up a really new stage in relations between Poland and the USSR. [passage omitted]

Moscow Agrees To Withdraw by End of 1992*AU0810160691 Paris AFP in English 1542 GMT
8 Oct 91*

[Text] Warsaw, October 8 (AFP)—Most Soviet troops in Poland will be withdrawn by the end of 1992 and a friendship agreement between the two former Warsaw Pact countries will be signed this month, Polish Foreign Ministry spokesman Grzegorz Dziemidowicz told AFP Tuesday.

Only “some logistical units” will stay in Poland until 1994 to help repatriate Red Army troops from former East Germany where withdrawal operations are to continue until then, he said.

Some 45,000 Soviet troops have been based in Poland since the end of the Second World War.

Until now Moscow has refused to withdraw its troops before 1994, while Warsaw has demanded their withdrawal as soon as possible. Until now, only 4,500 Soviet soldiers have left the country.

Poland was a member of the now defunct Warsaw Pact defense alliance of communist bloc countries dominated by the Soviet Union.

A Polish delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Jerzy Makarczyk concluded talks in Moscow Monday where the last details of a bilateral friendship treaty were hammered out.

Under the new text, a controversial clause dealing with security, which Poland considered a threat to its sovereignty, was dropped, Makarczyk said.

The new version, concluded after a year of negotiation, "conforms fully to the norms of international law," he said.

The conclusion of a treaty with Moscow does not rule out the possibility of establishing direct ties with the individual Soviet republics, the Polish minister added.

General Cited on Troop Pullout

LD0810140391 Warsaw PAP in English 1457 GMT
7 Oct 91

[Text] Warsaw, October 7—Government plenipotentiary for stationing of Soviet troops in Poland General Zdzislaw Ostrowski told the *DZIENNIK LODZKI* daily on Monday that Soviet soldiers had been systematically pulled out from Poland since last April. "We have taken over more than 900 objects and over 2,000 hectares of land. The garrisons in Szczecin, Troun, Nowa Sol and Debica, have been liquidated," he said.

Ostrowski also said that the greatest problems in concluding the talks on the pull-out were connected with ecological and financial questions. Poland would like to estimate whether the ecological losses and the costs of renovating buildings destroyed by the Russians are equal to the compensation they want for constructing new objects. On the other hand, the Soviet side wants to link the date for final withdrawal with signing an agreement on financial settlements.

General Ostrowski firmly denied rumours that the Soviet troops pulled out from Germany were occupying quarters in Poland, just left by their colleagues.

ROMANIA

Foreign Ministry Greet Bush Arms Initiative

AU0310080091 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
2200 GMT 2 Oct 91

[Text] Bucharest (ROMPRES) 2/10/1991—The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has learnt with interest about the new initiative of the President of the United States, on arms control and disarmament, an important contribution to the efforts to further strengthen international stability and security in the nuclear era, says a declaration of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, presented by Teodor Melescanu, spokesman for this ministry, in the weekly news conference on Wednesday, October 2.

We equally welcome the unilateral measures decided on by the United States and the proposals it made that new negotiations be opened between the United States and the Soviet Union, that are part of the positive course of the relations between the two great powers and of the international relations, as a whole.

The initiative of President Bush and the positive response of the Soviet party, the recent proposals of President Mitterrand and the appreciation and support expressed in many capitals of the world show that a process is about to start intended to make the mechanisms underlying nuclear armament inefficient.

Part of the logics of the deep changes that took place and continue to take place in Europe and the world, the new initiatives are added to the treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States on intermediate-range nuclear missiles and the Soviet-U.S. "START" Treaty.

From the point of view of an European country, the new measures and proposals are particularly significant, because, it is for the first time that such steps refer to short-range nuclear missiles, that are in great number in Europe. The elimination of all land-based nuclear missiles of this type and the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons boarded on ships, attack submarines and land-based sea planes, and their destruction, are partly in concord with the new realities on the European continent, with the interests of stability and security of the whole international community, continues the declaration.

The Romanian Foreign Ministry is also glad to welcome the decision taken by the President of the United States to put an end to the state of alarm of all strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles, listed in the "START" Treaty. That is an important action, that should directly contribute to the further diffusion of international tensions and first of all, to the diminution of the risks of a nuclear accident.

Considering the importance of the measures taken and in view, it is essential that, once put in place, they become irreversible.

We hope that, starting from the recent proposals made by the United States, and from the previous proposals of France, the nuclear powers will manage to agree on adequate measures of cooperation for the strengthening of the control and security of nuclear weapons.

Romania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also learnt with special interest about the proposals the United

States made that the process be continued and further negotiations take place for the consolidation of strategic stability—by eliminating strategic missiles with multiple warheads—and expresses its hope that the present efforts will result in substantial accords backing the structural changes and the positive developments of the nineties, towards which the hopes are headed of Europe and the whole world.

EGYPT

Editorials Praise Bush Arms Reduction Initiative

NC3009133191 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0602 GMT
30 Sep 91

[Excerpt] Cairo, 30 September (MENA)—Editorials in Cairo newspapers today focus on U.S. President George Bush's initiative to reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The papers stress the link between this initiative and the world's arms race and the issue of international peace and stability, foremost of which is the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East.

Under the headline "Bush's Initiative is a Historic Step," AL-JUMHURIYAH points to the Egyptian welcome and appreciation of the U.S. President's initiative and says this is especially significant in light of ongoing peace efforts in the Middle East.

The paper says that Bush's initiative is not only important in itself but has significant international repercussions because it will certainly invite similar measures by other nuclear powers, particularly the USSR, Britain, and France.

To Arabs, this historic step will assume its full force when a just peace is actually established in our region and weapons of mass destruction, notably nuclear arms, are eliminated, the paper concludes.

AL-AKHBAR remarks that the extensive and positive reactions to President Bush's plan to unilaterally reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal is a clear demonstration of the peaceful trend that prevails in the world today.

The paper points out that the post-Gulf War movement to revive the peace process which, for the first time ever, has been given a strong impetus by a U.S. President is part of the peaceful trend that has begun in various parts of the world and is making yesterday's enemies seek to eliminate everything that prevents peaceful coexistence among all parties.

In conclusion the paper urges the Israeli leaders to join the peace trend and move forward courageously to meet with the Arabs, who have not hesitated to make sincere steps to attain a real peace that will benefit all parties, instead of continuing to live on top of a gunpowder keg. [passage omitted]

INDIA

Soviet Response to Bush Proposals Welcomed

BK0810145491 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 1430 GMT 8 Oct 91

[Text] New Delhi has welcomed the comprehensive Soviet response to the U.S. announcement on reduction of nuclear arsenal. An External Affairs Ministry spokesman expressed the hope that the one-year Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing will be reciprocated by all

other nuclear-weapon states and facilitate negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty. He said the set of measures and proposals announced by both the United States and the Soviet Union can almost accomplish the first stage of the Indian action plan for ushering in a nuclear-free world. This, he said, is a matter of some satisfaction for India.

IRAN

Foreign Minister Calls Bush Initiative 'Face-Saving'

LD0310215291 Tehran IRIB Television Second
Program Network in Persian 1645 GMT 3 Oct 91

[Interview with Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati by unidentified moderator on the "Political Roundtable" program; date not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Moderator] Greetings. As you know, the 46th UN General Assembly met recently. The respected foreign minister of our country took part in the meeting. He also talked with the foreign ministers of the six GCC member states on the periphery of the General Assembly. Because the most important topics of discussion dealt with the seven sided talks, regional security, the Middle East peace conference, and the new world order, we have dedicated this week's roundtable discussions to the same issues. [passage omitted]

[Velayati] The recent action by the U.S. President is, in fact, more of a face-saving action for the U.S. Government. There is no further reason for the continued presence of U.S. short-range and even medium-range missiles in Europe. That was something quite predictable. When the communist camp collapsed, and the Soviets announced that they would remove their forces from Europe, the Berlin Wall was broken down, and the Warsaw Pact no longer existed, no reason was left for the continued presence of U.S. forces, the forces that had extended their so-called defense protection over Western Europe.

[Moderator] Considering that point of view, will NATO then transfer its forces from Europe to the Middle East in general, and the Persian Gulf in particular?

[Velayati] I will tell you now. It was predictable that the Americans would leave the region sooner or later. The U.S. Government's new posture—the peace-loving pose and the withdrawal of short-range missiles—is nothing but a face-saving effort to meet the demands of the European governments.

I give you this example for this reason: The precedence has been set for the Persian Gulf and other regions of the globe. In other words, all countries know that the presence of foreign armed forces in their country, in their region, undermines security, stability, and peace. The same formula and view applies to the Persian Gulf. The presence of American forces in the Persian Gulf will not

lead to security. This view is wrong, whoever may hold this imaginary view. This is our position with regard to Kuwait, the pact it has signed, and the presence of foreign forces in the region. [passage omitted]

Commentary on Bush Initiative, Soviet Response

LD0710135191 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 1100 GMT 7 Oct 91

[Station commentary]

[Text] In a reaction to the unilateral nuclear arms reduction by the United States, the Union of Soviet Republics has announced that it will destroy its tactical weapons. Mikhail Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union will eliminate all its tactical nuclear weapons deployed on ships and submarines and cut its armed forces by 700,000.

Following the failure of the recent coup d'etat in the Soviet Union, and with the West, especially the United States, becoming confident about the continuation of the reforms in that country, nuclear arms reduction—with the twin objective of reducing the burden of military expenditure and showing good will to the opposite side—is enjoying an upward trend. Last week, in a television message, George Bush for the first time made unprecedented proposals regarding the reduction of nuclear arms. The proposals were so far-reaching that, after many years of the Soviet Union losing the initiative in such policies, its reaction was marked by confusion. [sentence as heard]

Under the new international conditions, reducing the military budget has in reality become a general policy across the world. Moreover, the recent war in the Persian Gulf and the experiences gleaned from it by the states involved in the war resulted in the western countries making substantial changes in their military policies, and in the formation of a coherent, flexible, and responsive force equipped with the most modern technology to replace the classic military doctrines in which the use of large numbers of soldiers and armored equipment formed the main pillar of armies.

Military analysts believe that although the world is daily witnessing armed forces reduction announcements by various states, this does not necessarily entail a reduction in military power. And in reality those policies mean nothing but the conformity of political policies with the new international requirements and it should not lead to the conclusion that the world is progressing toward real disarmament.

Nevertheless, from the experts' point of view, the arms reduction issue has its own special meaning for both the Soviet Union and for America. The Soviet Union, which is experiencing a turbulent period with Gorbachev's reform policies as well as the adverse effects of the recent

abortive coup d'etat, expects the state's nuclear capability, as the sole symbol of its superpower era, to be used to attract western aid. In this way, by receiving its required resources from the West and by increasing its economic power, it is reducing its military power—which in any case is considered a threat against the West—in the same proportion.

As for America, considering the recent Soviet coup d'etat, which raised the issue of the possibility of illegal use of nuclear arms as a serious threat, even by giving concessions to the Soviet Union, it expects to reduce the number of nuclear weapons which can be used against the West, especially America.

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

Foreign Minister Welcomes Bush's Arms Initiative

JN0510070291 Sanaa Yemeni Republic Radio Network in Arabic 0430 GMT 5 Oct 91

[Text] Foreign Minister brother Dr. 'Abd-al-Karim al-Iryani has affirmed that the launching of unity and the establishment of the Republic of Yemen, which epitomized our Yemeni people's hopes and aspirations throughout their protracted struggle—this historic event—constitutes a modest contribution by the Yemeni people toward the march of change being witnessed by mankind in various parts of the world. All these changes will eventually contribute toward safeguarding the new world order, he added.

In our country's speech, which he delivered during the UN General Assembly's 46th session in New York yesterday, the brother minister expressed pride that the Yemeni unity reflects a unique experience in our region—an experience that removed once and for all the wall which separated the two parts of Yemen. He pointed out that our people achieved unity through peaceful and democratic means in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Yemen which was endorsed in a public referendum in May 1991.

The brother foreign minister indicated that the Constitution has become a beacon guiding our steps in the building of a new Yemen along the path of freedom, democracy, justice, equality, and the building of institutions through which all citizens can exercise their rights in full, and participate effectively in our country's political life, development, and economic endeavors.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Karim al-Iryani welcomed U.S. President George Bush's initiative on the reduction of some types of nuclear arms. He expressed hope that this initiative will be the beginning of efforts to achieve disarmament with regard to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in order to eventually effect a real and total disarmament of nuclear and other lethal weapons.

In our country's speech, Dr. al-Iryani also touched on a host of issues and Arab as well as international developments.

RESPONSE TO BUSH INITIATIVE

Aleksey Arbatov Evaluates U.S. Initiatives

AU0310123591 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 1 Oct 91 pp 1,2

[Interview with Aleksey Arbatov, chief of the Disarmament Department at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, leader of the Strategic Research Center at the Foreign Policy Association set up by Shevarnadze, and adviser at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by Demeter Pogar; place and date not given: "Arbatov: Military Reality to Politics"]

[Text] The USSR will reply to George Bush's disarmament proposals within the week, and Mikhail Gorbachev is working on a counterproposal, the INTERFAX independent news agency reported on 30 September, referring to one of the Soviet presidential spokesmen. How was the U.S. step received in Moscow, and what kind of answer is Moscow going to give? Aleksey Arbatov expounded his views to our newspaper.

[Pogar] Can we consider the cancellation of the military alert on U.S. strategic missiles as the final end of the cold war?

[Arbatov] In my opinion, the cold war ended a long time ago. President Bush's announcement adjusted the military reality to the political reality. However, the U.S. steps and announcements only affect a certain area of weapons systems. This in itself is not enough, because disarmament has to be extended to the other components of nuclear arsenals.

[Pogar] Can this U.S. proposal contribute to a return to the original concept of the START agreement, namely a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons on both sides?

[Arbatov] There is no direct link between President Bush's proposals and the stipulations of the START agreement. In any case, the U.S. proposal to eliminate land-based missiles with multiple warheads would mean a more than 50-percent reduction for the USSR because it would only leave 40 percent of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. At the same time, the Americans would only have to part with 20 percent of their nuclear weapons. I also note that, talking about the European strategic nuclear weapons, Bush announced that for the time being they would be withdrawn from the continent and he did not say that they would be dismantled. In addition, a similar category of equipment, namely the air borne missiles will not be part of the reductions. Therefore, if the Americans withdraw their tactical weapons then they will reduce the number of their nuclear weapons by approximately 50 percent in Europe.

[Pogar] Republics that have recently expressed a desire to have nuclear weapons or at least to have a say in nuclear strategy must undoubtedly worry Washington.

Can the U.S. announcement have any kind of effect on Kazakhstan or the Ukraine?

[Arbatov] Naturally. The Americans suggested the reduction of land-based missiles with multiple warheads, and the bases of these missiles are in Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and Russia. If we reduce their numbers, we will first do it in Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, and Russia will only follow after that. As for the strategic weapons, we will probably agree to their dismantling. We will start to do this in places where there is a greater possibility that people who are not authorized to use them might get hold of them.

[Pogar] According to the news, Moscow might soon come up with some counter-proposals. What could they be?

[Arbatov] As I already mentioned, it is quite possible that we will agree to the disarmament of strategic nuclear weapons. We are also ready to speed up the reduction in the area of strategic weapons. It is also possible that a proposal will be made for a moratorium on nuclear tests, especially since the USSR has nowhere to execute these tests just now. In addition, there is a hope that the two sides will be able to cooperate in the civilian use and, possibly, the storage of the fissionable material of warheads that are to be dismantled or which have not yet been built.

[Pogar] The reactions of Soviet leaders differed somewhat from each other. For example, Gorbachev made much more restrained statements than Yeltsin. Why?

[Arbatov] Gorbachev might have been more cautious because he pays more attention to the soldiers, and he probably had not received their expert opinion before he gave his reaction. The emphases of his opinion are also shaped by the fact that the conservative forces accuse him of having given too many concessions to the West.

Initiative Seen Prompted by 'Collapse of USSR'

92UF0027A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 1 Oct 91 p 3

[By political observer Eduard Volodin under the rubric: "An Observer's Opinion": "Causes and Effects"]

[Text] U.S. President G. Bush has announced a possible large-scale reduction in nuclear arms—without negotiation, without coordination, joint planning, or consensus with the former USSR. He announced it, and let everyone else think and do whatever they wish.

Of course, things are never that simple in politics, and official decisions like G. Bush's are made according to the real situation and realistic military-strategic prognoses. What is the real explanation for this announcement?

It seems to me that we must look for the main causes in the change in the balance of forces in the world arena, which was predetermined by the transformation of a

great power (the USSR) into a patchwork quilt of who knows what states. On a world scale, our national tragedy is a planetary catastrophe, the consequences of which are already being felt by those countries that until quite recently were friends and allies of the USSR and are now quickly changing their foreign political orientation through internal civil strife, slaughter, and military coups. We do not know precisely what is really happening in Ethiopia, we do not know about the real events in Angola, and we can only guess what new stage is coming in the national tragedy of Afghanistan. Propaganda-type hysterics regarding the "hand of Moscow" and "CPSU proteges" in the developing countries were clearly intended to make fools of all who want to know the real situation in the Third World, where the USSR already occupied one of the leading positions according to all indicators.

The words about the position of the former USSR among the countries of the former Third World are, in my opinion, one of the explanations for G. Bush's announcement. It is too burdensome to maintain powerful weapons against a poorly developed country and one filled with interethnic conflicts. Internal conflicts can destroy any sovereignty much more effectively than any military threat from outside can, and political stakes are now being placed on this. With an announcement of arms reduction you can gain political capital as well as the aura of a peacemaker and a democrat.

The collapse of the USSR also predetermined the purely military aspects of the announcement from the U.S. President concerning the reduction of weapons of mass destruction. There are limits to the application of tactical nuclear weapons from a long distance. As long as there was a USSR, the old scheme for dispersion of U.S. tactical weapons took into account its boundaries and the boundaries of its now former allies. Now, with the application of tactical weapons located in West Europe, all they can do is strike a blow to the independent Baltics or freedom-loving Moldova. The Asian system of the same weapons did not extend beyond Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, where processes of democratization, liberalization, and sovereignization are also developing with all their might. Under these conditions tactical nuclear weapons have lost their significance, and it seems to me that this is why G. Bush started talking about the peace-loving foreign policy of the citadel of democracy and the empire of prosperity and abundance—all the more so as the diversion of tactical nuclear weapons to the territory of the sovereign newcomers is both costly and what if they decided to use them.

Under these conditions, strategic nuclear arms aimed at Russia—its industrial centers, the capital, the strategic arms system—are of fundamental significance. This significance remains and increases and, along with the intensive development of the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] system, is a well-structured complex for destroying the geopolitical force that is potentially capable of restoring, under new conditions and on a new

political and economic basis, the unified power which has traditional foreign ties, allies, and its own geopolitical interests. G. Bush did not mention the reduction of these kinds of arms, which indirectly shows that the U.S. strategy regards Russia as its potential strategic opponent, even under the rule of the "democrats." This should be remembered by everyone who is in a hurry to be even more democratic than G. Bush in putting an end to the residual military might of the former great power, thinking about reducing and destroying even more weapons in response to the President's promises. Incidentally, one cannot rule out a version whereby the dismemberment of Russia itself will make it dangerous for it to have nuclear weapons and useless for the United States to have its own strategic weapons. But this will be clear (if everything continues to go the way it is now) in a year.

As for the peace-loving incantations by the head of the United States of America, obviously they must be seen in light of their real actions. Here again one must recall Iraq, against which, under the banner of the United Nations, a policy of trampling on the norms of humanism and democracy is being followed. It boggles the mind: Kuwait is free but the blockade continues, and the encroachment on the sovereignty of a country that is a UN member continues. By now it is clear even to a school child that during the past 10 months the United Nations has been merely a screen enabling the United States to dictate its will to an independent state and suffocate a freedom-loving people merely so that there will be only one nuclear power in the Near East: Israel.

This question also arises: Who and what is the former USSR in the world arena now? Actually there is no longer a Soviet Union, and the semblance of a "central power" does not influence the processes taking place inside the country—economic, political, interethnic, and "interstate." This "central" government which just six years ago spoke as an equal with the United States now despondently and obediently follows the instructions, recommendations, and wishes of the master of the world which remains alone on the Olympus of world politics.

It would be wrong, however, to think we have seen the last of Russia as a world power. The national and patriotic leaders of Russia will be able to restore its state power and revive self-respect and national pride. Emerging from the crisis in and of itself will return to Russia the status of a great power—not a nominal one but a real one. Then it will once again participate as an equal with all others in discussions, deliberations, and negotiations about peace and disarmament. On behalf of its own national interests and the interests of its historical friends and allies.

'Reservations' About Bush Proposal, Prospects Eyed

*PM0210102991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Oct 91 Union Edition p 2*

[Military correspondent V. Litovkin article: "Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry Welcome G. Bush Initiative But With Reservations"]

[Text] A briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists on the theme of U.S. President Bush's initiative was held at the USSR Foreign Ministry 30 September. The briefing was conducted by USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister V. Petrovskiy and Deputy Minister A. Obukhov.

In his opening address, Vladimir Petrovskiy noted that the U.S. President's proposals are being viewed in the USSR as a major and historic event which takes us closer to a nuclear-free world. He stressed our country's readiness to cooperate with the United States in achieving this aim and said that the Soviet Union is ready to take steps of comparable significance toward the U.S. initiative. At the same time the first deputy minister noted that the "palette of G. Bush's proposals could have been even richer had it also included the ending of nuclear tests."

What measures does the Soviet side envisage? Journalists were told that Foreign Minister B. Pankin, who is currently in the United States, is in contact with U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker to work out specific proposals on the implementation of G. Bush's initiative. Aleksey Obukhov is flying to Washington in the first half of October to discuss and coordinate the Soviet counter-proposals on the spot. They include proposals on talks to limit underground nuclear tests.

The participants in the briefing also noted that it is too soon to speak of anything more concrete because the U.S. President's proposal contains no real figures and it is not known how long it will take the two sides to complete the analytical work to agree with them. And if experience is any guide, that work will be extensive.

Colonel General B. Omelichev, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, also reacted positively to the U.S. President's proposals on tactical nuclear arms reduction. In a telephone conversation with your IZVESTIYA correspondent, he said that the Soviet military are ready for a whole series of mutual confidence-building measures. For example, if the United States drops alert status for strategic bombers we will be ready to remove our heavy bombers as an equivalent step. As for ICBMs, this question, in Omelichev's opinion, should be examined in the framework of talks on strategic stability.

Defense Ministry experts at the level of colonel and lieutenant colonel with whom I talked on Monday were more reserved in their assessments although they, too, received with satisfaction the news that the United States is ready to eliminate its entire arsenal of land-based tactical nuclear weapons and to remove tactical nuclear weapons, including sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles, from surface ships, including aircraft carriers and attack submarines.

They also note as a positive factor the decision to remove nuclear weapons from naval aircraft and the fact that a considerable part of those armaments will be scrapped and the remainder sited at arsenals and dumps in the central United States.

"We withdrew our tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of central Europe long ago," they recalled, "including Germany."

In 1989 there were 500 tactical combat weapons (166 aviation weapons, 50 artillery shells, and 284 missiles), plus around another 200 tactical missile launchers (Scud-B, Tochka, and Luna complexes), over 3,000 units of nuclear artillery (artillery pieces of 152 mm and above capable of firing nuclear shells) and the corresponding number of nuclear charges.

Experts stress the Soviet military's readiness to continue working with the Americans on reducing and completely eliminating tactical nuclear weapons as an entire class of deadly weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time they greeted with a certain degree of skepticism the proposal on the "confining to garrison" ["ostatsionirovaniye"] of mobile launchers for ICBMs and removing MRV ICBMs from the strategic nuclear forces.

"This proposal," I was told by a lieutenant colonel and participant in the arms reduction talks, "is contrary to the START Treaty. After all, a balance of forces and interests has been achieved there and it would be very dangerous to upset that because this could give definite advantages to one side. In particular, the 'confining' of our mobile heavy launchers would give the Americans advantages."

There are other questions which, in the Soviet military experts' opinion, require serious and thorough study and the clarification of many technical aspects and timetables for the implementation of these and other programs. After all, it will take quite a long time to drop alert status for 400-500 ICBMs. And that period may coincide with the timetable of the agreed reductions of strategic offensive arms.

At the same time, everyone I managed to talk with noted the Soviet military's readiness to cooperate with their transatlantic partners in the secure, environmentally safe storage, transport, and destruction of nuclear munitions and also in achieving the maximum guarantee that the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons will be excluded, and in an accord on the complete cessation of underground nuclear tests.

I think that these talks will be difficult. But there is confidence that nuclear security benefits both sides. And that inspires the hope that the prospects are good for the U.S. President's initiative.

Shevardnadze Welcomes Bush Arms Initiative

*LD0310020591 Moscow TASS in English 1722 GMT
2 Oct 91*

[Text] Moscow, October 2 (TASS)—Eduard Shevardnadze, head of the Soviet Foreign Policy Association, on Wednesday welcomed U.S. President George Bush's initiative to radically reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal as

a move to develop and consolidate partnership and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

He said the elimination "of the world stockpiles of ground-based short-range nuclear weapons" means that soon all U.S. artillery shells and short-range warheads will be removed from Europe and other territories. Shevardnadze believes the move may generate similar processes in Europe.

Shevardnadze praised the decision to remove all U.S. strategic weapons, including nuclear bombs, from surface ships, attack submarines, land-based aircraft and aircraft carriers.

He stressed the Soviet Union should take reciprocal steps.

Shevardnadze described confidence-building measures proposed by Bush as "reasonable and responsible" and called the Soviet leadership to "support them and take reciprocal measures."

The U.S. initiative gives the Soviet Union an opportunity to reorganise its own strategic forces to strengthen trust and strategic stability.

Shevardnadze believes Bush's proposal to use non-nuclear means against limited missile attacks, or SDI programme, will draw strong fire.

He said, however, the SDI technology can be used not only for military purposes but also for solving global problems, including ecological monitoring, natural calamities forecasting and navigation safety.

Shevardnadze also stressed the need to ban nuclear testing and cooperate to ensure nuclear arsenals' safety.

General Staff Reacts Positively to Bush Proposals

LD0310143491 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 3 Oct 91

[Report by Radio Moscow military observer Captain Aleksandr Yakovlev—read by announcer]

[Text] On instructions from the Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, a special group has been set up in Moscow to respond to George Bush's nuclear disarmament initiative. Part of the group are Soviet military leaders. More from a Radio Moscow military observer, Captain Aleksandr Yakovlev.

I have been to the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, says Aleksandr Yakovlev. The staff are scrutinizing the American proposals, comparing them with the initiatives this country put forward earlier. Back in January of 1986, Moscow advanced a program to move to a nuclear-free and nonviolent world stage by stage. The initiative of the American President to bring about radical nuclear disarmament naturally evoked a positive response. Let's listen to the chief of a department [the

Treaty and Legal Directorate] of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Fedor Ladygin:

[Begin Ladygin recording in Russian with superimposed translation into English] I'd like to say President Bush's proposals met the proposals that this country has repeatedly put forward over some years, proposals for ground- and sea-based nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear arms in general. An American delegation is arriving in Moscow one of these days. It will include representatives of the American military leaders. I hope the Soviet side will have prepared its own proposals by that time, to ban nuclear tests in particular. Let me say the Soviet countermeasures will jibe with the American in terms of their scope. We'll carry out some unilaterally. For example, following Washington the Soviet Union decided to remove from combat duty the ballistic missiles that fall under the START treaty.

The two sides will have to coordinate their positions to reach understanding, because first the Soviet nuclear arsenals and the America's [as heard] arsenals are poles apart in terms of quality, and second, we cannot but take into account the French and British nuclear forces in Europe. There is much work to be done, but I do hope for success. At any rate, the General Staff believe Moscow takes as much interest as Washington in bringing down nuclear arsenals to a minimum. [end recording]

Gen Ladygin: U.S. Plan 'Step in Right Direction'

LD0310210191 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1630 GMT 3 Oct 91

[Remarks by Lieutenant General Fedor Ladygin, chief of the Treaty and Legal Directorate of the USSR General Staff at the USSR Defense Ministry in Moscow; date not given; from the "TV Inform" newscast—recorded]

[Text] The United States initiative on scrapping short-range nuclear weapons remains one the leading subjects, if not the leading one, in the news. Politicians and diplomats are working on it while economists are analyzing it. So what does the Soviet military think about President Bush's proposals? We went to the USSR Defense Ministry to ask this question.

[Ladygin] The range of measures put forward by the United States President for reduction of nuclear weapons is a step in the right direction. Overall, they accord with the 1986 Soviet statement on a comprehensive program for scrapping nuclear weapons. Many times, we proposed reductions and elimination of nuclear arms in Europe. Judging by President Bush's statement, the need for that has now been realized by the United States as well. A number of the proposals put forward by President Bush accord with the written agreement jointly signed by the presidents of the USSR and the United States on 1 July 1990 regarding future negotiations on nuclear space weapons and further measures to strengthen strategic stability. Naturally, we

welcome the United States's abandoning of certain strategic programs. At the same time, as stated by President Bush, the United States will decisively continue to follow the program for the modernization of strategic weapons, including the Strategic Defense Initiative, in creating a widescale anti-missile defense system, something which, as we deeply feel, contravenes the aims of the 1972 agreement on anti-missile defense. Still, we are prepared to move jointly with the United States and other nuclear powers down the path of ridding mankind of nuclear weapons.

U.S. Plan Renders Nuclear War 'Virtually Impossible'

*LD0310111591 Moscow TASS in English 1038 GMT
3 Oct 91*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Andrey Surzhan-skiy]

[Text] Moscow, October 3 (TASS)—The implementation of U.S. President George Bush's last week's initiative to reduce U.S. tactical nuclear systems renders a nuclear conflict virtually impossible, Sergey Rogov, an arms control expert at the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies, told TASS.

Actually, the U.S. President's proposal envisages reductions in the two countries' nuclear weapons by 80-85 per cent, Rogov said.

For the sake of comparison, the expert recalled that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, signed by the Soviet Union and the United States two months ago, will reduce their potential by 10-15 per cent.

Touching upon the U.S. initiative's portion concerning the phasing out of MIRVed intercontinental ballistic missiles, Rogov said that the implementation of this point might rule out the danger of an accidental missile launch, rendering a disarming nuclear strike impossible. He favoured cooperation in creating a defence system safeguarding against an unsanctioned missile launch or an attack from a third side.

Rogov believes that the possibility of reducing land-based nuclear arsenal should be linked with a limitation on submarine-launched weapons, in which the United States has an advantage.

In the opinion of the Soviet expert, an immediate termination of nuclear tests by the United States is unlikely. However, Rogov added, this may become a reality in the near future in the event of the implementation of the U.S. President-suggested plan.

'Point of View' Program Examines Bush Proposal

*LD0310184891 Moscow All-Union Radio First
Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1330 GMT
3 Oct 91*

["Point of View" program, hosted by Viktor Levin, with Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, adviser to USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Levin] The theme of our conversation today is the U.S. President's initiative aimed at making considerable reductions in nuclear armaments; the significance of this proposal; what may come of all of this in the end, or at least in the foreseeable future; and the most important thing, it seems to me, or at least a very important thing—to determine why this initiative became possible.

Taking part in our broadcast today is Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, adviser to USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, and I will address my first question to him: What made this unilateral step by the U.S. President possible in our world and why did it take place at this time?

[Zagladin] Viktor Nikolayevich, may I broaden your question by adding one more word and making the question read possible and essential?

[Levin] I am happy to accept that.

[Zagladin] This is the point: Bush's initiative is, on the one hand, a continuation of the long-term logic of the development of our relations with the United States and those debates and discussions that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and George Bush have held between them of late. When the treaty on strategic offensive weapons had been signed, the question then naturally arose of what was to happen next. This subject was discussed in conversations, letters, and telephone calls. The intentions to move forward did exist and still do, both in connection with strategic offensive weapons and tactical nuclear weapons.

Let me continue: In practice, there have recently been discussions on how to approach tactical nuclear weapons—to carry out unilateral reductions, or to conclude some sort of overall agreement, taking into account the fact that several states possess these weapons. So this was not something totally unexpected but the continuation of a certain logic. This logic—our gradual movement along the path of really reducing nuclear weapons—made this initiative possible.

But I think the proposal was made essential by other circumstances. I think that events in our country—in particular the 19 August coup d'etat, which panicked many Western politicians who were aware of the danger of the situation which could arise if our nuclear weapons got out of control or fell into the hands of various, including possibly irresponsible, elements—played a very great role.

[Levin] Our military men and our defense minister assert that there was no possibility of this danger developing, but nevertheless the situation itself gave reason for this problem to be discussed and for some serious thinking.

[Zagladin] And you know, Viktor Nikolayevich, in the West, in particular DIE ZEIT carried a long article which gave details, on the basis of conversations with our military men, of what measures were taken, what was done, and how it was done. It caused serious anxiety. It caused serious anxiety and raised the question of how one could protect oneself from such things. Well, OK, appropriate additional measures are being taken in our country to control them, but the situation is 100-percent effective in terms of strategic weapons because they are in the hands of a single command and are reliably defended, stored, and so on. Tactical nuclear assets are, naturally, in the arsenals of individual units and formations. There, of course, control is not so strict.

[Levin] Consequently, they are at the disposal of the commander of the particular unit, to a certain extent at least.

[Zagladin] To a certain extent, yes, because naturally the overall command to use nuclear weapons is not issued by the commander of a unit, but from that point on he has greater freedom of initiative, if you would.

It was apparently these circumstances which made people give this some thought. The actual direction of the thinking had been set earlier because the ideas already existed. But the question was how to do it. And here, I think, the U.S. President and his close entourage—because this question was considered and discussed in a very small circle—came to the conclusion that it was possible to take such a step.

It was possible because there is virtually no danger of war between us and the United States now, and practically no danger of nuclear war in general. There is no intention of attacking each other. On the other hand, there is a real need to reduce the risk of uncontrolled actions or events which could give rise to the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons. I think this is the reason which made this initiative essential for Bush.

[Levin] Is it also essential for us? That question is also coming up.

[Zagladin] I think it is, for the simple reason that, first, we ourselves announced the idea of a nuclear-free world. That is our strategic long-term goal. And such a major step in this direction is in full accord with our interests and our intentions. Second, if we now intend to carry out a reform of the Army—and this is already actively under way, as the draft has already been handed to the Supreme Soviet. [sentence as heard] In connection with a reduction in the numerical size of the Army, there will be a reduction in the number of weapons. Therefore we ourselves should have raised the question of the need to

reduce nuclear weapons, including tactical ones, since strategic weapons fall under the bilateral treaties signed with the Americans.

Third, there was also the problem of the development of events in the Union and instability in certain regions where this tactical nuclear weaponry is located. This question also came up. Therefore it is natural that our president immediately gave a positive assessment of this idea. In general some of our thoughts have already been elaborated on how specifically and within what timetable we could respond to it.

[Levin] Vadim Valentinovich, what you are saying explains very much of the behavior of the United States and the reaction, the first reaction, of the Soviet Union. Don't you think that to a certain extent—if not to a decisive extent—that such a step by the Americans became possible as a result of the serious changes for the better in the international atmosphere as a whole—the implementation of the policy of new thinking and those changes? You said no one intends to attack anyone, and evidently this is the key phrase in the present international situation.

[Zagladin] You are right, Viktor Nikolayevich. I was simply trying to say the same thing using different words when I spoke about the logic of our talks, about the progress along the path of nuclear disarmament.

[Levin] I was simply following old habits and wanted you to say more about our initiatives. [both laugh]

[Zagladin] You know, as far as our initiatives are concerned, they played a major role in this matter, too, because the most important thing today, in these days as Bush's idea is being discussed, is that one is particularly reminded about the initiative made in January 1986 for a nuclear-free world. At that time the Americans totally rejected it. But now Bush himself is gradually coming to the same conclusion and he is moving in that direction, although of course there are still some major stockpiles of nuclear weapons left. So you are right about our initiatives. They played a major role.

But speaking frankly there is something I regret: that this initiative was not put forward by us.

[Levin] The thing I like about the answers Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev gave to the questions from his press aide—which were made public in his television interview immediately after the announcement of Bush's initiative—what I liked was that Mikhail Sergeyevich said: We will equalize the tally. He let it be understood—or at least this is how I understood it—that in the final analysis it is not so important who took a particular step first, since the very logic of events, the logic of the development of bilateral events from Reykjavik to Malta and so on and so on—and in this list there are, of course, other events. [sentence as heard]

Our broadcast is being aired on a very noteworthy day, the first anniversary of German unification. Many

people in our country—I would not say they were ill-intentioned, perhaps they were sincere—considered and perhaps still believe that the unification of Germany creates a threat to us. [passage omitted]

[Levin] It is still possible for our side to put forward initiatives.

[Zagladin] Undoubtedly, and all the more so since in his appearance on television Mikhail Sergeyevich spoke about the banning of nuclear tests. That is also a considerable issue. As far as can be understood from the latest contacts with leaders of other Western countries who were in Moscow, in general the majority of them are very sympathetic toward an initiative to halt nuclear tests. So this issue is cooking, as the saying goes. It is still cooking. It is not yet cooked, but it is cooking.

[Levin] Were these people who do not possess nuclear weapons, or do they include some who possess nuclear weapons?

[Zagladin] Both, including those who have them on their territory and those who possess them. In general, this matter is gradually coming to maturity, but of course it will still take time.

But as far as Germany is concerned, I agree with you that the past year in itself has dispelled the fears that had been expressed. [passage omitted]

[Levin] Vadim Valentinovich, returning to the issue of nuclear weapons, I would also like to touch upon the issue of a nonproliferation regime. In my view this is now becoming even more important. We really have concluded a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive nuclear arms with the Americans. We are moving toward the elimination of tactical nuclear arms. Medium- and short-range missiles have already been eliminated. The nuclear superpowers are moving, without rushing, at a fairly steady pace, but at the same time consistently toward a significant reduction in their nuclear potential. This reduction is so significant that at this time the concept of a nonnuclear world is already taking on a fairly solid outline.

Along with this, there is "x" number of so-called near nuclear powers and there are, to put it delicately, one or two nuclear powers which are saying...well, let us wait. Things have not yet reached us. One can understand them to a certain extent, but if they are planning at some point to join in, then the issue here is purely technical in nature. But those near-nuclear powers—this is a most alarming situation.

[Zagladin] Yes, absolutely. This, by the way, is an issue which has been discussed for some time now. It has been discussed within the framework of our bilateral negotiations, including talks with the United States, Great Britain, the FRG, Italy, and France. This issue is worrying everyone now, especially in light of the Gulf crisis and the discoveries which are being made in Iraq. This topic is also being discussed at NATO. Specifically they

are discussing what kinds of measures can be taken to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the technologies which can be used for their production.

A serious discussion is under way, and the problem itself is very significant. But nonnuclear powers sometimes use the following arguments: You are telling us all this, but you yourselves have the weapons and will not let us have them. So it is as if there is an element here of not enjoying equal rights. Well, I generally do not accept this argument because it is not possible to measure the equal rights of states by the presence of the means of destruction for the planet. The equality of rights which we want to achieve lies in the absence of these means. I think that in this sense our Soviet- American process of reducing nuclear weapons and George Bush's initiative are the arguments which prove to near-nuclear powers and those who aspire to be one that our intentions are serious and that we are indeed planning to embark upon this path, in other words not to increase but to cut them to the minimum.

By the way, proceeding from the same initiative put forward by the U.S. President, in the United States itself some very influential people, including Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate committee on nuclear issues [as heard], and Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, are saying that we should think about further immediate cuts in strategic weapons. It is through these intentions of ours that we can really prove that we want to go in this direction. If, by the way, we managed to agree on nuclear testing, it would be one more step in the direction of showing our good intentions, the intentions of the present nuclear club, and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, because naturally it is difficult to create a weapon without tests.

[Levin] Vadim Valentinovich, for a number of years at arms control negotiations—as they called them—the Americans have been putting this issue like this: trust first and then disarmament. We were saying disarmament itself would lead to trust. But now we are enjoying trust and disarmament is taking place. How would you assess the trust factor in the present development of Soviet-U.S. relations, first and foremost, and relations between the Soviet Union and other nuclear powers as a whole?

[Zagladin] Yes, I think that this used to be and continues to be an extremely important factor. If we were to look back to the past, literally for just a minute, we would remember that our first significant initiative, which came out in 1985-1986, was received with a certain amount of skepticism in the West. It was not because of their contents. Some people thought that a plan to get rid of all nuclear states was utopian.

But other proposals were received with skepticism because our initiatives began to be trusted only after we withdrew our troops from Afghanistan, showed real respect for our eastern [as heard] neighbors, and so on and so forth. So generally speaking, trust developed on

the basis of actions, and this affected the process of destruction, without a doubt.

In the future this process of trust, of strengthening trust, and the process of expanding the atmosphere of trust should be just as significant, because even with all the trust that exists now—and even the partnership about which we are speaking nowadays—some elements of distrust still exist. They continue to exist in political circles to some extent, and especially in public opinion. This factor cannot be disregarded. Take the fears expressed in our own public opinions regarding Germany and the comments published by some of our newspapers which were almost suspicious of President Bush's proposals. All this speaks to the fact that distrust continues to exist, and politicians cannot come to terms with this fact.

The same issue exists in the United States. It may sound like a paradox but at present there is perhaps less distrust in the United States toward us than there is in our country toward them.

[Levin] Perhaps they have a broader view of the world, or it may be that they were blinded less by the old propaganda framework. They had the opportunity to consider a broader spectrum of information.

[Zagladin] That is true, but everyone was misled. Let us not hide this fact from ourselves. The fact that each side was misled helped to ensure that the other side was misled. That was a reciprocal process. But now, on the contrary, the process of eliminating these blinders is under way. But I am speaking about deepening and broadening the atmosphere of trust. Why? Because, well, take something as simple as this: Disarmament has begun. The Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] restrictions are being dealt with; they are gradually being removed. But this is proceeding slowly. Why? Because distrust still exists. They ask: What if this is used to create some new death-dealing weapon?

[Levin] Excuse me for interrupting, Vadim Valentinovich, but do you think the stumbling block in Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] is not economic—not the fear of giving a potential competitor some technology which could then be used to the detriment of the party who gave the technology—but precisely the issue of the military threat, or military distrust?

[Zagladin] You know, as far as we are concerned, I think military mistrust is still playing a part. We still have a very long way to go before becoming a country that can compete with the United States.

[Levin] Let us hope it does happen at some point!

[Zagladin] We will get there. As far as the other aspect of the matter is concerned, the Cocom instruments have sometimes been used and continue to be used by the United States to battle Western competitors. I could give

you a list of contracts which would have been very advantageous to us and France, Belgium, Italy, and West Germany, for instance, but which could not be concluded because of Cocom restrictions. These are deals worth hundreds of millions [not further specified]. I will not give you the list now, it would take too long.

So there is this aspect of the matter, but it does not for the moment affect what we are talking about. Coming back to the issue of trust: Trust is something that must of course be applied more broadly in the economic sphere as well. What is holding things back here? It is said that no one has the money we need. That is true, generally speaking, but the main point is not that we need money now. We need something quite different. We need stimuli for the development of our economy—not just a cash stimulus, but also the knowhow, organizational stimuli, and so forth. It is not the shortage of cash that is holding things up but rather distrust over what is happening in our country, the level of stability, and the ability of our economic organism to survive. Here the restoration of trust depends on us ourselves. I have already said that in the spheres of foreign policy and disarmament trust was born from action. It is exactly the same in all other areas, including the economy. So trust must increase. But to that end we have to work inside the country, and we also need new action in the international arena.

[Levin] Vadim Valentinovich, a final question. How do you think the implementation of these Bush initiatives and our own probable response will influence stabilization inside the country, above all economic stabilization?

[Zagladin] You know, as far as stabilization in general is concerned, I think this will play a positive role because, generally, you know that a number of republics have declared that they want to become nuclear-free. The removal of tactical nuclear weapons from those territories will be a step in that direction. Elements of trust inside the country will grow.

As far as the economic aspect of matters is concerned, it is a contradictory subject. The destruction of nuclear weapons requires money. We already know this from our experience with medium- and short-range weapons. This will lead to savings later, but initially it costs a lot of money. There is a certain contradiction here. Nevertheless, taking things as a whole, this reduction in the level of the military threat, of the nuclear threat, of nuclear weapons, is of course a factor which will promote stability both in the world and in every country, particularly nuclear countries.

[Levin] My thanks to Professor Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, adviser to the USSR president, for taking part in our program.

Bovin Calls Nuclear-Free World 'Utopian'

PM0310223091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Oct 91 Union Edition p 6

[Aleksandr Bovin "Political Observer's Opinion":
"Nuclear Disarmament—From Utopia to Politics"]

[Text] Last week U.S. President G. Bush came up with far-reaching proposals to cut the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. In my view, the G. Bush proposals should be adopted in principle. And we should immediately start talks to clarify some uncertainties, specify some details, and avoid any pitfalls.

At the same time, it would be useful to return to the overall concept of nuclear disarmament once proposed by the Soviet Union. I am referring to the idea of phased progress toward a "nuclear-free world"—which has again been mentioned in connection with the G. Bush initiatives. "Nuclear-free world..." Those words are so familiar and have been said so often that we hardly seem to notice them. Yet they really provide food for thought. Thought about whether the total and universal elimination of nuclear weapons is realistic and in line with the country's security interests.

Let's think about it.

One obvious positive result of perestroika is the gradual way in which our awareness has been cleansed and freed of all kinds of illusory, mythological ideas about ourselves and the outside world. We have gotten rid of all the chimeras, utopian ideas, and false orientations which had led us into a dead end. This process of spiritual self-cleansing is difficult and hard—we have grown so accustomed to soothing, reassuring, and simplistic mirages. And yet things are moving; both our awareness, our world view, and our behavior are changing and becoming more realistic.

If we look at our behavior in the international arena and our approach to foreign policy tasks, it seems that, when analyzing military-strategic parity, we have already given up comparing our potential with that of the rest of the world. We seem to have realized that our officers and men have no business either in Afghanistan or indeed in Ethiopia, Iraq, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Judging by everything, we have finally grasped—if not completely as yet—that the demands for verification, transparency, "open skies," and so forth, which the Americans were always pressing upon us, are entirely natural and necessary.

And now, in my view, we are mature enough—or are becoming mature enough—to tell ourselves and our partners that total nuclear disarmament is impractical, at least within the visible historical horizon. The vision of a nuclear-free world by the year 2000—or by the year 2017—is nothing more than a typical case of utopia.

And a harmful and dangerous kind of utopia. I fear that if we remove and scrap our nuclear weapons, thereby abandoning the nuclear deterrent, we will feel highly

uncomfortable. Or we will lay ourselves open to pre-nuclear level military adventures.

A few years ago I used up quite a lot of time and paper demonstrating the opposite—finding arguments to confirm the possibility that nuclear potentials could be destroyed by the year 2000. Analyzing those arguments now, I can see that they in turn were based on a general and, once again, utopian premise. It was assumed that in the next 10-15 years the entire system of international relations would be fundamentally renewed, democratized, and demilitarized—which would create the conditions for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

This premise was clearly false. And this should indeed have been realized even when the USSR was submitting its latest proposals on universal and total disarmament to the United Nations. All the more so when M.S. Gorbachev's famous statement was published. But the ingrained habit of supporting the leadership's words and actions, the majesty and humanity of the goal, and, ultimately, our own desire to rid ourselves, our children, and our grandchildren of the nuclear threat forever all militated against a strictly scientific and sober analysis free of any deforming influences.

Now there are far fewer obstacles. And we have gotten a bit smarter too. At the end of the 20th century and for a long time to come we will be surrounded by an extremely contradictory, turbulent, and rapidly changing world whose surprises will not always be nice ones. Strengthening the potential for mutual trust between ourselves and the West, and eradicating many conflict situations could indeed—as the East Europe experience and our own experience demonstrate—be accompanied by the emergence of new conflicts and "hot spots." It is still hard to say anything definite about the future foreign policy of the new great powers of the 21st century (South Africa or Brazil, for instance, Indonesia or India), much less about the powers striving to match them (Iraq, say, or Iran). Under these circumstances, I repeat, the nuclear security guarantee will not be out of place.

Moreover, everything indicates that there is no chance of "persuading" the United States, the PRC, Britain, and France to eliminate their own nuclear arsenals. No chance. Consequently, strategic nuclear weapons—unlike tactical weapons (although there are questions about this too)—will remain in service for a long time to come.

I share the opinion of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev that we should remove the thesis of the need for nuclear disarmament and ignore the achievement of a nuclear-free world as a practical task for our foreign policy. The real task is to create conditions in which nuclear weapons will never be used.

It would be useful to discuss with the Americans the question of what could be the minimum nuclear deterrent (given the ideas of "unacceptable damage," the potential of ABM defenses, the existence of nuclear

weapons in the hands of third powers, the chain reaction of uncontrollable consequences, and so forth).

Obviously, if a weapon exists it will inevitably be improved. A ban on modernization is unrealistic. What is realistic is an agreement which would lay down stringent and verifiable rules for modernization. Hence it follows that an end to nuclear testing is just as utopian as a complete ban on nuclear weapons. Testing should continue. But we can and must agree to reduce threshold yields [porogovaya moshchnost] and cut the number of tests. Given the current and growing level of mutual trust it is entirely possible to imagine groups of inspectors attending tests, or even joint use of test ranges.

In general, mankind will live in the nuclear world for a long time to come. But a ramified system of mutual commitments between the nuclear powers could make that life more peaceful. To claim that anything more is possible would be to deceive ourselves and others.

It seems to me that against this conceptual backdrop it will be easier to hold businesslike talks geared to real results with the Americans—and not only with them. Against this backdrop preventing nuclear nonproliferation becomes of particular, prime importance. That is the main danger.

Costs of Nuclear Disarmament Discussed

PM0710151191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 Oct 91 p 4

[By correspondent V. Linnik: "The Disarmament Race Costs a Lot of Money. But Why Do Our Politicians Remain Silent About This?"]

[Text] New York—The radical proposal to reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal that President Bush made in his radio address to the U.S. people last Friday [27 September] is, of course, the number one news item in the U.S. mass media.

The form by which Bush chose to make his proposal public also caused a sensation. Gorbachev and Yeltsin learned of the U.S. President's plans from a brief telephone conversation with him Friday morning. The day before this conversation with the White House, however, Gorbachev held a meeting in Moscow with Dzh. Collins [initial as transliterated], U.S. charge d'affaires ad interim in the USSR, who briefed him on the main details of Bush's impending initiative. There were no preliminary contacts at embassy or expert level. The minimal U.S. press leaks on this do not alter the crux of the matter. Bush's initiative clearly shows that when it suits a state to do something, it can quite easily do it unilaterally without waiting for—indeed, bypassing—the lengthy, wearisome procedure of bilateral or multilateral talks.

It is clear that the U.S. President's ideas have been floated for a while in the U.S. corridors of power, but this

does not reduce the drama of the event. What considerations guided the White House in its phenomenal decision? They must be extremely weighty at the very least. The first consideration concerns the situation in our country since the collapse of the August putsch. For the umpteenth time in the last few weeks, everything in our country has happened in line with the well known expression: Every cloud has a silver lining. The breakup of the USSR and the fears over the fate of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, above all the tactical arsenal—which could fall into the hands of irresponsible politicians or terrorists—compelled the administration to take dramatic steps. The U.S. press puts it bluntly: It was the quality of the current political situation in the Soviet Union, fraught with unpredictable consequences, that prompted the U.S. President to take rapid action. Naturally, Bush made his cuts conditional upon responsive actions from the USSR. The sooner the Soviet leadership eliminates the same quantities of the tactical weapons scattered over the territory of virtually all the former Soviet republics, the better. For all its long-standing talk of support for national self-determination, the administration is clearly not delighted over the prospect of getting 15 nuclear states instead of one. Today one of the top-priority tasks in U.S. foreign policy is to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons as fast as possible before the situation in the USSR gets out of control once and for all.

Domestic political and economic considerations were the second extremely important factor influencing Bush's decision. Bush is making his initiative in the hope of avoiding more radical cuts in the U.S. arsenal—that was how THE NEW YORK TIMES summed up this aspect of the President's logic. The sentiment has long been growing in the United States in favor of a 50-percent cut in the military budget and nuclear arsenals in view of the final laying to rest of the "cold war" and the Soviet threat. At any rate, that is the proportion of the budget and arsenals that people think the decades-long confrontation with the United States' former enemy number one accounts for. In his speech the President confirmed that the U.S. military budget will be reduced by one-fourth. In proposing to reduce radically the U.S. nuclear arsenal, he is thus anticipating criticism and pressure from opponents in favor of more substantial cuts. It is expected that his program for eliminating weapons will make it possible to save nearly \$5 billion in each of the coming five years. That cannot, of course, be compared with the demand voiced by 40 percent of Americans that the Pentagon budget of almost \$300 billion be halved.

Finally, one cannot help but draw attention to the crux of the U.S. proposals. Mobile strategic missile programs are being canceled, and this is being done in the hope that it will prove possible to keep untouched the B-2 bomber program and the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] program, which are being increasingly criticized by legislators. The U.S. President is determined to carry through

SDI in its entirety—despite the extremely illusory military necessity of such a program and the fact that its implementation may jeopardize the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

The U.S. initiatives, the press here notes, are drawn up in such a way that the United States will have to destroy only 500 warheads on its MIRVed strategic missiles. We will have to destroy roughly 2,500, an extremely costly process. The Americans alone will have to spend \$0.5 billion on destroying nuclear arsenals. Naturally, we will have to spend far more. I was told by a high-ranking USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman that the disarmament race also costs plenty of money.

Gorbachev Offers Response to Bush Initiative

Addresses Nation

LD0510224391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2040 GMT 5 Oct 91

[Address to the nation by USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow on 5 October—recorded]

[Text] Dear compatriots, a week ago U.S. President George Bush put forward an important initiative on nuclear weapons. This initiative confirms that a new way of thinking has been widely supported by the world community. George Bush's proposals are a worthy continuation of the drive started in Reykjavik. This is my principled opinion. I know that Boris Yeltsin and leaders of other republics share this opinion. In this statement I will announce our reciprocal steps and countermeasures.

In the field of tactical nuclear weapons, the following actions will be taken: All nuclear artillery munitions and nuclear warheads for tactical missiles are being eliminated. Nuclear warheads for surface-to-air missiles are being removed from the forces, concentrated at central bases, and some are being eliminated. All nuclear mines are being eliminated. All tactical nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from surface ships and from multipurpose submarines. These weapons and also nuclear weapons of the Navy's land-based aviation are to be stored in central storage bases. Part of it is to be eliminated. Thus, the Soviet Union and the United States are taking reciprocal radical measures leading to the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, we propose to the United States that the Navy's tactical nuclear weapons be eliminated totally on a reciprocal basis. Also on a reciprocal basis, it would be possible to withdraw from military units and fronts and from tactical aviation all nuclear warheads, aerial bombs, air-launched missiles and to place them in central storage bases. The USSR calls upon other nuclear powers to join in these far-reaching USSR-U.S. steps on tactical nuclear weapons.

Like the U.S. President, I support the earliest possible ratification of the strategic offensive arms treaty. This question is being submitted for examination to the first session of the new membership of the USSR Supreme

Soviet. In view of the unilateral measures on strategic offensive arms announced by President Bush, we are taking the following action: Our heavy bombers, like those of the United States, will not be kept on combat footing, and their nuclear weapons will be stored at military depots. We are discontinuing the development of a modified short-range nuclear missile for Soviet heavy bombers. We are discontinuing the USSR's development of a mobile small-size ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]. We shall not be building up the quantity of launching facilities for railway-based ICBM's. The modernization of these missiles will not be carried out over and above those we already have. Thus the number of our mobile ICBM's with individually aimed separable warheads will not be increased. All our railway ICBM's will be kept at the places where they are permanently based. As a reciprocal step, we are removing from combat duty 503 ICBM's, including 134 ICBM's with individually aimed separable warheads. We have already removed from our combat forces three atomic missile submarines with 44 launching facilities and are removing three more submarines with 48 missiles with their launching facilities.

We have adopted the decision to make deeper cuts in our strategic offensive weapons than the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Weapons envisages. As a result, when the seven-year period of cuts is up, the number of strategic nuclear warheads in our country will be 5,000 units, not 6,000 units, as outlined by the treaty. Of course, we would welcome an analogous approach on the part of the United States. We propose to the United States that immediately following the ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, intensive talks on further radical cuts in strategic offensive weapons, approximately by 50 percent, be begun. We are ready to discuss the U.S. proposals on non-nuclear anti-missile defense systems. We propose to the U.S. side that the possibility of creating joint systems to avert nuclear missile strikes with ground- and space-based elements also be examined.

We declare that as of today, a unilateral moratorium on carrying out nuclear weapons tests will begin for a period of one year. We are relying on other nuclear powers to follow our example. A path toward the earliest and complete cessation of nuclear testing will thereby be opened up. We are in favor of reaching an agreement with the United States on the controlled cessation of the production of all fissionable weapons materials.

We express our readiness to begin detailed dialogue with the United States on the development of safe and ecologically responsible technologies for storing and transporting nuclear warheads and on methods of utilizing nuclear explosive devices and increasing nuclear safety.

With a view to enhancing the reliability of nuclear arms control, we are uniting under a single operational directorate all strategic nuclear forces and are including strategic defensive systems in a single type of armed forces.

We hope that eventually other nuclear powers will actively join the efforts of the USSR and the United States. I consider that the time has come for a joint statement by all nuclear powers on the non-first use of nuclear weapons. The USSR has long adhered firmly to this principle. I am convinced that such a step by the U.S. side would play an immense role. We are pleased to learn of the U.S. Administration's plans to reduce numbers in their Armed Forces by half a million men in the next few years. For our part, we intend to reduce the numbers of our Armed Forces by 700,000 men.

In conclusion, I want to stress the following: By acting thus—in one instance unilaterally, in another on reciprocal courses, and in a third by means of negotiations—we are decisively moving the disarmament process forward, thereby approaching the aim that was proclaimed as long ago as the beginning of 1986: a nuclear-free world, a safer and more stable world. There is much work here for governments, experts, and departments. We are talking about a new phase in one of the main directions of international development.

Evidently, the question also arises of a new USSR-U.S. summit. I have been speaking to U.S. President George Bush. I told him about our countersteps in connection with his initiative. At the same time, I voiced proposals for a summit meeting. There was a good exchange of views. He gave me a positive assessment of our proposals, and stated his satisfaction with how we are acting and addressing some of the most major issues in world politics.

Thank you. All the best.

'Full Text' of Statement

*LD0510210191 Moscow TASS in English 2054 GMT
5 Oct 91*

["Full text" of statement made by President Mikhail Gorbachev on Soviet television on 5 October]

[Text] Moscow October 5 TASS—Follows the full text of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's statement made on Soviet television on Saturday:

"Dear compatriots,

"A week ago, U.S. President George Bush put forward an important initiative on nuclear weapons.

"This initiative confirms that new thinking has been widely supported by the world community. George Bush's proposals continue the drive started in Reykjavik. This is my opinion. I know that Boris Yeltsin and leaders of other republics share this opinion.

"In this statement, I will announce our reciprocal steps and counter-measures.

"First. The following steps will be made as regards tactical nuclear weapons:

- All nuclear artillery ammunition and nuclear warheads for tactical missiles will be destroyed.

- Nuclear warheads of anti-aircraft missiles will be removed from the Army and stored in central bases. Part of them will be destroyed. All nuclear mines will be eliminated.

- All tactical nuclear weapons will be removed from surface ships and multipurpose submarines. These weapons, as well as weapons from ground-based naval aviation will be stored. Part of them will be destroyed.

"Thus, the Soviet Union and the United States are taking reciprocal radical measures leading to the elimination of tactical weapons.

"Moreover, we propose that the United States remove on a reciprocal basis from the Navy and destroy tactical nuclear weapons. Also on a reciprocal basis, we could remove from active units of front (tactical) aviation all nuclear ammunition (bombs and aircraft missiles) and store them.

"The Soviet Union urges other nuclear powers to join these far-reaching Soviet-U.S. measures as regards tactical weapons.

"Second. Like the U.S. President, I call for the earliest possible ratification of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons. This issue will be discussed by the first session of the Soviet Supreme Soviet of new convocation.

"Taking into account the unilateral steps on strategic offensive weapons announced by President George Bush, we will take the following measures:

- Our heavy bombers, like U.S. ones, will be removed from alert, and their nuclear weapons will be stored.

- We will stop work on a new modified short-range missile for Soviet heavy bombers.

- The Soviet Union will stop work on a mobile small-size inter-continental ballistic missile.

- We will scrap plans to make new launchers for inter-continental ballistic missiles on rail cars and modernise them. Thus, the number of mobile inter-continental ballistic missiles with multiple individually targeted warheads will not increase.

- All our inter-continental ballistic missiles on rail cars will be returned to their storage.

- We will remove from day-to-day alert status 503 inter-continental ballistic missiles, including 134 inter-continental ballistic missiles with multiple individually targeted warheads.

- We have already removed from active forces three nuclear missile submarines with 44 launchers for submarine-based ballistic missiles and three more submarines with 48 launchers are now being removed".

"Third. We will make more radical cuts in our strategic offensive weapons than the treaty on strategic offensive weapons envisages. As a result, in seven years, we will have 5,000 nuclear warheads instead of 6,000 envisaged by the treaty.

"We would welcome reciprocal steps by the United States.

"We propose that immediately after the ratification of the treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union begin negotiations on further radical cuts in strategic offensive weapons, approximately by 50 per cent.

"We are ready to discuss U.S. proposals on non-nuclear anti-aircraft systems.

"We propose to study the possibility of creating joint systems to avert nuclear missile attacks with ground- and space-based elements.

"Fourth. We declare an immediate one-year unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons tests. We hope other nuclear powers will follow this path towards the earliest possible and full cessation of nuclear testing.

"We hope to reach an agreement with the United States on a controlled cessation of the production of all fissionable materials for weapons.

"Fifth. We are ready to begin a detailed dialogue with the United States on the development of safe and ecologically clean technologies to store and transport nuclear warheads, as well as methods to utilise nuclear explosive devices and increase nuclear safety.

"To increase the safety of nuclear arms control, we put all strategic nuclear weapons under single control and include strategic defensive systems into a single armed service."

"Sixth. We hope that eventually, other nuclear powers will follow the example of the United States and the Soviet Union.

"I believe time has come for all nuclear powers to make a joint statement to keep them from making first nuclear strike. The Soviet Union has long been adherent to this principle.

"I'm convinced the United States will take vital step by making such a commitment.

"Seventh. We welcome the U.S. plans to reduce its Armed Forces by 500,000 people.

"We plan to reduce our Armed Forces by 700,000 people.

"In conclusion, I would like to stress that taking unilateral and bilateral steps and holding negotiations, we push forward the process of disarmament, approaching the goal proclaimed in early 1986—a nuclear-free, safer and more stable world.

"The governments, experts and departments will have much to do in this field. It will be a new stage of international development on one of its major directions.

"Therefore, a question about a new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting may naturally emerge. I have just had a conversation with U.S. President George Bush and told him about our reply to his initiative. We had a good discussion. The U.S. President gave a positive assessment of our proposals and expressed satisfaction with our approach towards solving key problems in world politics.

"Thank you. All the best to you."

Officials Comment on Bush Nuclear Arms Initiative

Lt Gen Manilov: 'Extremely Positive'

LD0510141791 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 5 Oct 91

[Text] The Soviet Defense Ministry is studying the initiative of the United States President George Bush to reduce nuclear armaments. Here's the view of Lieutenant General Valeriy Manilov of the Soviet Defense Ministry:

The initiative should be assessed as extremely positive and in line with our own proposals. Way back in 1986 and later, we repeatedly suggested doing something to rid humanity of nuclear weapons altogether. The Soviet program to eliminate all nuclear weapons before the year 2000 is our strategic policy. The Soviet Union has more than once declared that its Armed Forces are ready to scrap their nuclear potential on the basis of reciprocity. Our position remains the same today, too. The Soviet Union has repeatedly pointed to the need of holding talks on reducing and subsequently scrapping short-range nuclear weapons, Valeriy Manilov said.

It seems that the Soviet-American relations in the sphere of arms control have entered a new stage when a unilateral initiative based on trust in the military sphere, not on talks that at times drag on for years, help them move forward. General Manilov again:

This process is dialectical and both aspects are interconnected. It is absolutely clear that disarmament talks are needed where the parties could coordinate their positions and clear up their views, but the process may become altogether useless. Many negotiations could be held on different aspects, but to no avail. That's why the second aspect of this dialectical process is that it should be constantly filled with practical content. The Soviet Union has always borne in mind this dialectical interaction. Take our unilateral initiatives, say the armed forces reduction by half a million in 1988, or the issue of putting an end to nuclear arms testing. Unfortunately, the latter was not reflected in the initiative of the American President. The Soviet Union has made a unilateral pledge and has not carried out nuclear tests for

two years, while the other side still conducts them. This question, too, must be included on the agenda of the Soviet-American talks. The characteristic feature at the moment is that on the basis of the level of confidence reached at previous talks practical steps could be made today, even outside the framework of the treaties and agreements already signed.

Shevardnadze Praises Initiative

*LD0410112491 Moscow TASS in English 1042 GMT
4 Oct 91*

[Text] Moscow, October 4 (TASS)—Eduard Shevardnadze, head of the Soviet Foreign Policy Association, has praised U.S. President George Bush's decision to radically reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal as a move to develop and consolidate partnership and cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

He told the Soviet weekly *NEW TIMES* that this initiative would have been impossible in the past. "We have long been building this hill to get on top of it and see new inspiring perspectives," Shevardnadze said.

He said five years ago his idea of a nuclear-free world was called naive, but the U.S. President's initiative gives the world a chance to realise it now by destroying nuclear weapons.

Commenting on the U.S. decision to remove nuclear weapons from alert status and accelerate the process of arms reduction, Shevardnadze said "these are reasonable and responsible steps fitting new relations of partnership between our countries. We should support them and take reciprocal measures".

G. Arbatov Welcomes 'New Approach'

*LD0410192591 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1135 GMT 4 Oct 91*

[Text] Moscow, 4 October (TASS)—The diminishing threat of war during the last few years has occurred in the first place because the USSR and the United States have started to undertake unilateral measures in disarmament, states Academician G.A. Arbatov, director of the USA and Canada Institute.

In an interview with a TASS correspondent, the Soviet scientist welcomed President G. Bush's new approach to the problems of disarmament, emphasizing that by their character and significance they rank alongside the 1988 initiatives of President M.S. Gorbachev on the unilateral reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces by half a million and with the Soviet unilateral moratorium several years ago on carrying out nuclear tests. The unilateral measures of the USSR and the United States to lower the level of military conflict, continued Arbatov, have guaranteed the strengthening of mutual trust and have helped to overcome the buildup of technical difficulties. Such approaches have saved a lot of time, and this has played a decisive role. Slow diplomacy, along with speedy progress in establishing military technology, has resulted

in the arms control talks' tackling yesterday's problems rather than today's, and, even more so, tomorrow's.

Arbatov noted: To resolve the problems of disarmament, we first relied on talks, and important agreements were reached. I cannot escape the thought, however, that as a result of this whole process we have two and a half times more nuclear weapons than we had at the start of the talks. It is possible that this result was unavoidable. This was the model for talks during the years of the "cold war." Their aim was not to eliminate the arms race, but to direct it. Practically speaking, these talks were governed by the needs of the military-industrial complexes of the two countries.

The strategic arms talks lasted almost nine years and showed that we can no longer rely on old procedures. The world urgently needs us to seek new ways to achieve disarmament. Talks should be combined with unilateral measures on arms reduction.

The "cold war" is over, but its legacy remains and places a heavy burden on us. The most unpleasant part of this legacy is militarization—monstrous militarization. Economics, politics, and thinking have been perniciously affected by it, the director of the USA and Canada Institute thinks.

We will have a difficult time in reducing military arsenals to reasonable limits. A perverted vision of the world still prevails here. We do not realize how much we are militarized. Before World War II, the United States spent \$2 billion on the military sector per year. After the civil war, in conditions of a really hostile atmosphere, Soviet Russia had 500,000 people in its Armed Forces. Now there are about 4 million people in the USSR Armed Forces; and the U.S. military budget amounts to \$300 billion.

The 5-10 percent reductions in the armed forces are regarded now as great progress. This does not, however, meet present demands. You see, there is no real danger. In the past we were preparing for a war with a powerful enemy having an enormous Army, Air Force, Navy, and with an enormous nuclear potential. The situation has changed dramatically. Threats of local conflicts, which appear from time to time, are not in the least what threatened the world before.

Now they are talking about reducing the Armed Forces by 500,000 in the United States over the next five years and by 700,000 in the USSR. These reductions should not be the last in both countries.

I have an impression, G.A. Arbatov says, that further reductions in the USSR Armed Forces are restrained not by a military necessity but by social problems. Military expenditures we have ruined us to the extent that now we have a housing shortage problem, an absence of jobs for demobilized servicemen, and difficulties in the defense industry. An absurd situation has been created, but we should come out of it quickly and decisively. Life does not give us much time for resolving these problems.

It seems that the USSR and the United States have now embarked on the right road. I think our reply to Bush's proposals will be not only positive but also interesting, and that new, hopeful prospects will arise. We can join a reduction race to reasonable limits.

At present, rare opportunities for resolving war and peace problems in the interests of mankind are appearing, and they simply cannot be missed, Academician G.A. Arbatov stated, concluding the interview.

Kondrashov Views Arms Race, Bush Proposal

*PM0710140791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Oct 91 Union Edition p 6*

[Stanislav Kondrashov "Political Observer's Opinion":
"Arms Race and Other Troubles"]

[Text] Operational-tactical nuclear missiles have a range of up to 500 km, and the yield of their charges is comparable to the Hiroshima bomb. Nuclear artillery also belongs to the junior class of nuclear weapons called theater weapons. It sends a shell with a yield of approximately 5,000 tonnes of explosives (plus radiation) a distance of 20-30 km. In addition to these two types, U.S. President George Bush intends to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships and strike submarines, as well as those used by land-based naval aircraft.

Having unilaterally proclaimed his initiative, Bush insistently invited us to follow his example. He made it clear that with a bilateral approach, it would be far easier to implement the unilateral U.S. action. We cannot fail to respond to this invitation. We promise to respond with our own initiative in the next few days, after we have secured the necessary amplifications concerning the U.S. initiative.

So, a nuclear-free world will come about within a radius of up to 500 km from each operational-tactical missile base as soon as it ceases to exist. The complete destruction of Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, which carried their lethal load a distance of 500-5,500 km, was completed in May. If all the missiles that have been eliminated and marked for elimination were in one place, we could probably say that the nuclear-free world will soon extend over a radius of 5,500 km, while the dangerous nuclear world will remain outside the nuclear-free world, where the possessions of intercontinental missiles and strategic bombers lie.

I am one of those who do not believe in the coming of a completely nuclear-free world in the foreseeable future. But the former joint accords between the two superpowers and the present U.S. initiative, on condition that we join in with it, physically reduce to a minimum the aspect of chance in the emergence of nuclear conflicts. Just one option remains, which is patently unrealistic under the new conditions: the option of universal nuclear war.

The Bush initiative is an attempt to cut out all aspects of chance and rule out all nuclear risk options before it is too late. The former nuclear threat—from confrontation between two powers, two military blocs, and two political worlds—has vanished. The United States can fearlessly remove all its nuclear means from the periphery of the Soviet borders—above all from Europe, from Germany. At the same time, however, it is thinking primarily of another, new nuclear risk connected with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the lack of 100-percent guarantees of control over Soviet nuclear weapons. They are sited, if you take strategic systems, in four republics that have become sovereign states and, if you take tactical systems, in almost all the military districts of the once rigidly centralized power.

Previously, a frightening threat proceeded from a force not accountable to any democratic institutions, concentrated in the Politburo and at the mysterious top of the military-industrial complex. Now, alas, it proceeds from the growing impotence of the former Moscow center and from the increasing impossibility of keeping control in the same hands. This is a case where it is easier to drive the nuclear jinni into the bottle with one practiced hand than with several hands that do not know how to deal with him.

Of course, Bush is reckoning on a "peace dividend" from the elimination of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. But he is thinking still more about the urgent removal of the Soviet tactical nuclear systems and of all the risks associated with them. And about a new sharp reduction in the Soviet strategic nuclear arms. Although the corresponding treaty was signed just two months ago and has not yet been ratified, the time-out, or "respite," in the 10-year talks marathon has come to an end. Bush is in a hurry, having proposed his broad initiatives, and he is inviting us to hurry, awaiting "equally bold steps from the Soviet side."

A disarmament race, you might say—and it is a race against time. In proposing an accelerated pace, Washington is trying to anticipate the possible negative consequences of the process of the Soviet Union's disintegration and to resolve tasks that might prove insoluble tomorrow.

We have our own emergency system of priorities. We have our hands full with the economy and politics on the eve of winter. The Americans, however, are pushing us, as it were, in a different and not necessarily parallel direction and are promoting their own system of priorities in our relations, which once again puts nuclear disarmament at the head of the agenda. It is perfectly possible that they will link its acceptance to their own assistance and that of the whole West in easing our critical position.

It cannot be said that Washington does not believe the statements of Mikhail Gorbachev or Boris Yeltsin about the maintenance of effective control over Soviet nuclear arms. People there know that not only strategic but also

tactical combat supplies even in general-purpose divisions are guarded by special subunits and are kept in special dumps. There has not yet been a single case where "even" a quarter-liter bottle of Hiroshima in the form of any nuclear shell has fallen into the hands of one criminal or another.

However, Nursultan Nazarbayev speaks of his own share in control over the military atom. Kiev is speaking now of a nuclear-free status, now of the right to vote on the nuclear weapons sited in the Ukraine. The longer the list of authoritative deponents and the options set forth by them, the more strongly the worm of doubt gnaws at the strategists in Washington. The greater is their desire to "drop" the maximum number of nuclear warheads as quickly as possible, while the remains of the Moscow center maintain, together with Russia, the unity of the Armed Forces and are still in practical charge of nuclear arsenals of monstrous force. God helps those who help themselves, if they protect themselves as well as possible against all kinds of consequences of such a unique historic cataclysm as the collapse of a nuclear superpower.

Incidentally, it is impossible to extract precise data on the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons from our military, not because they continue to keep things secret but because here too there is confusion.

There is no doubt that we will meet the Americans half way, particularly as the Soviet side previously raised the question of eliminating tactical systems more persistently than the U.S. side. In addition, in our present state of disunity and changing authorities the political influence of Washington's White House on the new republic centers of power quite frequently proves more acceptable and more persuasive than the influence of the Kremlin. The Americans also sense this, take it into account, and use it to restrain our centrifugal trends as far as possible. Moreover, the aforementioned carrot of economic assistance is very attractive in their hands.

We will meet the Americans—and ourselves—half way, but certain amplifications are needed, about which informed circles are now speaking. First, it is a question of some dates. The economic crisis, the excessive strain over finances, and the overall situation of political instability, alas, prevent the taking of "bold steps." Before you profit from disarmament, you have to spend a fair amount on it. This paradox on the way to the "peace dividend" is less painful in the United States.

Second, to what extent must the elimination of theater weapons be carried out, and how much of their stockpiles? The Bush initiative proposes both options but does not specify more precise numbers.

Probably most questions—and objections—are elicited by Bush's proposal for new reductions in strategic nuclear arms; namely for the destruction of ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic missiles] with multiple reentry vehicles in the two powers' arsenals. It clearly promises the United States a unilateral advantage, since the

majority of the U.S. multiple-charge ICBM's are on submarines and are not covered by this proposal. In this option it is mainly Soviet ground-launched missiles—the chief constituent part of our strategic arsenal—that are to be reduced.

Disputed issues will be a topic of the discussion which is on the point of beginning and which will make much quicker progress than the well-known Geneva talks. There is no longer any rivalry between the two powers on the way to an agreement.

Commentator Rebuts Detractors of Bush Plan

PM0710153991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Oct 91 First Edition p 2

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observer Aleksandr Golts commentary: "Topic of the Week. Rendezvous With Disarmament"]

[Text] U.S. President G. Bush's sensational nuclear disarmament proposals last Friday [27 September] were undoubtedly this week's main international event. The U.S. initiative generated a real avalanche of statements, rejoinders, and commentaries, the overwhelming majority of which were positive. Britain and France stated their intention of getting rid of tactical nuclear weapons. Dozens of countries voiced their approval. Even Pyongyang, where people are traditionally in no hurry to agree with U.S. proposals, saw the U.S. initiatives as a chance to strengthen security on the Korean peninsula.

Needless to say, the main question, however, is how the Soviet Union will respond, as it is the country to which the U.S. initiatives are primarily geared. I cannot agree with those reproaching M.S. Gorbachev for not detailing a package of countermeasures immediately. The problems at issue are too deep-seated. In the current situation, it is not only a question of our country's political readiness to follow the U.S. example. It is also a question of whether we will keep up with the pace of disarmament proposed by Bush in conditions of a self-disintegrating economy.

There are also questions about preserving the strategic balance. The United States is suggesting talks on eliminating MIRVed intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM's], for instance. But it is only referring to ground-launched ICBM's, leaving naval missiles aside. Nor has it raised what the USSR considers to be the key question of suspending nuclear tests. And, if we are talking about U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, some of these will remain untouched in Europe because they are deployed with the Air Force. There are also other difficult questions which, at the very least, need to be clarified by specialists. People in Washington have reacted with understanding to our suggestions that in-depth consultations be held. There are no doubts that the Soviet Union will formulate and make its response.

At the same time some of Bush's approaches and proposals over the last few days cannot help but cause amazement. They were staggeringly reminiscent of the situation described 150 years ago in the article "Russian Man at a Rendezvous." The crux of this is that some Romeos are very lively when given a chance to walk with a lady on their arm and to philosophize about the eternal. But the subject of their advances only has to take them seriously and, God forbid, reciprocate their admirer to become immediately flustered and, within minutes, shower recriminations upon the unfortunate woman. How could she by her recognition put him in such an awkward position? A situation in which it is necessary to act and take responsibility for these actions?

How much has been written and how much has been said about our passionate longing for the United States to support us in our desire for nuclear disarmament! How much have the leaders of the sovereign republics said about their desire to see them as nuclear-free states, and now we have U.S. initiatives. That is not enough. Washington appeals directly to the republics. What is their response? Only B.N. Yeltsin has given a clear-cut positive reaction. The others have kept quiet or issued statements that do their leaders' diplomatic skills credit, but fail to clarify the situation.

Thus, speaking at the United Nations, L. Kravchuk, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet chairman, spoke approvingly of the Bush initiative. The Ukraine's position, if we are to believe TASS, is this: "We proceed on the premise that the presence of nuclear weapons within the Ukraine is a transitory phenomenon. Their elimination and the elimination of basing components is a matter of time." So, does the Ukrainian leadership agree to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons on its territory or not? As we can see, there was no clear-cut response. But, just as no one has ever managed to be slightly pregnant, so a republic cannot be slightly nuclear-free.

Now we come to a very difficult question. However we may curse nuclear weapons, it has already turned out that ownership of these weapons was the USSR's main attribute as a great power. Let me offer the hypothesis that some people today want to enhance their status in relations with the outside world through their ownership of these weapons—and, perhaps, in relations with other republics.

I think that this is a dangerous delusion. Our country has a chance to use the period of disarmament (that is, the period when the West is willing to cooperate with us on the basis not of economic interests but for considerations of its own security) to revive all the republics. But this is only possible if there is a clear-cut concerted decision regarding the future of nuclear weapons. If anyone intends to compete over nuclear arsenals, they risk their reputation in the eyes of the whole world and—and this is the main thing—they risk the security of their own people.

It cannot be denied that the U.S. proposals provide another incentive for finding a way out of an extremely complex situation together. After all, everyone now is concerned that the USSR's tactical weapons may, to put it mildly, fall into the wrong hands in unstable conditions. For that reason Washington is directly prompting us to eliminate these weapons. It is acting in the interests of its own security. But I definitely do not agree with those people who seek a dirty tricks campaign here. After all, a concerted decision to eliminate tactical nuclear arsenals is primarily in our own interests. If we are unable to take this opportunity, will we resemble not Ivanushka the simpleton, but the peasant from the well-known proverb who bolts the stable door after the horse has bolted? Will we be able to bolt the stable door if the horse bolts?

I am reluctant to talk seriously about the opinions that if the USSR responds positively to the United States, it will be acting at "Washington's bidding." A sense of grievance that someone has left us behind in making peace initiatives looks painfully childish. Incidentally, we have frequently mooted the idea of a global tactical zero and cuts in sea-based nuclear weapons. In effect, the United States has now picked up the impetus.

The Soviet Union and the sovereign republics are currently going through a difficult period. If disarmament brings peace dividends, it will not be today or tomorrow. But there is no other way. I want to believe that all political forces in our country will act in a dignified manner at the next rendezvous with disarmament, a rendezvous to which we did not hand out the invitations.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Analyzes Bush Proposals

*PM0910090991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Oct 91 First Edition p 2*

["Own Information" report under the "Our Information" rubric: "What Is Being Destroyed and What Will Remain"]

[Text] At the request of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's readers, we are announcing some of the details of the quantitative aspect of the unilateral U.S. initiatives on tactical nuclear weapons and strategic offensive systems. These figures were provided by U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney and General C. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at a Pentagon briefing.

Ground-Launched Tactical Nuclear Weapons

The United States is dismantling and destroying all nuclear shells and tactical missile warheads sited both abroad and on U.S. territory.

In total roughly 2,150 units of the following munitions will be subject to elimination: 850 warheads for two types of Lance missile (including the W-79 "enhanced radiation" warhead) and roughly 1,300 155mm (M-48) and 203.2mm (two types) artillery shells.

Navy Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear-tipped Tomahawk long-range cruise missiles (roughly 100 units) on surface ships and attack submarines are to be removed from the arsenal and put in a centralized store on U.S. territory. If necessary, they can be remounted on ships.

Nuclear aerial bombs for carrier-based aircraft (M-57 and M-61) stored on board aircraft-carrying ships, along with nuclear depth charges used from aircraft carriers and shore-based naval aircraft (P-3 Orion aircraft), will be placed in centralized stores on U.S. territory. Later roughly 50 percent of the approximately 400 aerial bombs in the Navy arsenals will be destroyed (outdated models).

Air Force Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Aircraft using both conventional and nuclear (M-57 and M-61) munitions will remain the basis of the U.S. tactical nuclear potential.

Air Force Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Strategic bombers equipped with nuclear bombs, cruise missiles, and SRAM missiles [short-range attack missiles] are to be removed from combat alert duty. Forty of the 280 B-52G, B-52H, and B-1B aircraft were permanently ready for takeoff with hundreds of munitions on board. Henceforth they are on 24-hour readiness and the nuclear munitions will be stored at depots.

The ground-launched ballistic missiles to be eliminated in accordance with the Strategic Arms Treaty (to be implemented within seven years) are already being removed from combat alert duty and once the treaty has been ratified their destruction will be speeded up in comparison with the previously envisaged schedule. It is a question of the 450 single-warhead Minuteman-II missiles. Some 500 Minuteman-III ICBM's (1,500 warheads) and 50 Peacekeeper ICBM's (500 warheads) will remain in the U.S. arsenal.

Navy Strategic Nuclear Weapons

These arms systems are the foundation of the United States' nuclear might and are not covered by President Bush's initiative. Two-thirds of the missile-carrying submarine fleet will continue to be kept in permanent readiness for combat use—one-third actually on combat alert duty and one-third en route to patrol regions or heading back to base.

Strategic Nuclear Command of U.S. Armed Forces

In order to centralize control of the strategic nuclear weapons within the U.S. Air Force and Navy there is to be a joint strategic nuclear command stationed at Offutt Air Base, Nebraska.

Reports on Bartholomew Mission To Moscow

Consultations Begin

LD0610202191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1550 GMT 6 Oct 91

[By TASS correspondent Rostislav Gertsen]

[Text] Moscow, 6 October (TASS)—Soviet-American consultations on the issue of reducing nuclear weapons began in Moscow this morning. During the break, the heads of the delegations held a brief meeting with representatives of the mass media.

"Today we have reasons to speak about a joint Soviet-American initiative in the reduction of arms," stated Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Obukhov, head of the Soviet delegation.

Replying to questions from journalists, the Soviet diplomat expressed the hope that the world superpowers, primarily the United States, would respond to the appeal from USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and join the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing. "If this problem is resolved, our progress along the road of disarmament will be much more rapid," he stated.

Aleksey Obukhov reported that the Soviet initiatives proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev in his address on Soviet television Saturday were positively received by the U.S. side and by President George Bush; however, they have not yet been discussed at the expert level.

Answering a question on the extent to which, in his view, Mikhail Gorbachev's initiatives are commensurate with the proposals of the U.S. President, Aleksey Obukhov said: "We have several proposals that go beyond the proposals of the U.S. side. In this sense, Gorbachev has gone further than Bush. But if we take both packages as a whole—the U.S. initiatives, and the efforts of the U.S. Administration and of President Bush personally, were very highly regarded by the Soviet side—then what is now emerging is a qualitatively new situation in the field of nuclear disarmament. This situation is very favorable for making new important decisions, and in this sense, it seems to me we are experiencing a completely new era in world politics."

Reginald Bartholomew, U.S. under secretary of state for international security affairs and head of the U.S. delegation, was brief. "We are working fruitfully together on the initiatives of our presidents," he stated. "As for the viewpoint of the U.S. side, it was excellently reflected in the address by President Bush in the Rose Garden."

Bartholomew Comments

LD0810162491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1534 GMT 8 Oct 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Andrey Surzhan-skiy]

[Text] Moscow, 8 October—U.S. Under Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew, head of the U.S. delegation

on questions of nuclear arms reduction which is in the USSR, has highly appraised the results of the Soviet-U.S. consultations which are being held in Moscow.

In a brief interview for Soviet and foreign journalists today before the start of the talks with Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, he said that "at the moment he cannot speak about more specific results of the work which has been done before he delivers his report to the U.S. President". However, according to information received by a TASS correspondent at the Russian Foreign Ministry yesterday, the leadership of the republic is examining the possibility of "additional, more radical" reductions in armaments than has already been announced by the USSR president.

Reginald Bartholomew also stressed the need for a positive solution to the question of arms control. At the same time he pointed out certain discrepancies on specific details of the subjects under discussion, noting that they have historic roots.

Regarding a possible timescale for a Soviet-U.S. summit on problems of nuclear arms reduction, the head of the U.S. delegation recommended addressing this question to Washington.

General Lobov, Bartholomew Meet

*LD0810161691 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1452 GMT 8 Oct 91*

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 8 October—A meeting took place today between Army General Vladimir Lobov, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and Reginald Bartholomew, U.S. under secretary of state for security assistance, science, and technology.

"We discussed with General Lobov U.S. President George Bush's new initiatives and USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev's counterproposals on a reduction in nuclear armaments", Reginald Bartholomew stated in an interview with a TASS correspondent after the meeting. The U.S. presidential assistant noted that his "meeting was extremely useful and constructive."

According to B. Lobov, certain specific questions on a further reduction in the strategic armaments of the USSR and the United States were also discussed. "The very emergence of these initiatives marks the departure to a qualitatively new level of relations between our countries," he stressed.

Yeltsin Said Planing To Present Own Proposals

*AU0810093491 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
8 Oct 91 p 2*

[By Vladimir Markov: "Yeltsin Wants To Disarm Even More Massively"]

[Text] Moscow—As has become known from Russian Government circles, President Boris Yeltsin plans to present his own disarmament proposals, which might go a bit further than the ones announced by Mikhail Gorbachev on Saturday [5 October]. As DIE PRESSE has learned, these proposals are supposed to refer to strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear tests, and the reduction of the number of soldiers in the Armed Forces.

In a talk with Soviet President Gorbachev, the Russian president fully supported the disarmament steps worked out on Gorbachev's orders. At the same time, Yeltsin reportedly called for even more drastic measures. An experts group has been ordered to work out independent proposals by Russia. Until yesterday evening these proposals were being examined in Moscow by experts of the Union, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and Belorussia.

As early as today Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev might present these proposals to U.S. Under Secretary of State Bartholomew, who is in Moscow for consultations about the details of the latest disarmament initiatives.

RSFSR Foreign Minister Comments

*LD0810193691 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 8 Oct 91*

[Report by S. Milyanchikov, including recorded remarks by Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, on meeting between Kozyrev and U.S. Under Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew in Moscow; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] At a meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Bartholomew, U.S. under secretary of state, today, the Russian side tabled more radical proposals on reducing nuclear arms than those stated by the Union government.

[Kozyrev] Nuclear arms must not be distributed among national quarters. We are categorically against this. Therefore, all the proposals that have been stated have been made on behalf of the Russian leadership. This is our contribution to a common cause, so to speak, the cause of nuclear disarmament that has begun. They relate to our Soviet arsenal, too, which we do not regard... [changes thought] We do not require to have our control over this arsenal; however, we do not regard it as belonging to somebody else. This is precisely the arsenal which protects all of us.

[Milyanchikov] The Russian Government's proposals contain a decision on reducing the numerical strength of

the Soviet Armed Forces by 700,000 people, and on halting all nuclear arms tests.

Bartholomew Makes 'Hasty Return Home'

LD0810232691 Moscow TASS in English 2222 GMT 8 Oct 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Andrey Pershin]

[Text] Moscow, October 8 (TASS)—U.S. Under Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew left for the United States late this evening. He has held consultations on radical reduction of the Soviet and American nuclear potentials.

There are two reasons for hasty return home in diplomatic practice: failure or success of negotiations, about which the leadership should be informed immediately.

Sources at the Soviet Foreign Ministry told TASS that the consultations' results were quite inspiring and both sides are satisfied.

Bartholomew arrived in Moscow with cardinal proposals of President Bush on the reduction of nuclear potentials. By the beginning of consultations with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Obukhov, a package of response initiatives by Soviet President Gorbachev has been made public.

Many observers believe that Soviet initiates go further than those of Bush in some specific spheres.

The two packages of counter measures made the groundwork of the Soviet-U.S. consultations. The third element of the disarmament process has become a bloc of initiatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, presented today during a conversation between Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Bartholomew.

This package is even more radical than Gorbachev's proposals. As it is known, the major part of the Soviet nuclear potential is located on Russian territory. That is why the voice of the sovereign republic has a special value.

In addition, the U.S. guest had an opportunity to exchange opinions with Soviet ministers of foreign affairs and defence. It is clear that Bartholomew will return to Washington with a larger baggage of nuclear disarmament proposals than he had when arriving in Moscow.

It is no doubt that a powerful and mounting impetus has been given to the nuclear disarmament process.

Few details about the consultations are known. However, one can suppose that Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin will dwell on them at tomorrow's briefing. Now Aleksey Obukhov and Reginald Bartholomew made general remarks about mutual satisfaction with the results.

Judging by the information obtained from diplomatic sources, during this round of consultations on nuclear

disarmament the sides mainly acquainted themselves with each other's initiatives and specified the initial stands.

The major work on the transition of the proposals in the sphere of specific and clearly formulated mutual agreements is still to be done. It is expected that this process will be continued in the nearest future through diplomatic channels.

Chief of Staff on Bush Initiative, Gorbachev Response

Calls U.S. Step 'Significant'

AU0710135891 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 7 Oct 91 p 20

[Interview with General Vladimir Lobov, Soviet chief of staff, by unidentified DER SPIEGEL reporter; place and date not given: "A Significant Step"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Was Moscow surprised by the U.S. President's disarmament proposals?

[Lobov] I do not quite see it that way. As you know, President Gorbachev started his significant initiative to abolish all nuclear weapons by 2000, as early as in 1986. Real disarmament has always been our goal. The best example of this is the Soviet-U.S. START agreement, which was signed but has not yet been ratified.

[DER SPIEGEL] So, you do not think that what has come from the West is revolutionary or new, do you?

[Lobov] What do you mean by revolutionary? We think the United States has taken a significant step. However, considering the United States' entire nuclear capabilities, a mere 5 percent of its strategic offensive weapons are involved. What is important is that this initiative came from the United States. That is a political step of extraordinary importance because it shows that the United States has ceased to consider us its enemy. We will submit specific counterproposals, and as a result, some new things could be started.

[DER SPIEGEL] What is the United States' most important motive: concerns about the threatening disintegration of the Soviet Union, or fear about a third zero option in Europe?

[Lobov] Neither the one nor the other. I am seeing an effort here to eliminate the most terrible weapons—strategic and tactical nuclear weapons—step by step, and thereby creating more confidence and security.

[DER SPIEGEL] Soviet military officials expressed doubts last week. They say that taking away the multiple warhead missiles, for instance, could upset the balance in the START treaty, which was achieved in very difficult negotiations.

[Lobov] I do not know with whom you discussed this. I think it is tactless to suspect me as the general chief of staff in connection with such views.

[DER SPIEGEL] After all, even Mikhail Gorbachev said that there are some pending problems. Do you know what problems they are?

[Lobov] Why don't you ask Mikhail Sergeyevich personally?

[DER SPIEGEL] Will you follow the U.S. example and have your strategic bombers step down from a state of alert as well?

[Lobov] Of course, we are ready to do so.

[DER SPIEGEL] When?

[Lobov] We have already begun.

[DER SPIEGEL] However, you do not like the fact that President Bush failed to mention a worldwide ban on nuclear tests.

[Lobov] Regrettably, you are right. We have always advocated banning such tests. Because we have proposed a nuclear-free world, we have abstained from carrying out such tests for some time now.

[DER SPIEGEL] Several Soviet republics that are striving for independence want to have a say on nuclear weapons in the future. Will Russia, Kazakhstan, or the Ukraine be permitted to take part in formulating an answer to President Bush?

[Lobov] I do not rule it out. After all, we are also increasingly coming to terms with them on other issues.

[DER SPIEGEL] In what way do such disarmament measures affect the restructuring of your Armed Forces?

[Lobov] If both sides now destroy some of their nuclear weapons, the respective units will be disbanded as well. The rest will be regrouped. In any case, we are already taking these changes into account in our plans.

[DER SPIEGEL] When can we expect Moscow's official response to the Bush initiative?

[Lobov] Very soon.

Says U.S. 'Surprised' by Response

*LD0910153691 Moscow TASS in English 1511 GMT
9 Oct 91*

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, October 9 (TASS)—Chief of the Soviet General Staff Army General Vladimir Lobov told TASS today that the recent proposal by President Bush to further cut U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals and President Mikhail Gorbachev's reply initiative coincided in many ways. He noted that there was also "an obvious proximity of positions" on tactical nuclear weapons.

"The two presidents' initiatives did not catch the Soviet Armed Forces unawares," Lobov stressed. "The dynamics and logic of disarmament," he said, "make us work with an eye for the future—the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, a deadline set by Mikhail Gorbachev several years ago. Nevertheless, it was difficult to expect some elements of the voiced proposals, including the complete destruction of nuclear mines, decommissioning and partial liquidation of nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles."

According to Lobov, the Soviet side's reply initiative came as a "surprise" for the Americans. It envisages the removal of all nuclear weapons from the tactical air force. "Judging by everything, the United States did not expect this," Lobov noted. "Now the American side is studying this proposal," he said.

"The 'third zero', i.e. the complete liquidation of tactical weapons, is yet infeasible," Lobov noted. "But nuclear ammunition for the artillery and tactical missiles will be fully liquidated, and this is already a big step forward".

"The Soviet Union's attitude to the 1972 Anti-Missile Defence Treaty so far remains unchanged," Lobov said. The expressed Soviet readiness to discuss the American proposals related to non-nuclear anti-missile defence facilities, Lobov believes, will not bring about a hasty revision of the treaty.

"The Soviet Union's lag behind the United States in the development and creation of such systems is proportional to our technology's lag behind the American," the general believes. "In order to overtake the United States in this sphere, huge investments must be made in the Soviet economy and science. But the received effect must be efficiently used in civilian sectors," Lobov declared.

Speaking about the moratorium on nuclear tests, announced in the USSR once again, he stressed that the Soviet side "expects an adequate and constructive reaction from the United States".

Bush Reaction to Response on Arms Cuts Noted

*PM0810153791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
8 Oct 91 Single Edition p 4*

[Correspondent V. Gan report: "USSR-United States: Price of Disarmament. Hopes Justified"]

[Excerpts] Washington—Even before the helicopter carrying U.S. President G. Bush from his out-of-town residence at Camp David touched down on the White House South Lawn, U.S. reaction to M.S. Gorbachev's statement on the problem of nuclear arms was known. People here reacted at least with enthusiasm to what he said. [passage omitted]

Bush had to drown out the helicopter's roar in order to answer our questions after we had spent several hours in an agony of suspense in the White House's uncomfortable press room.

[PRAVDA] What is your reaction to Gorbachev's speech?

[Bush] Very positive. I think that world reaction is also very positive. There are some areas and questions that I would like to discuss. We now have a very good team in Moscow. I listened to the entire speech. I spoke to him (Gorbachev—V.G.) before he made the statement and I think that this all represents good news for the entire world. I think we have come a tremendous way. And I also think that this has not been in vain. It is after all a question of nuclear arms. Many people in this world are grateful, in my opinion, to the Soviet leadership for its approach. [Bush ends]

The President said that he has something to discuss with the Soviet leadership and that he has no intention of commenting on each and every aspect of Gorbachev's program. "As I have already said, we have a great deal of work ahead of us and we must discuss a great deal before coming to the table for the next summit meeting," Bush said. However, he did not rule out the likelihood of a meeting, reiterating that the U.S. side "is very satisfied with the Soviet response." "I felt that they would respond positively," the President added. According to him, the administration has gotten "enough food for thought"—and positive food at that.

PRAVDA Commentator Remarks on Arms Cut

*PM0810135191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Oct 91
Single Edition p 4*

[Yevgeniy Shashkov "Commentator's Opinion": "Measure Seven Times Before You Cut Once"]

[Text] As Washington presumed, the Kremlin's detailed response to G. Bush's disarmament initiative followed rapidly. M. Gorbachev's statement was published in full in our newspaper yesterday. As expected, Moscow's countermoves are wholly in line with the U.S. initiative but also have a number of proposals of their own. I shall note a few of them.

The Soviet president has proposed to the United States the scrapping on a reciprocal basis of naval tactical nuclear weapons as well as the removal of all nuclear munitions (aerial bombs and air-launched missiles) from tactical aviation combat units. They are to be kept at central storage bases. As for the numerical strength of the USSR Armed Forces, Gorbachev declared his intention to cut them by 700,000 men.

It is not only servicemen who are considered superfluous here now but also strategic offensive nuclear weapons [boyezaryad]. A few months ago the Strategic Offensive Arms [START] Treaty stipulated that we shall retain no more than 6,000 of them. But now a new decision has

been adopted: At the end of the 7-year period of reductions it is planned to cut them to 5,000. In addition, it has been proposed to Washington that, after ratification of the START Treaty, intensive talks begin on a further radical reduction of strategic offensive arms by approximately half.

I think that I should not inundate you with any more numerical computations. After all, apart from those people whose profession it is to study disarmament problems, few in our country are interested in them. Over the past six years people have become sick and tired of the empty promises that if we "melt down" the guns and missiles it will mean butter on everyone's table in a year or two. The country is in such a situation today that talk of potential multibillion windfalls from the disarmament process simply cause an indignation which could give way to bitterness at any moment.

Indeed, people no longer believe that an arms reduction can turn into real gains today which will be reflected in the lives of the present generation. They have been "fed" too many fables about a radiant future. They are waiting with increasing impatience for real and not "mythical perestroika" internal reforms. But instead of that the powers that be are again becoming furiously active in the foreign sphere, that is, in those areas where, it seems to them, they can quickly improve their political rating, particularly in the disarmament sphere.

There is no denying it—we cannot manage without disarmament. What is more, it could be implemented even more radically than the Bush and Gorbachev initiatives propose. In my view, guaranteed security can be achieved even with 200-300 nuclear warheads for strategic offensive arms on both sides.

The objections are due to something else—the oversimplified nature of the very approach to disarmament shown in some places: If we "melt down" all the nuclear weapons we shall begin to live like real people in a nuclear-free world. No, we will not! Meanwhile, our leading politicians do not have the courage to admit that as things stand today the nuclear-free world is a myth, a utopia. Among the members of the "nuclear club," in my opinion, we are the only ones who regard the attainment of a nuclear-free world as a practical task for foreign policy.

That was still possible in 1986 when we were striving for moral and ethical leadership in the world. But is it really justified in the present situation to claim that we are still continuing today the cause that began in Reykjavik? If you look around you will see that our country's place and role in the world have changed fundamentally. Paradoxical as it may seem, the Reykjavik initiatives were viewed as an intellectual breakthrough not so much because of their content. It was more to do with the fact that they were voiced by the leader of a totalitarian superpower. But our present initiative is not evidence of a breakthrough but confirmation of the collapse of a totalitarianism based on superarmament.

Our present activeness in the disarmament sphere is largely due to a concatenation of fatal circumstances to do with the disintegration of the Union and the impossibility in the future of monitoring tactical nuclear weapons in particular from a single center. Why should we not tell people that honestly? Has life really not taught us anything?

I think it would be no exaggeration to say that foreign policy recently, largely designed for outward effect, has become, alas, a contradictory factor in our life. And indeed, was it not the harshness and haste of that policy which promoted the destabilization of society which ultimately led to the attempted coup d'etat?

By conducting a course toward disarmament we tried to do something good not only for our own country but for the whole world, too. That was the theory. But in practice this was done in a forthright, bolshevik-style manner, the most powerful blows were dealt to the country's already ailing economy, and the futures of millions of ordinary people were ruined. No, not the leaders of the military-industrial complex, up until the August putsch they were among the president's immediate entourage.

Why did we not plainly tell the West even once that the very scale of our disarmament initiatives and their incredible cost to the Soviet economy presume an absolutely specific and, moreover, vast Western aid for the conversion of whole sectors of the country's already sick economy? But that is how it is because the reduction of the USSR's military potential made it necessary to directly link the accords achieved in the disarmament process, accords on the elimination of military systems, including the agreement on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and treaties on conventional arms and strategic offensive arms with multibillion agreements in the sphere of cooperation in conversion so as once and for all to transform the production of instruments of destruction into the production of instruments of creation. Why did we not insist that the West share its equipment and technological achievements in this area free of charge? After all, that would have been a real contribution to the cause of strengthening world peace.

Once more, unfortunately, there is not a single word about this in the president's reply to Bush's disarmament initiative. And that means that once again the COCOM restrictions will remain in force, as will the bans on the use of the output and services of Soviet enterprises by firms and organizations in the NATO countries' military industrial complex. As before a vast part of the external market in high-technology output—space services, telecommunications, and nuclear technologies—will remain inaccessible to our country's firms.

Apart from the fact that the lack of an adequate Western response is a most severe blow to the most advanced sectors of our country's industry, essentially leaving them without a future, this will be yet another serious problem not only for us but for the whole world, too.

Thousands of Soviet physicists and engineers could be turned into an army of "hired hands." I would not be surprised if after some time the number of members of the "nuclear club" began to rise sharply because scientists bought up in the Union will be creating nuclear weapons.

Is there a way out of this situation? In my view, one will be found. But for that, clearly, we must rid ourselves of the illusion that problems, including those in disarmament, can be resolved only via the collective organs of the center. By all accounts, the START Treaty, which is designed to run seven years, will have to be seen through to the end by the states of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan. But above all by Russia. Not only because 70 percent of the country's military-industrial complex and almost all its nuclear potential are located on Russian territory but also because Russia today remains the only great power in the military-political and economic sense in the entire vast Eurasian continent.

I should like to believe that, before attaching its signature to the documents on disarmament, the present Russian leadership will be able to convince the West that it is impossible to behave as though it is the Russians who, having given everything they had for the creation of the military potential in the past, should now shoulder the heavy burden of eliminating it.

Bovin on Bush Initiative, Gorbachev Reply

*PM0910110091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Oct 91 Union Edition p 5*

[Aleksandr Bovin article under the "Political Observer's Opinion" rubric: "Challenge Taken Up: Gorbachev Answers Bush"]

[Text] It seems that both we and the Americans have underestimated George Bush. His proposals on tactical and strategic nuclear arms reductions surpassed all expectations. And they caused—without identifying the sources of each reaction—euphoria, confusion, and skepticism.

In the long years of confrontation we grew accustomed to thinking that each disarmament initiative from their White House was ultimately aimed at weakening the Soviet Union's position and strengthening U.S. security. Like "CIA intrigues," but on a different scale and in a different form. Now that the former "adversaries" have turned into partners, that approach is obsolete, in principle. Although sometimes it is hard to avoid the temptation...

But still. Why has the present administration set about nuclear disarmament so zealously?

First, let us listen to Bush himself. "The changes that allowed us to adjust our security strategy a year ago," Bush stated 27 September, "have greatly accelerated. The prospect of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe, launched with little or no warning, is no longer a realistic

threat... New leaders in the Kremlin and the republics are now questioning the need for their huge nuclear arsenal. The Soviet nuclear stockpile now seems less an instrument of national security, and more of a burden. As a result, we now have an unparalleled opportunity to change the nuclear posture of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

"If we and the Soviet leaders take the right steps—some on our own, some on their own, some together—we can dramatically shrink the arsenal of the world's nuclear weapons. We can rely more on defensive measures in our strategic relationship. We can enhance stability, and actually reduce the risk of nuclear war. Now is the time," the President said, "to seize this opportunity."

A few clarifications by way of commentary.

First. The Americans, by all appearances, genuinely believe that a new world order is possible. That the threat of war could be drastically reduced. And that in order to preserve such an order it is necessary only to maintain the nonproliferation regime, with the states belonging to the "nuclear club" having minimal deterrent forces. Given this approach, any nuclear weapons "surplus" would be regarded as destabilizing and be subject to elimination.

Second. Events in the Soviet Union are threatening by virtue of the frightening uncertainty as regards control of strategic and particularly tactical nuclear weapons. It is therefore better beforehand, while the "familiar" central structures still exist, to bind the Soviet Union and its possible successors by new commitments, and to encourage them to eliminate thousands of items of tactical nuclear weaponry which could escape from control in the course of local conflicts and civil "mini-wars."

Third. The abolition of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, and the formation of a wide corridor between the USSR and NATO destroys the military purpose of nuclear artillery shells and short-range missiles—they simply will not reach the enemy. Therefore, Washington's initiative—to tumultuous applause from Bonn—was supported by Paris and London.

Incidentally, in view of the destabilizing role of any theater nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has long been proposing the "third zero," that is, the elimination of all forms of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. We also proposed their removal from naval ships. The Americans have virtually adopted the same stance. They propose that tactical nuclear weapons be retained solely on Air Force planes.

For reference: According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, U.S. nonstrategic nuclear forces number 7,922 delivery vehicles and 7,147 weapons [boyezaryady]. The USSR's analogous forces consist of 13,759 delivery vehicles and 11,305 weapons. Thus each country has created a mighty infrastructure for "limited nuclear war." The Americans did so openly.

We, as was often the case, did one thing but said another, and sought to persuade everyone that such a war was impossible.

If the American proposal is accepted, they will be left with 1,300 aircraft and 1,800 bombs, while we will have 2,560 aircraft and 3,100 bombs. No bad thing...

Fourth. G. Bush's initiative is also associated with the political struggle inside the United States and the preparations for the next presidential elections. The fact is that the Democrats intend to seek deep cuts in military spending. With his proposals the President is, so to speak, moving toward the Democrats, testifying to his peaceability, and at the same time preparing the ground for defending spending primarily on projects like the B-2 heavy bomber (\$3.2 billion) and SDI (\$5.2 billion). As for the Pentagon, apparently it will—whoever holds sway in the White House—maintain its course of gradually getting rid of "old" nuclear stuff and replacing it with "smart" nonnuclear weapons based on the most advanced technologies.

The U.S. President's initiative is interesting not only by virtue of its content, but also because of the new approach to disarmament. George Bush, M. Gordon writes in *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, has "thrown out of the window all the traditional ideas about control over disarmament." An exaggeration, maybe. But an understandable one. Instead of prolonged, cautious soundings, endless disputes over words, and miserly shifts in position, G. Bush is formulating radical starting positions at a stroke and—taking the other side's interests into account—immediately making a final solution accessible.

Incidentally, independent Soviet experts were talking about the desirability of this approach some time ago. But a prophet in his own country... Carter was the first to approach the new method of talks. At the time, Moscow took fright. And do you remember Reykjavik? There, Gorbachev frightened Reagan. Now times have changed, and Bush did not frighten Gorbachev.

Regarding tactical nuclear weapons, the USSR president not only accepted all the U.S. President's proposals, but went further. Moscow proposes that no exceptions be made, that is, that all weapons of this kind be eliminated and removed. The total third "zero."

Regarding strategic arms, Gorbachev is generally in solidarity with Bush, and proposed, for his part, a number of new initiatives "outstripping" Bush.

It is noteworthy that M. Gorbachev's Statement bypasses in silence G. Bush's proposal to eliminate all land-based ICBM's with multiple reentry vehicles (MRV's).

This is a sensitive issue. In principle it is not possible, in my view, to dispute the thesis that—given the absence of ABM defense—the switch to single-warhead missiles will strengthen general strategic stability. But in this specific

instance it is necessary to consider the matter not only in principle, but in the light of the differing structures of the Soviet and U.S. missile potentials.

We have put the emphasis on the development of land-based ICBM's. The Americans put submarine-launched ballistic missiles first. Therefore, if G. Bush's proposal is accepted, we lose a far greater number of weapons. This approach can hardly be considered right. The Americans know that, but they continue to act disingenuous.

It must also be taken into account that the Americans are still working on SDI. And unless a mutually acceptable compromise is found, in order to maintain a convincing level of deterrence, we cannot renounce ICBM's with multiple warheads.

The fundamental question is as follows. Can we, in the context of deepening cooperation with the Americans, accept structural changes in our strategic triad? So that the most destabilizing components would be removed, and the proportional share of single-warhead missiles, strategic aviation, and defensive systems would be increased? From the military-strategic viewpoint, this appears expedient. But there is also another viewpoint, more important today—the economic viewpoint. Not only is disarmament costly, but then you have rearmament too...

Of course, not all questions can be resolved at the highest level. The "negotiators" also have plenty to do. They should, I believe, present the political leadership with the conceptual basis for disarmament. What forms of strategic arms, in what quantities, do the USSR and the United States need in order to guarantee reliable deterrence at the minimum level? The answer to this general question will make it possible to answer questions of detail more rapidly and accurately.

PRC Reaction to Reduction Proposals Cited

*PM0910114291 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Oct 91 Union Edition p 5*

[Correspondent Yu. Savenkov report: "China Welcomes It, But..."]

[Text] Beijing—The Chinese newspapers are reporting M.S. Gorbachev's initiative on nuclear arms reduction with restraint, as if they are keeping their distance. What would Beijing itself say? There was a long silence. After two days had elapsed, foreign correspondents started impatiently calling the Foreign Ministry (I was among them). A polite voice replied: Wait for the response.

Soon, the XINHUA agency teletype carried a statement from an unidentified Foreign Ministry staffer repeating word for word the Chinese reaction to G. Bush's initiative. China welcomes the Gorbachev plan, but continues to believe that the United States and the USSR, which have huge nuclear arsenals, bear special responsibility in the nuclear disarmament sphere.

In Beijing diplomatic circles, this response to Bush was dubbed a "polite gesture." One diplomat told me: "Beijing had an opportunity to take a real step in the same direction, but preferred to remain within its traditional framework." The logic of Beijing's reasoning apparently goes like this: Take no notice of us; we are a developing country, we account for too small a share; the supreme responsibility rests with the United States and the USSR, so let them make the cuts; we can only support this. Why was the text of the response to the two presidents identical? Diplomats in Beijing believe that, first, Beijing thereby emphasizes its equidistance from the two countries, and, second, it shows once again that it is not prepared to participate in the nuclear disarmament process.

Western experts believe that China manufactures shorter-, intermediate-, and longer-range missiles. They are capable of carrying nuclear warheads, but, on announcing Beijing's decision in principle to adhere to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (China was the last of the great powers), a Foreign Ministry spokesman again stressed that in China the quantity of nuclear weapons is small and is exclusively for self-defense purposes.

In any case, many observers are concerned: Despite the reductions in weapons of mass destruction announced by the two presidents, there are still plenty of them in the arsenals of many countries, and they could in future spread to other countries too. Not only the United States and the USSR should participate in the disarmament process.

Petrovskiy: No 'Closed' Disarmament Topics

92UF0026A Moscow TRUD in Russian 1 Oct 91 p 3

[Article by E. Alekseyev: "New Perspectives Opening Up"]

[Text] Vladimir Petrovskiy, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs, has given a high appraisal to the initiatives advanced by U.S. President G. Bush in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. On 30 September he appeared before Soviet and foreign journalists at the press center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and emphasized the unconditional readiness of our country to embark upon "actions comparable in significance," to cooperate with the United States on the path to full rejection, in the final analysis, of nuclear arsenals. And V. Petrovskiy made note of the following remarkable detail—prior to his television appearance, G. Bush gave preliminary notification of his proposals not only to the closest allies of the United States, but to USSR President M. Gorbachev and Russian President B. Yeltsin as well.

Petrovskiy stated that the Soviet side was prepared to immediately and constructively examine all of G. Bush's proposals. In this regard, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Boris Pankin, being in the United States, has already made direct contact with Secretary of State J. Baker. USSR Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Aleksey

Obukhov will fly to the United States during the first 10 days of October to continue these contacts.

Once again it was noted that the Soviet side will enter into dialogue without delay regarding all matters of nuclear disarmament touched upon. There exist no "closed" topics here.

Coordination of Union and republic positions will be effected on all questions.

Concept of UN Nuclear 'Police Force' Contemplated

*PM0210111391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Oct 91 Union Edition p 10*

[“Editorial Office Viewpoint”: “Why the United States Is Curtailing the Arms Race”]

[Text] George Bush has proclaimed the start of a new era in arms limitation, having announced on Friday the biggest cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal in history. The proposed reductions concern the majority of types of nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical.

Of course, the United States expects the USSR to reciprocate and to reduce its nuclear arms sharply as well. Such “trustfulness” of the White House arises out of its confidence that disarmament and a sharp reduction in military spending will benefit the Soviet Union, which is now quite incapable of pulling the military cart. All the more so as the supporters of a tough line in the military-industrial complex will now find it hard to allude to a U.S. “nuclear threat.” But at the same time the U.S. President is acting in the highest interests of his country. The United States is again using the arms race as an instrument to achieve political ends—this time, it is true, not by boosting it but, on the contrary, by curtailing it. And the ends themselves have also exchanged a “minus” for a “plus”—Washington is now interested not in stifling the USSR economically but, on the contrary, in giving it support. In addition, it is exceptionally important to the West that nothing should prevent Moscow from totally destroying its tactical nuclear weapons that are scattered throughout the vast country (and a considerable part of the strategic weapons). The threat of “nuclear chaos” associated with the current collapse of the Union would thereby be eliminated or reduced.

It is now time to think of further steps too. Of course, the USSR must follow the U.S. example. But then? Is it possible to move further ahead, right to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons? The U.S. President believes that it is still necessary to preserve a certain part of them—as a deterrent factor. And, as the example of Iraq has shown, weighty arguments exist in support of such a stand.

But there is also another path—the path of creating under UN auspices an international “police force” equipped with a certain minimum of nuclear weapons. This would free many countries, including, maybe, the

sovereign republics of the former USSR, from their “nuclear inferiority” complex and, at the same time, ensure reliable guarantees of international security. In today’s rapidly changing world this idea, first advanced in our country by Academician V. Goldanskiy, no longer seems totally fantastic.

U.S., Soviet Nuclear Initiatives Spur CSBM Talks

*LD0210191791 Moscow TASS in English 1846 GMT
2 Oct 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, October 2 (TASS)—As the United States stuns the world with a decision to radically reduce its nuclear arsenal and the Soviet Union promises equal moves, the Vienna talks on confidence-building measures and security [CSBM] in Europe steadily remove one obstacle after another on the way towards safer Europe.

The negotiators have agreed to create a network of direct communication between CSCE countries and discussed ways to cover its expenses. The network will help reduce the distance between CSCE countries’s capitals and lay a foundation of a common European home.

However, there is much to do yet in working out a new package of confidence-building measures to be approved by the forthcoming summit meeting Helsinki-2 in the spring of 1992.

The package will envisage restricting measures to reduce military activities, information exchanges and selective evaluations of irregular military units temporarily deployed for routine training, and the expansion of exchanges of information on various types of weapons and military activities.

GENERAL

Ukrainian Defense Minister Disavows Nuclear Weapons

*LD0310144191 Moscow TASS in English
1411 GMT 3 Oct 91*

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Sergey Balykov]

[Excerpt] Kiev, October 3 (TASS)—“The Ukraine needs an army as a guarantor of democracy and independence,” Air Force Major General K. Morozov, Ukrainian defence minister, said in an interview with the NARODNAYA ARMIA newspaper. Troops deployed now on Ukrainian territory will be a basis for its creation. These include three military districts, the Black Sea fleet and some individual units. They all will undergo a radical reform. This work will be carried out jointly with the General Staff, in accordance with the act

on state independence of the Ukraine and a resolution of the republican parliament about military units deployed on its territory.

The Ukrainian armed forces will never have nuclear weapons, Morozov stressed. The strategic forces with a nuclear component, deployed on its territory, are already being set apart. They should be managed by a single control body with the participation of the Ukraine. The future of the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory will be decided in line with the course, proclaimed by the declaration on state sovereignty. It says that the Ukraine intends to become a neutral state, not to join military blocs and follow three non-nuclear principles through the stage-by-stage reduction of nuclear weapons in accordance with the existing treaty and further agreements with sovereign republics. [passage omitted]

Belarusan, Ukrainian Officials on Stationing of Nuclear Weapons

LD0310223991 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Oct 91

[Report by correspondent Fuad Ogly; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] An issue which was not raised at the meeting in Alma-Ata but in which everyone is interested is the fate of the nuclear installations located in the territory of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan.

[Belorussian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich] We do not want to possess nuclear weapons nor bear the cross of anxiety borne by those countries possessing such weapons. Let us be honest, however, and admit that the NATO alliance exists and that it does have armed forces. This means that the first defensive shield in the path of the Western countries is Belorussia and the Ukraine.

[V. Grinev, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet] I think that the nuclear weapons should remain at their launching positions. This is a point of principle, and there is no need, so to speak.... [changes thought] Well, I did not very much like Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's statement about Russia appropriating all the weapons. It has created tension. [passage omitted including indistinct portion]

Delegation Attends Arms Conference in Italy

LD0710013791 Moscow TASS in English 1638 GMT 6 Oct 91

[Text] Castiglioncello, Livorno Province, October 6, (TASS)—Averting the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the survival of humanity, and action to ensure a genuinely peaceful development of life around the world in the third millennium are the exceptionally important problems that are under discussion at an international arms control conference that opened at Pasquini Castle here today.

The conference, which was organized by the Italian Alliance of Scientists for Disarmament (USPID) together with the Florentine forum on the problems of war and peace, is being attended by prominent scholars and arms control experts from many countries, including Italy, the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, Israel, Germany and other states.

This conference acquires particular topicality in the light of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's latest televised statement, Professor Cathryn Kelleher, director of Maryland University's Centre for Strategic Arms Studies, said in her speech at the conference. She referred to Gorbachev's proposals as "a step in the right direction".

"We feel profound satisfaction in view of the measures announced by your president. This is of particular importance, since substance is thereby being added to the subjects that we are discussing: the two nuclear superpowers have decided to patently show to the world that they genuinely want to get rid of nuclear weapons by the turn of the century," USPID National Secretary Giuseppe Nardulli told TASS.

"I must admit that to a certain extent Gorbachev caught us unawares—so wide is the spectrum of his proposals which encompass both tactical nuclear weapons, strategic offensive arms, and a one-year unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests," Nardulli said.

"It is significant that the Soviet Union removes all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and versatile submarines. This is known to have been one of the issues over which the Soviet Union and the United States previously disagreed", Nardulli pointed out.

Center-Republic Consultations on Nuclear Arsenal

Center To Retain Control

LD0910224491 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2100 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Text] The USSR Defense Ministry has announced that those attending a consultative meeting on military reform have confirmed the decision that all forms of weapons of mass destruction must be under the control of the center. Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian republics declared themselves in favor of retaining a unified armed forces. The representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Moldova expressed special positions and reservations. The Ukraine did not attend the meeting.

Guarantees Against Unauthorized Use

LD0910232191 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 2010 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Announcer-read report on a consultative meeting of republic representatives at the USSR Ministry of Defense in Moscow on 9 October, including recorded remarks by Lieutenant General Valeriy Manilov,

Defense Ministry press secretary—Manilov speaks in Russian with superimposed English translation]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] The meeting of the authorized representatives of the Union republics to reform radically the Soviet Armed Forces is being held at the Defense Ministry in Moscow. Details from the Defense Ministry press secretary, Lieutenant General Valeriy Manilov: [passage omitted]

[Announcer] General Valeriy Manilov then commented on how the country's nuclear potential will be controlled:

[Manilov] The nuclear problems are the core of the military reform. The control system must be comprehensive and embrace all of its elements. If one element goes out of control there are no guarantees against non-sanctioned use. According to foreign experts coming to the Soviet Union, the reliability of our control over nuclear arms surpasses everything that's being used for the purpose in the West.

[Announcer] General Valeriy Manilov then analyzed the possibility of 100 percent guarantee for the non-use of the nuclear weapons if they are checked by the center:

[Manilov] Politically, only their full elimination could exclude the accidental use of these weapons. They must be removed from all arsenals of the nuclear powers, and their further spread to new owners must be prevented, so we can fully guarantee security only if we achieve a reliable control over them and reduce them at the same time.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Lithuania Demands Prompt Soviet Withdrawal

Landsbergis Reiterates Stance

LD0210105591 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in English 0000 GMT 1 Oct 91

[Text] Speaking on the national TV on Sunday, chairman of the Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis confirmed once again that Lithuania was not going to negotiate the issue of the pullout of Soviet troops from the Lithuanian territory. The withdrawal of the Army is not a subject for discussions: That is an undebatable demand and a necessity, said Vytautas Landsbergis. According to him, the issue will get top priority on meeting with the Soviet negotiating delegation. If we fail to come to an understanding on this issue and agreement to start withdrawing Soviet troops immediately, we shall not be able to remain friendly, benevolent on other issues, to smile and demand nothing, said the chairman of the parliament, pointing up that in that case Lithuania will have to insist and apply pressure.

Vytautas Landsbergis rejected the argument that Lithuania ought to reconcile itself to the term of a few years of the Soviet troops' pullout, on the alleged grounds that the more rapid withdrawal would give the

Soviets a lot of inconvenience. When they say it is a problem, we can ask whose problem, and may they not try and burden the problem on us. Let those who created the problem by their illegitimate actions 50 years ago solve it now, said Vytautas Landsbergis. He urged Lithuania's political forces, the possible opposition, and society, on the whole, to realize that the immediate withdrawal of the alien army was, as he put it, the most important task of our state and of the life of our society. The Army which occupied Lithuania during two days might leave but not within two days; two months, at least. By the new year, the main contingent of the troops ought to be removed, Landsbergis stated on national TV yesterday.

It is estimated that there are up to 80,000 Soviet troops in Lithuania.

Referring to domestic problems, Vytautas Landsbergis said that the problem of the stability of power was still acute and he urged society to support the current economic reforms, however painful they might be.

Fears Deployment of Nuclear Arms

*LD0810174791 Moscow TASS in English
1706 GMT 8 Oct 91*

[By correspondent Dmitriy Voskoboinikov]

[Text] Blackpool, October 8 (TASS)—Troops must be withdrawn from Lithuania the soonest possible, as their presence there is dangerous to the people and is a continuing violation of international law, Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis told an informal meeting within the framework of the annual conference of British Tories.

According to him, the Soviet Union wants to legalize the presence of its troops in the republic and intends to adjust the Soviet-American Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty to apply to the changed situation in such a way as to make Lithuania a country on whose territory Soviet nuclear weapons will continue to be deployed.

"We shall not agree to this," Landsbergis said.

"American inspectors should check whether these rockets have been relocated to some other place on Soviet territory and then check to see whether these weapons are no longer on Lithuanian territory."

Landsbergis stressed that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuania is also important because there remains a possibility of another, and perhaps more successful coup d'etat in the Soviet Union as a number of old structures have been preserved.

He told journalists that the Baltic Council intends to pressure for Soviet withdrawal from the capitals of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia before December 1, 1991.

Asked about his present relations with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian President Boris Yeltsin,

Landsbergis said he had no direct contacts with them lately but noted that diplomatic relations between Lithuania and the Soviet Union would be resumed on Wednesday. He said the move would create a much more acceptable beginning of a dialogue with the Soviet leadership.

Landsbergis stressed that there had been "no conflicts in relations between Lithuania and Russia and these ties have not deteriorated."

Estonia, Moscow Discuss Soviet Troop Withdrawal

Council Discusses Organization of Talks

*LD0210134791 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1500 GMT 1 Oct 91*

[Text] The Estonian Supreme Council chairman's council discussed the organization of talks with the USSR. The session was chaired by Supreme Council Chairman Arnold Rütel. The Supreme Council chairman's press service reported to ETA that the session heard information from Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar about temporary agreements concluded by the government and about the future organization of the talks. Arnold Rütel provided information about the telephone conversations which he held on these issues with USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and with Anatoliy Sobchak, leader of the USSR delegation. It was decided to continue the discussion at the next session of the Supreme Council chairman's council on 7 October and to elaborate proposals to the Supreme Council in respect of the talks being held with the USSR. Participating in the session were Supreme Council chairman's council members; Supreme Council Speaker Ulo Nugis; Estonian Ministers Olev Laanjarv, Jaak Leimann, and Endel Lippmaa; Robert Narska, chairman of the Estonian Union of District Governments; Estonian Bank President Siim Kallas; and Arno Allmann, Raimund Hagelberg, and Advig Kiris, councillors of the Supreme Council chairman's council.

Prime Minister, Fleet Commander Meet

*OW0310033291 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1530 GMT 2 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar met in Tallin Wednesday with the new Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy's Baltic Fleet Vladimir Yegorov to discuss the gradual withdrawal of the USSR Navy units from Estonia.

Matti Pedak, an adviser on military affairs to the Estonian government, told BF [BALTFAX] that under the agreements reached earlier, the dismantling of the arms warehouses in Tallinn, in the village of Harku near Tallinn and on the Naissaar isle in the Tallinn gulf is about to begin.

The military air base of the USSR Navy in Suurkula, 40 km away from Tallinn, will be shut down. Bombers stationed at that base will no longer execute training flights over the isles of Suur-Pakri and Vaike-Pakri in the north-west of Estonia.

In an interview with BF Toomas Puura, head of the Estonian government's department on home defense and border control, said that all in all there are 5 major military air bases in Estonia. Three of them belong to the USSR Air Defense Force—one in Parnu, one in Haapsalu (western Estonia) and one in Tapa (northern Estonia). One more base, that of the USSR Air Force in Tartu with the headquarters in Smolensk, serves long-range strategic bombers. For a long time several nuclear bombs had been stationed at the base but last year they were removed from there, Mr. Puura noted.

He also said that Edgar Savisaar and State Minister Raivo Vare are set to meet with USSR Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov in Moscow Thursday.

Yesterday, October 1, in Tallinn Mr. Savisaar and Commander of the 6th North-Western Army of the USSR Air Defense Force Major-General Anatoliy Ivanov agreed to close the Parnu air base.

Withdrawal To Be Negotiated

*PM0710135991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Oct 91 First Edition p 1*

[Report by Colonel V. Streltsov and Captain 2d Rank V. Urban incorporating reports on interviews with St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak and Yuriy Kakhn, Estonian permanent representative to Moscow, under the "Sore Spot" rubric; date and place of interviews not stated: "Estonia: What Status Will Our Troops Have?"]

[Text] St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak has been appointed head of the delegation for talks with the Estonian Republic.

In Sobchak's opinion, "the talks should be conducted on a scientific basis." According to RIA reports, he noted that it is first and foremost necessary to define the range of problems subject to discussion and the sides' claims on the various issues. Actually, Sobchak believes that it is too early to start talks at the moment. The Estonian leadership must be ready to hold talks, he thinks. It is assumed that the initial work will be done by a group of experts who will outline possible compromise solutions, and only after this will the USSR delegation sit down at the negotiating table, Sobchak said.

Our correspondent put the following question to Anatoliy Aleksandrovich: How does he perceive the status of Soviet troops on the territory of the Baltic states, and what is his position in this difficult matter?

This is his answer:

[Sobchak] There is an integrated system of state defense security. This is a system costing hundreds of billions of

rubles. And therefore it cannot be changed overnight. At the moment we can only talk about future changes. The Baltic states are insisting on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from their territory. And this is their legitimate right. Independent states are entitled to have no foreign troops on their territory. But our troops will be there under the terms of a treaty. The treaty will also define the status of troops temporarily stationed on adjacent territory.

Let me note that Japan is one of the richest countries in the world, and the presence of U.S. troops there does not cause any problems. In exactly the same way, the presence of U.S. troops in Germany and South Korea has not prevented them from prospering. Thus the actual fact of troops being stationed there has absolutely no effect at all on real economic conditions. We simply have to agree the terms for the stationing and maintenance of Soviet troops on the territory of the Baltic states.

Our position, therefore, is as follows. Until the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany and other East European countries has been completed (and we shall be withdrawing troops from there in a systematic manner, ensuring housing for the contingent of servicemen being withdrawn, creating jobs, and so on), we will not withdraw troops from the Baltics. This position is clear and unequivocal. Once Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Germany we will discuss the withdrawal of troops from the Baltics. And once again, with due consideration for all ensuing consequences. [Sobchak ends]

But what is the Estonian leadership's position? Yuri Kakhn, permanent representative of the Estonian Republic Government in Moscow, told our correspondent over the telephone that the republic is interested in finding normal solutions to defining the future status of Soviet troops. This solution should be defined within the framework of the talks. At the moment Estonia does not have a definitive position to put forward at the talks, he went on to note. At any rate, information about this has not reached the permanent mission.

As far as the time frame for troop withdrawal is concerned, Mr. Kakhn expressed his point of view: The republic is naturally keen on the earliest possible troop withdrawal, but since much depends on economic questions (payment for the lease of bases, for example) and this will be mutually beneficial, compromise solutions are possible.

Agreement in Principle Reached

OW0410124991 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1100 GMT 4 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Estonia's Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar and the USSR Defense Minister Yevgeny Shaposhnikov agreed in principle in Moscow on Thursday that the Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Estonian territory.

The agreement is the first official document whereby the Soviet Union pledges to pull its troops out of a Baltic republic.

The parties wrote down that the time limits for the Soviet pullout would be set by an intergovernmental treaty between the two countries, and the order of the troop withdrawal by separate protocols.

The Estonian Minister of State Raivo Vare told BF [BALTFAX] that E. Savisaar and Y. Shaposhnikov had also agreed orally that the military withdrawal would begin without delay. Specifically, two battalions of assault troops would leave Estonia within the next month.

Under the agreement, Estonia will regain the land currently occupied by Soviet Army units. Until they leave for home, Soviet troops will be paying land rent to Estonia.

The agreement says the USSR Defense Ministry will consider the opportunities for transferring to the Estonian government on mutually acceptable terms certain amounts of weapons, ammunition and military hardware.

Mr. Vare noted that the army command displayed what he called "the Karabakhi syndrom" in formulating with "double care" the provision on the transfer of weapons to the Estonian side.

The parties agreed to set up a joint commission to define the status of the Soviet contingent temporarily staying on Estonian territory, and to work out suggestions concerning the time limits and order of the troop withdrawal. No additional forces will be sent to Estonia, and no new military bases will be set up on its territory. The strength of the military contingent will not exceed that of September 1 1991.

Soviet Army units have been ordered not to block on the territories they control the fulfillment of duties by the police, customs service, border guards, or other government services in Estonia.

During the period until an intergovernmental treaty is signed, the USSR Defense Ministry will "substantially restrict" the holding of field and shooting exercises on Estonian territory. Each such operation will be coordinated with the republican government.

The government of Estonia, for its part, undertakes to guarantee the observance of the social and civil rights of army servicemen and their families on Estonian territory.

R. Vare said Thursday's talks had revealed a number of differences between the negotiating parties, and the agreement signed was a "matter of compromise." For instance, the date of the beginning of the Soviet troop withdrawal was crossed out from the text. Although we did not discuss any time limits for the Soviet pullout, I

believe the bulk of the Soviet contingent can be withdrawn from Estonia during the next 12 months, R. Vare observed.

Asked whether the Soviet Defense Ministry would receive any compensation for the fixed assets it was leaving to Estonia, Mr. Vare said one of the possible measures might be to sell ex-military installations on Estonia's market of immovable property and offer the proceeds (with the deduced interest) to departing army servicemen in the form of bonuses.

Discussion of Plans for Withdrawal From Baltics

Supreme Soviet's Ochirov Comments

LD0310200491 Moscow TASS in English 1907 GMT
3 Oct 91

[By TASS correspondents Oleg Moskovsky and Andrei Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, October 3 (TASS)—“Specific political steps and measures are needed to enable the identification of the legal status of the Soviet troops stationed in the Baltic republics over the transitional period,” Valeriy Ochirov, deputy chairman of the Committee on Defence and Security Affairs of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, told TASS.

“The status will enable a systematic and smooth fulfillment of arrangements connected with the troops withdrawal,” he said.

In a TASS interview upon the completion of a meeting of the Soviet Defence Ministry's Board, Ochirov stressed that “any politically or strategically significant solution on the Baltics should be made in the interests of people,” and that “interests of all sides should be taken into account, including Baltics peoples, thousands of Soviet servicemen and members of their families, and reserve militarymen.”

This stand of the people's deputy seems to be rather substantiated. TASS has learned from reliable sources, that almost 20,000 Soviet militarymen of active service and reserve have recently received notifications from the court authorities with a demand to immediately leave the housing granted to them by local councils.

“All problems, including this one, can and should be solved on the basis of a political consensus at the negotiations table,” Ochirov noted in this connection.

Soviet Commander Views Deadline

LD0710233491 Moscow TASS in English 2304 GMT
7 Oct 91

[By correspondent Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga, October 8 (TASS)—“The extremely radical formulation of the question may create yet another hotbed of confrontation. I do not think this decision can

be fulfilled,” commander of the troops of the Baltic Military District Lieutenant-General Valeriy Mironov said, commenting on the decision of the Baltic Council on the deadline for the withdrawal of Soviet Army units from the territory of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

It was announced today that representatives of the three Baltic republics had agreed on October 5 that they would work towards the withdrawal of all Soviet Army troops from the capitals of the three republics before December 1, 1991.

The question about deadlines for the withdrawal of Soviet Army units must be decided at the inter-governmental level, Mironov told TASS. “Let us look the truth in the eye. It is possible to withdraw troops from the capitals and accommodate them in barracks on three-tier beds, it is possible to set up a field camp, but all this requires a lot of money and time”.

Over the past few days, many families of servicemen in the Baltics have been notified by local authorities that they must vacate apartments they are now occupying. These actions are obviously directly related to the solution of the problem of citizenship.

“As the commander of Armed Forces in the district cannot turn a blind eye to the attempts not to let us complete construction of housing that is already underway, to the fact that almost 11,000 people have no apartments,” the general said.

“There is no ground to believe that troops can be withdrawn overnight or within a week. People need somewhere to live”.

All this causes tension in relations between local authorities and the military, Mironov said.

Because of this, it is necessary to define the legal basis of our relations, the status of troops and their commander.

“Participants in the recent meeting of the collegium of the USSR Defence Ministry agreed unanimously—there is the need to grant the commander of the troops in the District the rights of an authorized representative of the Soviet Government for the transition period,” the general said.

Lithuanian Radio Comments

LD0910083291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 0200 GMT 7 Oct 91

[“Review of Events” program, presented by Edvinas Butkus]

[Text] As you remember, last week we started our report with Vytautas Landsbergis' idea that the Soviet armed forces, at least the main contingent, should be withdrawn from Lithuania by the New Year. Both he and other high-ranking officials have been stressing during the

week that the withdrawal of the troops is not a subject for negotiation—only a certain technical agreement could be made on this matter.

Last week the same stance was confirmed also by Latvian and Estonian officials, and what is more, they had direct contacts in Moscow with high-ranking Soviet officials, and it seems that they also stressed to them to withdraw the troops without delay. Estonian Prime Minister Savisaar has even signed a provisional agreement on this matter with Soviet Defence Minister Shaposhnikov.

It was partly because of this concern about the present of Soviet troops in the Baltic states that the leaders of the Baltic states met in Vilnius on Saturday. The document adopted on this most important issue has not yet been made public. This does not mean that the public interests will suffer, that the Baltic leaders are intending to make preliminary compromises to the Soviet; however, it means that as before, the positions and the possibilities of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are not the same.

It was announced officially at a new conference when the sitting of the Baltic Council was about to be concluded that a demand had been included into the document that the troops should be withdrawn from the capital cities by December. However, it was not explained if this applied to all the capitals. The demand was made that the Soviet troops be withdrawn as soon as possible; however, the deadline was not given. The leadership of the Soviet armed forces was urged to solve the social problems facing the servicemen, while Western as well as the Baltic countries concerned about the withdrawal of the troops were urged to grant material help to the Soviets. The German example was mentioned at the news conference.

It was discovered from persons close to the negotiation process, people who did not wish to have their names made public, that the demand for the withdrawal of troops in the document did not name all the capital cities: It is not too difficult to guess which one is missing. In raising such a demand the position of Vilnius is not favorable; the position of Tallinn is worse because of several circumstances, one of which, without mentioning purely military matters, is the fact that comparatively not much progress has been made in Estonia in setting up their own structures for the defense of the country and special police units, which, for example, could successfully take over guarding prisons. Concerning Riga, the headquarters of the Soviet armed forces stationed in the Baltic states is in Riga.

In brief, the discussion of the document concerning the withdrawal of the armed forces and the final result revealed that Lithuanian positions are indeed the strongest; Lithuania has prepared itself well and therefore Lithuania's voice is the strongest. It looks as though the adopted document somewhat softens Lithuania's stance. However, if the Soviets are expecting this they will be mistaken.

The front of the Baltic states in the campaign against the Soviets continues to remain uneven, however. The obligation undertaken by the states mark the line from which there is no retreat. However, it says nothing about how much further one can advance. There is no doubt Lithuania will advance once again.

Concerning the new idea to urge the West to help the Soviet armed forces to leave the Baltic shores, Vytautas Landsbergis will have a chance to test this idea on 8 October when he meets British Prime Minister John. Perhaps it is one of the most suitable countries, bearing in mind that in this situation nothing could be expected from the Germans.

As is known, no news came from Eduard Shevardnadze last week. He had been appointed head of the Soviet negotiation delegation. We do not know if the Soviet delegation has been set up, although according to Aleksandr Yakovlev, he had already made up the team for the negotiations with Latvia and it is now getting ready. It is possible that the Soviet tactics in the negotiations with the Baltic states could be difference in every aspect. However, continuing to ignore Lithuania would turn into a scandal. I think that this week we will hear the news from the Kremlin.

Defense Ministry Spokesman on Timetable

OW0910211791 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2000 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Valeriy Manilov, head of the USSR Defense Ministry's Information Department, told a news briefing in Moscow that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltics will begin only after places of their new stationing are prepared. In his words, Soviet troops will remain on the territory of the Baltics at least until the end of 1994.

Mr. Manilov suggested that by that time the USSR may take a decision on paying compensation for the Soviet troops' stationing in the Baltics to their governments.

Calls Deadline 'Unrealistic'

LD0910230291 Moscow TASS in English
2237 GMT 9 Oct 91

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, October 10 (TASS)—Chief of Soviet Defence Ministry information service Valeriy Manilov on Wednesday [9 October] told a briefing the Baltic Council's demand for a full withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia by December 1, 1991 is "unrealistic and sounds like an ultimatum. Therefore, it does not fit human, civilised relations between the states".

The briefing was devoted to the results of inter-republican consultations at the Soviet Defence Ministry

on Tuesday [8 October] on preparations and implementation of radical military reform.

The consultations were attended by representatives of all Soviet republics, except the Ukraine and the Baltic states.

The majority of them stressed the need for a single defence space and single armed forces.

He said the Soviet Defence Ministry will base its relations with the Baltic states on the recognition of their independence.

He said most likely preference will be given to inter-state agreements based on international norms, adding that a large-scale withdrawal of troops from the Baltic states will begin not earlier than 1994.

Latvia, Moscow Discuss Troop Withdrawal

Yakovlev, Parliamentarian Meet

*OW0310213291 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2010 GMT 3 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Latvia's permanent mission in Moscow was the venue on October 3 of a tete-a-tete meeting between the heads of the delegations at Soviet-Latvian talks, namely between Mr. Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Political Advisory Council of the president of the USSR, and Mr. Janis Dinevich, leader of the Popular Front group in Latvia's parliament.

Mr. Dinevich told a "BALTFAX" correspondent that this had been a preliminary meeting of the two heads of delegations "aimed at getting acquainted with each other". He also said they had been pinpointing the items that will come up at future discussions. According to Mr. Dinevich, these will be primarily economic matters, as well as the issue of withdrawing Soviet troops from Latvia. According to information received by our correspondent from the permanent representative of Latvia in Moscow, Mr. Janis Peters, it is the intention of Latvia to press for Soviet Armed Forces to be pulled out at the earliest possible time, while their status in the meantime should be defined as temporary.

Interior Ministry Troops Begin Withdrawal

*OW0810195591 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1930 GMT 8 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Latvian Interior Minister Aloizs Vaznis told BF [BALTFAX] that the withdrawal of the USSR Interior Ministry's troops from Latvia began on October 8. In his words, in the first place, regiment 54/59 of the Riga militia which during the past year guarded the Communist Party's property will be withdrawn.

After that another militia regiment engaged in guarding prisons and convoying prisoners will be gradually pulled out. Mr. Vaznis explained that this regiment cannot be withdrawn overnight because it is necessary to prepare its substitute which may take two months. The minister also said that about 1,800 people, including officers, are needed to guard the prisons. The prisons will be guarded mainly by young men drafted for the Latvian state service.

Mr. Vaznis pointed out that in accordance with an agreement with Soviet Interior Minister Colonel-General Viktor Barannikov, Soviet interior troops will leave Latvia by the end of this year.

Further Report

*LD0910101491 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 0500 GMT 9 Oct 91*

[Text] Withdrawal of the USSR interior troops from Latvia started yesterday. Internal Affairs Minister Aloizs stated in an interview to a BNS correspondent that armed forces' unit No. 54-59, the so-called Riga militia regiment, which in the course of the past year was engaged in guarding Communist Party properties, began to withdraw. Armed forces' unit No. 74-58, which was engaged in guarding places of imprisonment and escorting imprisoned persons, would be withdrawn gradually.

As Vaznis reported, a gradual withdrawal of the armed forces' units is necessary so young men to be called up into the compulsory state service for guarding places of imprisonment can be suitably trained. It is planned to accomplish this training within two months. As Vaznis announced, to guard the places of imprisonment in Latvia, approximately 1,800 men, including officers and additional service soldiers, are required. He emphasized that after an agreement with the USSR minister of internal affairs, Colonel General Barannikov, all USSR interior troops will have left Latvia by the end of this year.

WGF Chief Confirms No Nuclear Arms in Germany

*PM0810104991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Oct 91 Union Edition p 5*

[By correspondent V. Lapskiy: "To Dispel Misunderstanding"]

[Text] Berlin—The Social Democratic politician Norbert Gansel maintains that not all the nuclear weapons that were at the disposal of the Western Group of Forces [WGF] have been removed from the territory of the former GDR. Newspapers have now taken up his statement and are casting doubt on the sincerity of our politicians and military figures with respect to Germany.

I asked Colonel General M.P. Burlakov, commander in chief of the WGF, to comment on Gansel's statement.

"This statement," Matvey Prokopyevich said in conversation with me, "does not correspond to the truth, to put it mildly. We have given the German newspapers a denial, and I personally handed the text of it to Bjoern Engholm, chairman of the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany]. I expressed my attitude that an SPD politician is accusing us of dishonesty. I got the impression that Mr. Engholm, on the whole, understands our concern. I hope that some steps will be taken in this sphere.

"I want to assure the Soviet and German public," Gen. Burlakov continued, "that we have removed the remaining nuclear weapons from the territory of the former GDR, and there are now none at the disposal of the WGF. The bulk of the nuclear charges was removed to the USSR as long ago as last year. What was left was under the direct jurisdiction of senior chiefs. I told Mr. Engholm that I would agree to make available for inspection any point in the WGF. Let competent persons see for themselves that we are behaving honestly and not concealing any nuclear ammunition.

"On Thursday [3 October] I was handed a request from FRG Defense Minister Stoltenberg that said he would like to send working groups to us for the purpose of conducting a check. He named two points German experts intend to visit: Torgau and Zeithain. We await the German specialists' arrival and hope that the misunderstanding occasioned by Gansel's statement will soon be dispelled."

CFE Treaty Implementation Issues Viewed

PM0910142591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Oct 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by V. Tatarnikov and I. Usachev, staffers of the Russian-American University: "Food for Thought: On the Question of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe"]

[Text] The crisis of the structures of legislative and executive power in the Soviet Union is hindering the solution of many vitally important problems. One should also add to them those arising in connection with the CFE Treaty.

This treaty was signed in Paris almost a year ago by the heads of the 22 states of NATO and the now-disbanded Warsaw Pact. By establishing a balance of forces from the Atlantic to the Urals at a substantially reduced level, it is designed to eliminate the threat of surprise attack or large-scale offensive operations by any state in Europe. Its implementation would help stabilize the situation on the continent, curb the arms race, and help the member states make the transition to defensive doctrines.

A characteristic of the treaty is that the deep arms reductions outlined in it should be implemented by the participants in precise sequence throughout the area of application and should adhere to a schedule to ensure the

sides' security while observing equilibrium between them. In 1994 the collective level for each of the two groups of states must not exceed the following: tanks—20,000; armored personnel carriers—30,000; artillery—20,000 pieces; warplanes—6,800; strike helicopters—2,000; and armored bridgelayers—740. Levels of arms have also been established for each party to the treaty. For the USSR, they are:

- 13,150 tanks of which 2,650 at depots;
- 20,000 armored personnel carriers, of which 2,000 at depots;
- 13,175 units of artillery, of which 2,350 at depots;
- 5,150 warplanes;
- 1,500 strike helicopters;
- and 462 armored bridgelayers among regular troops.

In addition—and this is very significant—the full area of application of the treaty from the Atlantic to the Urals is divided into agreed regions where there may be a strictly limited number of armaments and military hardware.

Even a general acquaintance with the treaty's provisions shows the complexity of the measures that our country will have to carry out to realize its requirements. After all, for the treaty to go into force it is necessary to reduce the total number of armaments to the level envisaged in it on the whole territory of the European USSR and consequently on the territories of the union republics situated there which have declared themselves to be sovereign states. A number of new factors arise in that connection.

The Soviet Union is the party to the treaty and bears full responsibility for the treaty's entry into force and implementation. But since the treaty was signed events have taken place in our country which cannot be ignored. For example, the Baltic states have acquired independence. The question is: Should their armed forces be counted in the USSR's level of armaments?

The next question is the creation of military formations—national guards and so forth—in the republics. If they are equipped with military hardware mentioned in the treaty but above the limits set for the USSR, that would constitute a violation of it. Who will bear the responsibility in that case?

There are fears in the world as to how successfully the Union will manage to pass through the transitional period. It is doubtful that the Western powers would ratify the treaty before the situation in our country becomes clear although it cannot be ruled out that some NATO countries will agree to ratification before us. In that case, we could be accused of creating obstacles to the strengthening of stability in Europe and the lowering of the level of military confrontation by not ratifying the treaty.

In brief, the time has come when solutions must be found. The renewed USSR Supreme Soviet, empowered to ratify international treaties and agreements, will soon resume its activity. Until then, however, it is not clear: Will it be capable of assuming the responsibility not only

for the act of ratification but also for the concomitant consequences in regard to ensuring the prompt and complete fulfillment of commitments under the treaty across the entire area of its application in the USSR? The honest answer would seem to be no, it is not. In any event not until there is a firm commitment from the republics to observe the provisions of the treaty relating to their territories, especially in the Baltics, the Ukraine, the Transcaucasus, and Moldova.

Of course the republics themselves could adopt such commitments but for that they need to define their attitude toward the Union of states that is to replace the old structure of the Soviet Union and to find their place in it. And indeed, to give their own assessment of the treaty and formulate their own attitude toward it. However, time does not stand still, the treaty exists, and it must be implemented. The European states are already engaged on this. What about us?

In our view it would be reasonable right now to agree with the republics a procedure for implementing the CFE Treaty. It is difficult to talk seriously about its fulfillment without the republics' commitment not to exceed the arms levels for the regions, especially on the flanks (in the Baltics, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan). This also relates to the right to inspect Soviet Army formations and units in the republics and inspect their national formations.

From the viewpoint of the reliability of the defense of the future Union of sovereign states and the creation of guarantees of military-political stability within the confines of its space, it would be sensible to have unified armed forces. The advantages of such a decision are obvious, in terms of both ensuring the security of the sovereign republics and reducing the economic burden on the participants. However, the existence of unified Union armed forces does not exclude the possibility of the republics' creating their own military formations. There must be complete clarity here. It is one thing if a national guard represents a form of internal troops with the functions of safeguarding the security of republic institutions and maintaining order. Then, having clearly defined its status, it should be made distinct from the armed forces. It is another matter if a given republic creates—in the form of a national guard—a contingent or even a national army to protect its territory with arms limited by the treaty. In that event these contingents must be counted under the CFE Treaty and subject to control.

We believe that regardless of the character of the solution of the question of organizing the Union's Armed Forces there must be commitments from the sovereign republics on the implementation of the CFE Treaty. It would clearly be sensible for the republics to delegate to the USSR Supreme Soviet (or to another higher organ of the Union which may emerge at the end of the transitional period) the powers necessary to ratify the treaty as well as the powers necessary to ensure the monitoring of its fulfillment. It is possible, in our view, to institute a

coordinating organ comprising representatives of the center and the republics whose territory falls within the area of application of the treaty. Such an organ, empowered to resolve questions which arise during the implementation of the treaty, could take part in talks to introduce amendments, clarifications, and additions to the treaty if such are required.

It seems to us that the republics' leadership should be giving thought now to the problems of implementing the treaty so as not to conflict with the interests of its participants and not place the enactment of the treaty in jeopardy. The republics could confirm commitments arising from the CFE Treaty and from other current agreements signed by the Soviet Union. It is obvious that the following agreements are not at variance with their interests: the commitments under the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Three Environments, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or the International Convention Banning Bacteriological Weapons. Similar steps by sovereign republics would help to create a favorable climate for the ratification and implementation of the CFE Treaty and would demonstrate a responsible attitude to their duty and commitments as subjects of international relations.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Arguments for Total Nuclear Test Ban Examined

PM0310094991 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Sep 91 pp 1, 2

[Article by A. Mokerov and A. Sanin, associates of the USSR Academy of Sciences Program Research Center, under the "Competent Opinion" rubric: "Can Nuclear Testing Be Abandoned?"]

[Text] Now that Russia is faced with the real possibility of becoming the only nuclear republic among the states of the renewed Union, we believe that the time is ripe to return once more to this question: Is a complete ban on nuclear testing a dream or a reality?

Let us remind you that the United States and the USSR have officially acknowledged the impossibility of winning a nuclear war. The Soviet-U.S. statement adopted in Geneva in November 1985 states: "Nuclear war must never be unleashed" and "It can have no winners." So why, then, continue improving these terrible weapons?

More than 50,000 nuclear warheads have been stockpiled in the world, of which approximately 30,000 are in the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and approximately 20,000 in the United States. We have already become nuclear hostages of each other. Our mutual nuclear balance is stable, and no further improvement of nuclear weapons is capable of shaking it. A further buildup of the lethal arsenals has lost all military-strategic meaning. Therefore the introduction of even quite lengthy unilateral moratoriums on nuclear testing today involves no risk for either the USSR or the United States.

In our view the arguments cited in favor of continuing nuclear testing are insufficiently convincing. Chief among them are the following:

First argument: "The need to modernize the existing complexes of weapons which carry nuclear warheads."

To date the USSR has carried out 715 nuclear explosions. This number includes explosions carried out at the Semipalatinsk test site and in Novaya Zemlya, the peaceful nuclear explosions carried out in various parts of the USSR, and also the nuclear explosion carried out in Orenburg Oblast's Tot'skiy Rayon during troop exercises 17 October 1954. The United States has carried out 1,080 nuclear explosions. The United States is in the lead here. But if you take the total yield of charges tested through 1963, when the Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Three Environments was signed, then the USSR has considerably outstripped its rival, having exploded charges with a total yield of approximately 450 megatons, against 141 megatons in the United States. Over the past 20 years the USSR has carried out 51 more explosions (366 against 315).

By carrying out such a number of nuclear tests the two sides evidently ensured the creation of a quite wide range of types of nuclear charges—which enabled them to achieve parity. This nuclear ammunition, based on experience of the existing first- and second-generation nuclear weapons, will evidently be able to continue to arm new and modernized nuclear weapon complexes for approximately 15-20 years. Thus, for the modernization and development of new weapon complexes, it is not necessary to conduct nuclear tests at least until the year 2000.

Second argument: "Nuclear tests are needed for the purpose of enhancing the safety, reliability, and efficiency of nuclear warheads and checking the existing nuclear warheads in the arsenal."

However, the reliability of nuclear warheads can be maintained at the prescribed level without carrying out real tests, just by testing mock-ups of nuclear warheads containing conventional explosives. In confirmation of the aforesaid it is possible to cite the authoritative opinion of Academician A. Sakharov, one of the creators of thermonuclear weapons in our country: "We can check all the circumstances connected with the storage of nuclear weapons without carrying out a real explosion, by making all the systems function with the exception of the final factor—the nuclear explosion. If the nuclear fuel is replaced by a passive substance, the final stage does not need to be checked."

Third argument: "Enhancement of the protection of nuclear warheads and models of military hardware against the damage producing elements of a nuclear explosion."

An alternative to nuclear tests in the interests of creating models of arms with enhanced protection against the damage producing elements of a nuclear explosion can

be provided by a calculated theoretical assessment of their durability and protection with subsequent experimental confirmation of the levels of this protection on existing accelerators, reactors, and other experimental installations simulating the damage producing elements of a nuclear explosion.

Fourth argument: "The need for nuclear testing in order to develop third generation nuclear weapons."

Third generation nuclear weapons (or directed energy nuclear weapons) are weapons in which a considerable part of the energy of the explosion is transformed into a form different from the shock wave and thermal radiation and is concentrated in a set direction. Probably, the development of such weapons can serve as the only grounds in favor of continuing nuclear testing. Therefore it is possible to maintain that its cessation is linked primarily with the cessation of development of third generation nuclear weapons. And this is why it is so important to prevent the development of third generation nuclear weapons from escalating from the scientific research stage into the stage of real, full-scale tests.

Whether or not third generation nuclear weapons should exist is a question requiring a political solution! This means that, given the good will, there are virtually no obstacles to the conclusion of a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear testing. And, if it cannot be reached in the very near future, it is possible to introduce a ban in stages, by using appropriate restrictions and limits on the number of tests, the yields of the charges being tested, and also the test sites.

Also worthy of note is the question of so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, which can be used to construct canals, to expose mineral deposits, to create underground reservoirs for the storage of petroleum products and toxic waste, to intensify the exploitation of oil and gas, etc. The quest for such ways to employ the "peaceful atom" was long since stopped in the United States. Such explosions are not practiced in other countries.

There have been 115 peaceful nuclear explosions conducted in various parts of the Soviet Union. These include something of the order of 12 explosions on the territory of Yakutia, starting in the seventies, and 16 in the region of Azgir (Astrakhan Oblast) from 1968 through 1979. There were 25 underground explosions near Astrakhan during the period 1980-1984.

The last peaceful nuclear explosion in the USSR was carried out in Tyumen Oblast in the summer of 1989.

Some of them had quite a large yield, like, for example, explosion "1004," carried out near the Shagan River (East Kazakhstan) 15 January 1965. The yield of that explosion totaled more than 100 kilotons.

The project to divert northern rivers into the Volga has still not been forgotten. Within the framework of this project it was planned to construct the Pechora-Kolva Canal, with the proposal that 65 km of its length be

created with the help of 250 nuclear explosions—which, in the opinion of experts, made it possible to reduce construction costs by a factor of between three and 3.5. Fortunately, that project did not come off—which, in our view, has averted a major ecological disaster. We believe that we are not exaggerating the danger. The 250 peaceful nuclear explosions (with a total yield of 750 megatons) would have discharged a vast quantity of radioactive soil and dust into the atmosphere and could have created a situation with extraordinarily serious ecological consequences (radioactive contamination) throughout the region.

The question of “turning Siberian rivers around” for the purpose of saving the Aral has recently begun to be debated once again. Without discussing the expediency of these projects, we would like to warn their new supporters against attempts to once again reduce the cost of possible work, if it ever begins, by using peaceful nuclear explosions.

It must be said most definitely that underground explosions—both those involving ejection of soil and those that are quite deep—are far from safe ecologically. A high level of radioactivity persists for as much as 100 years and more in the underground cavity of a nuclear explosion. Despite the fact that most of the radioactive products remain in a glass-like mass of hardened rock in the cavity of an explosion, a considerable quantity of them can get into the atmosphere. Nor can it be ruled out that the radionuclides of an underground explosion will be dissolved in and carried away by subsoil waters. At the same time the migration of radioactive isotopes results in their penetration of the plant and animal worlds and, through food chains, they might end up in the human organism.

Also rather debatable are the arguments of the supporters of continued nuclear testing in our country, claiming that its prohibition will result in “the degradation of unique collectives of highly-qualified professionals” engaged on nuclear weapons. If we were to follow this logic, the efforts that are being made to reduce and limit not only nuclear but also all kinds of arms, on which many collectives of specialists are working in our country, are completely pointless. Our task is precisely to ensure that these specialists and the corresponding organizations of the defense complex find their place within the framework of the current conversion and the realization of our “reasonable sufficiency” military doctrine.

So, there are no serious technical obstacles that could prevent the establishment of a regime of complete silence on nuclear test sites in the USSR and the United States. And, mindful of the favorable trends taking shape in relations between the USSR, Russia—the chief holder of the country’s nuclear potential, and the United States, there is a chance of securing a complete nuclear test ban already by 1995. And it is necessary to step up joint efforts to ensure that this chance becomes a reality!

‘Secret Laws’ Target Kyshtym Nuclear Weapons Pollution

92P50007A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 3 Oct 91 p 1

[Article by V. Nedogonov; “Kyshtym: A Nuclear Explosion With a 40-Year Record of Service;” satellite photograph accompanying article not reproduceable due to poor quality]

[Text] I recently saw secret laws with my own eyes. For example, the “Decree of the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies: ‘On Urgent Measures for Eliminating the Consequences of the 1957 Nuclear Release and the Emergency Radiation Situations of 1949-1956 and 1967 in the Urals Region.’” Judging from the text, the Congress has resolved “to declare this region a national ecological disaster area” and has instructed the government “to adopt a program for eliminating the consequences...and normalizing the situation in the area of the Mayak Production Association.” Signed: “Lukyanov. Moscow. The Kremlin.”

And here is another: “Decree of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet: ‘On Urgent Measures for Eliminating the Consequences...’” The text resembles that of the previous decree, except the signature reads: “Yeltsin.”

The ink had barely dried on the USSR President’s order to create an expert commission to investigate the ecological situation in the South Urals when this thick file of documents emerged. It was immediately distributed to all members of the commission. The folder contains plans for providing hundreds of millions of rubles for normalizing the situation at the Mayak Production Association (which consists of factories for producing radioactive nuclear weapons components, plants for reclaiming nuclear fuel, a radioisotope factory, radioactive waste reprocessing facilities, etc.) and tens of millions for hospital construction.

The South Urals, of course, require material assistance. Two thousand seven hundred square km are now “aglow” there, and 437,000 people have been exposed to elevated levels of radioactivity. To all appearances, the atom-mongers already have a solution for the Kyshtym problem.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Sverdlovsk 1979 Anthrax Outbreak Revisited

Official Version Supported

91WP0150A Sverdlovsk URALSKIY RABOCHIY
in Russian 12 Mar 90 p unknown

[Article by S. Bogomolov: “19th Post: a Reporter Is a Rare Guest Here”]

[Text] This is truly a town within a city: here, beyond a concrete wall, in places with barbed wire, is everything

needed for the independent existence of adults as well as children. There are two schools—a music school and an intermediate school (with a computer class, by the way)—and a House of Culture. It even has its own firemen.

Life at this place flows significantly more calmly than it does for other citizens of Sverdlovsk. They do not have their own hooligans here and outsiders cannot get through the KPP [checkpoint]. As for those who like to go over fences illegally, their actions are stopped most decisively. The post is clean and well maintained and everything is visible.

By the way, why is it called the 19th? It turns out that there is no secret here. The military builders very simply have the habit of numbering their facilities. So this name stuck with the people in Sverdlovsk, especially since the real name of this institution was known to only a small circle of persons. We can now say it. URALSKIY RAB-OCHIIY has already reported on the visit of a delegation of public representatives and journalists to military scientists at the 19th post. Here is located the Sector for Military Epidemiology of the Microbiology Research Institute of the Defense Ministry. A research institute for vaccines was located here until 1986. And even before then, the Cherkassko-Sverdlovskoye Infantry School was here.

By the way, we were not primarily interested in this remote past but in the comparatively recent past. Whatever the scientists showed us and whatever they said, the conversation inevitably returned to the main question.

The Tragedy of 1979—Who is Guilty?

An epidemic of anthrax was registered in that memorable year of 1979 for all citizens of Sverdlovsk. Although not many, there were some people who knew that some sort of work having to do with anthrax was going on in the 19th post. The fact that vaccines against this horrible disease were being developed and produced there was known to a very small group of people. The atmosphere of secrecy did even more to enhance the alarming situation.

Official reports failed to mention the 19th post, which supported the version of the rumors even more. The military departments remained silent—demonstratively and arrogantly, as it seemed to everyone then. The only source that they believed more than the official statements was the broadcasts of various “radio voices” that sometimes penetrated the “thickets.” Our mass media reacted sluggishly.

Meanwhile, in Chkalovskiy Rayon, they were washing roofs and people in protective suits and gas masks took samples next to the post and in places the upper layer of soil was removed. When patients arrived at the city hospital No 40, they were asked whether they had anything to do with the 19th post. All of this increased

the panic in the city and gave rise to even more frightening rumors. People were firmly convinced: something of the military exploded and the wind had spread the poison through part of Chkalovskiy Rayon....

Naturally our delegation was primarily interested in this question of who is guilty of this tragedy. I will mention that the delegation was made up of People's Deputy of the USSR V. Shmotyev; First Secretary of the Sverdlovsk CPSU Gorkom V. Kadochnikov; First Secretary of the Chkalovskiy CPSU Raykom A. Voronin; Chairman of the Chkalovskiy Rayispolkom G. Ionov; V. Chukanov, professor, doctor of physical and mathematical sciences, and director of the scientific-engineering center for ecological safety of the Ural Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V. Trubnikov, chairman of the city committee for the preservation of nature; and several journalists.

I am not a specialist in microbiology and epidemiology. In 1979, I was a student and the basis for all my knowledge of those events was those same rumors and an incomprehensible as well as overdue article in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. Just as most other citizens of Sverdlovsk, I was certain that it could not have happened without the military here. But I heard the arguments of the military people and they seemed quite convincing to me. By the way, let us allow them to speak for themselves. Col. A. Kharechko, chief of the Sector for Military Epidemiology and candidate of technical sciences:

“The rumors circulating in the city in the spring of 1979 about a supposed explosion in the territory of our institution and ejection into the external environment of an anthrax pathogen were without any real basis. Above all because we never had anything at all to do with explosions. There simply were not such substances, materials, or processes in our laboratories that could lead to an explosion.

“I think that this absurd version was spread because most people are more inclined to believe fantastic things than real and natural explanations. Clearly the very unusual and tragic nature of the situation required such unusual and sensational reasons. A very important role was also played by the regime of secrecy and the infamous departmental interests.

“Prior to 1986, our institute dealt with technological developments and the production of vaccines for the protection of troops and the population of the country against a number of dangerous infections. In 1986, this work was stopped and the technology was transferred to the USSR Ministry of Health.”

Candidate of Medical Sciences B. Mikhaylov, one of the leading specialists of the sector:

“Indeed—and this has been established—the outbreak of cases of anthrax among people was caused by a

previous outbreak of this infection among farm animals in many population centers of the southern part of Sverdlovsk Oblast.

"This was discussed frankly in an article by the professors N. Bezdenzhnykh and V. Nikiforov published in 1980 in *ZHURNAL MIKROBIOLOGII, EPIDEMIOLOGII I IMMUNOBIOLOGII*. By the way, for some reason it was also published later in a narrowly specialized journal only. It authors dealt directly with an epidemiological analysis of the outbreak. They directly proved that anthrax is endemic in Sverdlovsk Oblast. There were 159 flareups of this disease registered among animals here just in the period between 1936 and 1968. They were noted in 371 population centers, in 48 of them 2 to 6 times.

"As you know, such outbreaks are fostered by the improper burial of dead animals, the incorrect maintenance of burial grounds for animal refuse, the performance of large-scale earthworks without coordination with veterinary and sanitary supervisory agencies, abrupt rises in subsoil and ground waters, and a number of climatic factors.

"I think that the presence of a large number of stable soil sources of anthrax in the territory of the oblast must be the subject of the constant attention of medical and veterinary services and that it is necessary to do systematic prophylactic work. Those desiring to learn more details about this epidemic may turn to these sources: *ZHURNAL MIKROBIOLOGII, EPIDEMIOLOGII I IMMUNOBIOLOGII* No 5, 1980; the journal *CHELOVEK I ZAKON* No 9, 1980; and the journal *VETERINARIYA* No 10, 1980."

So What Are They Doing Here?

We went through buildings and laboratories and saw much and of course did not understand everything. But it was clear that before us was a well-equipped research center with a large potential. What was the thrust of the work of the military scientists? Are not all of their efforts superfluous with the current situation in the world?

"No," answered Col. A. Kharenko. "Research is being done on a large scale in this area in Western countries. To be sure, it is also done in private and not just government laboratories. And if you look at the regulations of the armed forces of these countries, you will see that they continue to provide for measures of antibacteriological protection. So it would be unwarranted carelessness for us to stop this work in the area of antibacteriological protection on a unilateral basis.

"I emphasize that our research, being a necessary and important element in the strengthening of the country's defense capability, strictly corresponds to the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine. Here are the basic directions of our research: the development of methods and means for the disinfection of places, military equipment, arms, and gear; development of the means to protect people against biological aerosols and rapid

detection of harmful substances in the environment. There is also a completely new direction, that of the investigation of the mechanisms of the biological impairment of military equipment. Yes, there are microbes in nature that destroy metal and plastic. As you see, civilians also have an interest in the results of our research.

"And for this reason we are inviting cooperation. What can we do? We have been under cost accounting since 1989 and on a contractual basis we can provide culture media for laboratories, perform extremely complex chemical analyses for medical people, sterilize instruments and materials, carry out topical studies, certify localities, and perform ecological investigations....

"I saw how the ecologists V. Trubnikov and V. Chukanov, for example, took an interest in automatic sampling complexes remotely controlled by radio or wire communications channels. Civilian authorities do not have them. Set them up around the city and receive regular information on the state of the air mass during the day and especially at night, when some enterprises prefer to emit their wastes into the atmosphere. Is that not a godsend?"

We still had to clarify one other important question: Is not the nearness of the 19th post to housing blocks dangerous?

It is not, as we became convinced. Only nonpathogenic microorganisms were used in research. All work with cultures of pathogenic microbes is forbidden. They do not even exist in the culture museum. All of the work is under strict control and all emissions into the atmosphere and sewage are filtered and controlled in accordance with All-Union requirements. There have been no cases exceeding the allowable concentrations of harmful substances in the air and sewage.

This is what V. Shmotyev, people's deputy of the USSR, said in this regard:

"An important result of today's visit is the very fact of openness and frankness. The curtain of excessive secrecy that effectively covered everything, thereby hindering the work and contacts, has been lifted. Today's visit by your institution casts serious doubt on the myth that we are sitting on a 'bomb' and that the 19th military post is dangerous to life...."

V. Chukanov, director of the scientific-engineering center for ecological safety, shared the plans for joint work with the military: "It is very good that the wave of conversion has also reached institutions of this kind. But it is even better that the sector management is showing initiative and is not waiting until circumstances force it into this. And scientists of the sector can already do much for the city and oblast. For example, they can perform a bacteriological analysis of the water.

"Here we saw a good analytical basis for a high scientific level and outstanding professionalism of the sector staff members. We were indeed here for the first time but our

contacts began last year. Now the plans for the work of the center and Ural Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences include the theme 'Bacteriological monitoring (continuous control and issue of recommendations on the elimination of ecological contamination) at industrial centers and zones' jointly with the sector. For the time being, this will be Sverdlovsk, Pervouralsk, and Revda.

"In the first stage, we are proposing the development of a methodology for the taking of samples in the water, air, and soil for the isolation of medically significant and ecologically dangerous bacteria and methods for the detection of microorganisms in samples and their identification by type...."

Thus, the military scientists are inviting cooperation, as required by conversion and the very spirit of our time.

Yeltsin, KGB Roles in Investigation

91WP0150B Moscow KURANTY in Russian 1 Nov 90
p unknown

[Article by Boris Yarkov: "The Disease Was in the Shoulder Straps"]

[Text] At the beginning of April 1979, several patients came to one of the hospitals of Sverdlovsk with the same diagnosis: acute inflammation of the lungs. They were not able to save anyone. The autopsy revealed a new diagnosis: anthrax, and a very rare form of it—in the lungs. This was the beginning of an epidemic of anthrax in Sverdlovsk that cost more than 80 human lives, according to official data. But this fact remains cloaked in secrecy.

From the start of the epidemic, sanitary services pursued an active propaganda: "Wash your hands before eating." They inspected all of the livestock in the oblast. In the markets, people were forbidden to trade not only in uninspected meat but also in fruits and vegetables. Violators were fined. Frightened citizens stopped buying any meat but the number of sick did not decline.

Just a month after the tragedy, meager information reached the press to the effect that the reason for the epidemic was the use as food of the meat of sick animals bought from private persons. But the source of the infection of the animals, according to specialists, was one of the burial grounds for animal refuse in a suburb of Sverdlovsk.

Long before the appearance of such publications, there were ominous rumors circulating around the city about the release of bacteriological substances at the military post located on the outskirts of Sverdlovsk. They talked about some secret commissions that were looking into the reasons for the outbreak of the epidemic. Not only the official press but also party leaders of the oblast kept silent. One of them was B. Yeltsin, who at that time was

first secretary of the CPSU Obkom. Only at the beginning of this year, when he met with his electors in Sverdlovsk, did Yeltsin lift the curtain of secrecy a little:

"I knew about the existence at this post of a closed research center but I had no information about what it was doing specifically, although I could guess," said Boris Nikolayevich. "After the beginning of the epidemic, I appealed to the Ministry of Defense with a personal request that it look into the involvement of this center in what happened and that it remove research laboratories endangering the lives of hundreds of thousands of citizens of Sverdlovsk beyond the borders of the city. A large group of military specialists and KGB people arrived. They did not inform me personally of the results of their work, although with the passage of time some of the laboratories were removed beyond the boundaries of the military post."

But the authorities are continuing to adhere to the old official versions. The KGB people affirmed that a large group of intelligence people from Moscow and Sverdlovsk did indeed work there during those months. They supposedly were helping to look into the reasons for what happened. It was not possible to determine what specifically this help involved. Many questions remain open.

Although logically the epidemic should have covered the entire city of some one million inhabitants, residents of only one rayon adjacent to the military post were victims of anthrax. It was precisely here where they carried out mass vaccination of residents and treated the soil and facades of dwellings. So other rayons of the city did not cause any particular concern of specialists.

But the most obscure story is that of the illnesses. Today not a single case remains in the records of those hospitals where patients were treated for anthrax. According to the official version, all case histories of the illness were utilized by specialists in scientific work. But no one was able to say to whom personally they were given and whether there was an authorization for this.

The facts presented confirm the truth of the words stated in the pages of the American scientific journal IN THE WORLD OF SCIENCE. In Bernstein's article "Birth of the Program to Develop Bacteriological Weapons in the United States" in the eighth issue for 1987, it is stated, in particular: "In the United States in the early 1980's, people began to surmise that the Soviet Union was actively pursuing a program to develop bacteriological weapons. This caused the United States to expand its own program. The suspicions with respect to the USSR were dictated in part by cases of anthrax in Sverdlovsk in 1979 possibly caused by a leak of pathogens of this illness from a laboratory in which, according to U.S. assertions, bacteriological weapons were being developed."

More on Alleged Sverdlovsk Bacteriological Accident

92WN0012A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 39, 2 Oct 91 p 6

[Article by Natalya Zenova: "Military Secret. Part II"]

[Text] A year ago, our newspaper published my article, "Military Secret" (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 34, 1990), on an outbreak of malignant anthrax in Sverdlovsk in April 1979. Having investigated the circumstances of the incident, I concluded that the tragedy was not caused by people's consumption of infected meat in their food, as the official version reads, but by the release of a bacteriological weapon which occurred in the so-called 19th military cantonment.

The article debated the arguments of professors I. Bezdenezhnyy and V. Nikiforov, cited in the May 1980 issue of the ZHURNAL MIKROBIOLOGII, EPIDEMIOLOGII I IMMUNOLOGII, the only publication on this topic in the Soviet scientific press. I showed that there were by no means "isolated illnesses" in Sverdlovsk—the dead alone numbered about 70 people; that the infection penetrated by way of the respiratory tract, therefore the disease manifested predominately in the lungs; and that there is a reason the disease infected basically the residents of Chkalovskiy Rayon, living south of the military cantonment—at that time the winds blew from precisely that direction. The article ended with an appeal: To create a parliamentary commission and conduct an investigation of the Sverdlovsk accident.

No official reaction whatsoever followed. On this subject, the "upper echelons" kept the same graveyard silence that lies in sector 15 of the Eastern Cemetery, where victims of epidemics are buried according to special rules and where to this day people walk warily... After all, right after LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (LG), other publications also came out, meetings were held in Sverdlovsk, there were appeals to deputies...

Then I decided to continue my own investigation. The impetus was a refutation of sorts which came to the editors from a person famous in the United States: M. Mezelson, professor of biochemistry and molecular biology at Harvard University, who was an independent consultant for an interdepartmental work group in 1980, created by the U.S. government to investigate the epidemic in Siberia. M. Mezelson insisted on the natural nature of the outbreak and wrote about the competence of the Soviet scientists (on his invitation, it seems, they visited America). Xeroxed copies of published materials related to this trip were attached to this letter: Thus, for the first time I was able to familiarize myself with our side's complete arguments.

Moreover, my volunteer assistant readers (thanks, above all, to Muscovite V. Zagranichnyy) sent a whole selection of publications in the foreign press on the subject of the Sverdlovsk accident.

January 1980. The first report on the incident with reference to an anonymous source. It speaks of an explosion at a military enterprise and about a possible violation of the convention on biological weapons, ratified in 1975.

March 1980. The U.S. officially demands explanations from the USSR: The USSR answers that a natural outbreak of malignant anthrax had occurred. The U.S. government questions this and claims that it has evidence of a release of bacteria into the air as a consequence of the accident.

April 1986. Through the general secretary of the Pugwash Movement, Dr. Mezelson makes an attempt to organize a scientific discussion of the nature of the outbreak.

August 1986. Mezelson meets in Moscow with former USSR Deputy Minister of Health Care P. Burgasov, RSFSR chief epidemiologist I. Bezdenezhnyy, chief pathologist V. Nikiforov, and his assistant O. Yampolskaya, all of whom were in Sverdlovsk at the time of the outbreak.

April 1988. Burgasov, Nikiforov, and V. Sergiyev, director of the Institute of Medical Parasitology and Tropical Medicine, visit the United States, where they give official reports and participate in scientific discussions.

The press reported on this visit extensively, but the journal FAS PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT covered it in particular detail, being the organ of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), which has been struggling for a halt to the nuclear arms race for many decades. A significant part of the September 1988 issue was devoted to the Soviet scientists' reports. They named (finally!) the number of dead—64 people—and the number of those infected—96 (mass vaccination of the population began immediately after establishment of the diagnosis). The general conclusion: The epidemic infected domestic cattle, people were infected by an intestinal form of the plague as a result of consuming the meat, sold in violation of sanitation rules, in their food.

So, on what new arguments is this conclusion based?

A Diagnosis Vanishes

So, all 64 people, it is claimed, died of an intestinal form of malignant anthrax. Its symptoms: "An elevation of temperature up to 41 degrees Celsius, chills, weakness, and headaches were noted in the patients. In the course of several hours, acute pain in the stomach, vomiting, and diarrhea appeared..." (from the journal FAS PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT).

I already quoted a detailed description of the course of the disease, which doctors observed in the hospital. Yes, there were chills, yes, there was a high temperature, but not one doctor recalled pains in the stomach, the more so acute. They all, to a man, described a picture of a very

severe pneumonia which led to a lethal outcome in literally in a matter of hours. Not even artificial ventilation of the lungs helped. It is no accident that the first death certificates are marked "bacterial pneumonia."

However, perhaps the stomach and intestinal symptoms were observed at home, and the doctors in the hospital simply did not manage to ascertain them in time?

A year ago, I had few addresses for the deceased. Now, it is a different matter. So here I am, walking from home to home, troubling people's memories...

The widow of M.F. Markov: "When we called the doctor, she said: ORZ. She prescribed some medicine. My husband began to take it, but he grew worse right before our eyes. I thought: maybe it is pneumonia? I began to rub him and keep him warm, but nothing was helping. I ran for an ambulance, and they immediately said: It is pneumonia, possibly lobar, and took him to hospital No. 20.

"No, he did not complain about his stomach. There was nothing like that either at first, or later... Early in the morning I ran to the hospital to see him, but he had already died. The doctor told me that he would have died all the same: His lungs had become like jellied meat."

The son and daughter-in-law of A.P. Komina: "At first Mama grew stronger and got up on her feet—first she was better, then worse... She even went to the doctor herself, and they gave her a diagnosis of 'ORZ.' But later she took to her bed. The 'emergency' doctor said, 'It looks like pneumonia.' When we called a second 'emergency' doctor, the doctor even accused us: What kind of relatives are you, to drive your mother to such a state, she has very serious pneumonia. At the hospital, they told us: 'Prepare yourselves, your mother will not last long.'

The son of A.A. Komelskiy: "In those days, Father worked a great deal in the garden plot by our home. He was glazing the greenhouse. One day in the evening he said: 'I have taken ill with something, obviously I have caught a cold...' And everything was just like with a cold, only something was hindering his breathing and his temperature kept going up. Later it got quite bad, and father ordered us: 'Call an ambulance, I am afraid it might be pneumonia.' The ambulance took him away, and the next day he died.

The widow of A.N. Syskov: "My husband came home from work and asked: 'Get me the thermometer.' We measured—his temperature was about 40. And he was breathing somewhat strangely, as though panting, as though gasping for breath—that sort of breathing. No, he had no diarrhea at all, and his stomach did not hurt. He had always been so healthy! I called an ambulance, and when the doctors arrived, he was tossing in bed—that is how bad it was for him. He died in the hospital the next day.

As soon as it was established that malignant anthrax was raging in the city, the diagnosis of "bacterial pneumonia" disappeared from the death certificates. As I was told at one home, much grief was visited on the first ones: People came to them afterwards and persistently asked them to give back the death certificate...

However, let us return to the symptoms. One way or another, of course, this is still not proof. The results of post-mortem examination and, of course, bacteriological analysis will give a reliable diagnosis. Omitting the details, let me note one thing: The emissaries of Soviet science spoke in the United States only about infections of the intestines. Their reports were supported by a series of color photographs taken, it was indicated, by V. Nikiforov during the post-mortem examinations. The conclusion: "There was no evidence whatsoever of cases of a lung form of malignant anthrax."

But here is what I was told by the highly experienced Sverdlovsk pathologist F. Abramova, who was present at most of the post-mortems (this is how, before the arrival of the "luminaries" and before the results of bacterial analysis, she first defined the plague): "All of the deceased had several infected systems, in some one system predominated, but the respiratory system was infected in all of them (the emphasis is mine—N.Z.). This attests to the fact that introduction occurred, evidently, through the respiratory tract.

I met with V. Sergiyev and O. Yampolskaya, V. Nikiforov's former assistant (alas, he himself, as well as I. Bezdenezhnyy, are no longer alive). They threw up their hands: Nobody knows whether the photographs demonstrated in America were kept or where to look for them.

However, life does not erase all traces. It turns out, not only V. Nikiforov had made photographs! L. Grinberg, who had worked in the pathology and anatomy group at that time, had also taken some. His photographs escaped destruction: True, not all of them. However, even those that survived intact, as L. Grinberg says, "give a different picture," than the one that was presented in the United States.

Where the Wind Blows From

"At first, it seemed that the victims of the disease had nothing in common, but it later became apparent that they all had to do with illegally produced meat... The meat came from small private producers..." (from FAS PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT).

Very well, let us assume that all 64 of the deceased ate meat, bought from private producers. However, a natural question immediately arises: If these people ate the meat at home, how come there were no cases of infection of other family members? And why did basically men die? The explanation that was given across the ocean is as follows: In Russian families meat is saved—according to "custom"—for the heads of families. This explanation is not only unscientific, it is simply false. In not one of

the houses that I visited was this "custom" followed: They all ate from the same "pot."

The largest center of infection within Chkalovskiy Rayon was the ceramics plant. Almost a third of all infections are among its share. Its workers also live predominantly in the surrounding homes. Why did the plague rage with particular force precisely here? It turns out, here is why:

"In April, the ceramics factory received several beef carcasses and the meat was put up for sale. At least one of the carcasses was infected..."

Who ascertained this and when? Where are the documents, who are the witnesses, and were the guilty parties found?

There is no evidence, no witnesses, no criminals. To make up for it, there are the first and last names of people, including the "first" persons, who declared entirely responsibly that the plant never received uninspected meat and never traded in it.

"Really, if they had found something, even the slightest hint that it was our fault, would I be sitting here talking to you now?" This rhetorical question of G. Khusnutdinova's, then and now director of the plant cafeteria, you will agree, makes up for the many missing forms and documents.

Yet there is still evidence: "At that time, the KGB was working here day and night. However, as you can see, I am alive and well, and not a single hair has fallen from my head." These are the words of the chief of the mixed fodder shop at the Aramil Grain Products Combine, B. Martyanov.

The trip to this combine was especially important for me. The accuracy of the answer offered in the United States to the main question, "How did the cattle of the 'small private producers' become infected?" depended on it. I recall that in the only article by Nikiforov and Bezdenezhnyy, published in the Soviet press, it was ambiguously stated: "The infection of the animals occurred, most likely, through the fodder."

Understandably, it was impossible to go abroad with such a "conclusion." So a clear answer was given: "The source of the epizootic was infected bone meal, used as a fodder additive. It arrived with a 29-ton shipment of bone meal produced at a plant in Aramil, a town located 15 km south of Sverdlovsk... This meal consists of bones and other wastes from meat slaughter-houses, mixed with grain. The mixture is placed in an autoclave for the purpose of deactivating the spores of malignant anthrax and other pathogenic microbes. The production process at the Aramil plant violated established technical rules."

Now, I continue my interview with B. Martyanov:

"In general we do not produce and have never produced meat and bone meal. We receive it in finished form from various suppliers, and all shipments are accompanied by

certificates of quality. There is no enterprise in the rayon of Aramil that makes this meal. We do not and have never had any autoclaves whatsoever or other such equipment. When the accident happened in Sverdlovsk, we checked the entire technological chain, all the documentation, all our suppliers and buyers. And finally, we never sold our output to the private sector. In general, we are not party to any of this."

What the Devil Are They Doing Over There?

Official representatives of the U.S. government found that the "explanation leaves many key questions open." I also have a number of questions, to which I was unable to receive an answer:

1. Why immediately after the tragedy happened were all the disease histories, all the post-mortem records, and in general all the documents in all the institutions "involved" confiscated? Including things that at first glance seem innocent, such as lists of families who received aid at the "Red Cross" line?

2. Why was the investigation of the mass deaths, started by the Chkalovskiy Rayon Prosecutor's Office, suddenly cut short, and the case transferred to a different, by no means civil, authority?

3. Why was massive decontamination work carried out in Chkalovskiy Rayon: They removed layers of soil, quickly laid asphalt, and washed the walls and roofs of buildings (which, incidentally, was denied during the "scientific tour," but is described in detail by witnesses)?

4. How come the widely broadcast promises, already given in America, on the forthcoming publication of a "great quantity of pathological and histological data relating to the outbreak" were not fulfilled?

And finally, about the situation surrounding the 19th military cantonment: As already stated, the military continues to deny its involvement in what happened, beginning with those working there directly and ending with former Minister of Defense Yazov. The military especially insists that the production of vaccine preparations "for protection of the troops and population" in the 19th cantonment was halted. In response, let me merely repeat the reply of Mr. Crocker, a U.S. State Department official, quoted by the American press: If this military project is no secret, then "how come they will not let us visit it?" And if it is secret, then "what the devil are they doing over there?"

It is not easy for me to write all of this. I am not one of those people, who easily suffers the failures and blunders of one's native land. However, having said "a," one must say "b." It is my duty, both to a country, which has concluded a convention prohibiting the production of bacteriological weapons, as well as to the memory of simple people, of Anna Petrovna Komina, Mikhail Fedorovich Markov, Aleksey Nikolayevich Syskov, and many, many others, whose lives came abruptly to an end before their time and strangely. To those close to them,

who were "compensated" for the loss of their husbands, sons, and mothers with a paltry 50 rubles, and not all even received this. And to the distant friends and readers of LG: Possibly, they remember that LG, alas, did not play the best role, attempting to "stifle" rumors in the world about what happened in Sverdlovsk.

"A situation, in which certain state institutions within the country may violate the international obligations accepted by the country, is not ruled out. A situation in which the state itself violates them in strictest secrecy is not ruled out," writes A. Yablokov, USSR people's deputy, deputy chairman of the Committee on Matters of Ecology. Incidentally, in general he does not consider even international monitoring to be a panacea: A test-tube of deadly bacteria can always be hidden from the eyes of inspectors. The main solution, in A. Yablokov's opinion, is "at the level of law, to recognize actions, related to the development, storage, and use of bacteriological weapons as a CRIMINAL ACT. The majority of developers—the military, scientists, and engineers—do not want to be potential criminals, no matter with what secrecy and high salaries such production may be protected."

These considerations seem extraordinarily topical to me. Nonetheless, I think we need yet another act, which deprives antihuman development work of its main concealment, the cover of "secrecy." Drafts of a law on state secrecy, part of which is military secrecy, have been traveling somewhere along the corridors of power for a long time already. Although there has not yet been a public discussion of the law, it seems that jurists are united in the opinion that actions which entail danger to people's lives and well-being cannot be included in such "secrecy."

"The right to health is one of man's most important rights and, it goes without saying, it is impossible to place any, even the 'highest' state considerations above it." Let this opinion of S.S. Alekseyev's, chairman of the Committee for Constitutional Inspection, be the last point in my article.

However, there are many marks of omission before official investigations and conclusions.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

NATO Secretary General on Prospects, Policies

AU0810141691 Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German 5-6 Oct 91 p 5

[Interview with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner by Dietmar Seher and Ingo Preissler; place and date not given: "We Do Not Need a Threat"]

[Text] [BERLINER ZEITUNG] After the disappearance of the enemy, does you not feel superfluous as the head of NATO?

[Woerner] The contrary is the case. First of all, we are, of course, satisfied that the great objective of the alliance has been reached, that hostility has been dissolved, that the division of Europe has been overcome, and that dialogue and cooperation have replaced confrontation. These have been and continue to be the objectives of our alliance.

After the period of the preservation of peace, the task of the development of peace arises for the alliance. Its political role becomes more important than the forum where 16 states can coordinate their security and foreign policy. It becomes more important as the control instrument of the transatlantic relations and as the stable basis of a new and complete Europe.

At present, all are looking at NATO because it is the only working security organization. I was able to ascertain this during the days of the Moscow coup when the Eastern Europeans telephoned us here one after the other and Yeltsin also personally called me on 21 August.

[BERLINER ZEITUNG] NATO defines itself via the Warsaw Pact. Where do you see the new threat as coming from?

[Woerner] We do not need a threat. This is an outdated view of the alliance, which does not account for the fact that the world has basically changed.

Of course, NATO is not an end in itself. If it is no longer needed, it can be dissolved. But it is needed—for military and political reasons. It is no longer militarily needed to ward off an immediate threat—which does not exist any longer—but as a precaution against risks. We have become nothing but an insurance company against risks. And these risks exist everywhere around us. We have to adjust our military instruments to this. We can manage with fewer soldiers; for this purpose, we must reorganize our units, for example.

The alliance is also politically needed. Who wants to replace it? Where is there a forum where North America and Europe can meet and come to an agreement? Where is there a community of fate that keeps together when crises develop—that is, that makes precautions against crises and crisis management possible? Nowhere.

[BERLINER ZEITUNG] Are the crisis areas today outside the NATO region?

[Woerner] They are almost exclusively outside our area. The great factors of insecurity are the Soviet Union and its future, the Eastern and Central European countries and the Balkans with their transition to democracy and market economy, and the crisis belt from the Maghreb to the Middle East. NATO was created to cope with risks that endanger the security of our member states. This is also valid today.

However, we do not consider military actions outside our alliance area, at least not at present. We also act politically outside the alliance, but we act militarily only within it. We did not participate in the Gulf war, but we protected one of our alliance partners, we secured the Mediterranean, and we also helped to implement the UN decisions, that is, we provided our instruments. And this indicates the future role of the alliance.

[BERLINER ZEITUNG] The fact that there will be no military out-of-area missions seems to be questioned by the creation of multinational task forces.

[Woerner] These units are also a reaction to the experiences of the Gulf war. We only have a very small international task force, which does not suffice for military purposes. If there were serious military threats at the flanks, we would need considerably stronger and more mobile task forces. These fast task forces were created for this purpose. However, as I already suggested, if a pan-European security alliance in which the alliance plays a decisive role is created, I do not rule out that, with the agreement of all 16 nations, out-of-area missions may also be possible, whether with us or with another international organization to which we provide our instruments being responsible. But this is a prospect for the distant future, and it is my personal opinion.

[BERLINER ZEITUNG] How do you react to the wishes of former East Bloc states that want to become NATO members?

[Woerner] In the short run, I hope that at the summit we will make the decision to further develop relations with these states by one step, that is, in the direction of formal, possibly institutionalized consultations, and that we will agree on additional cooperation projects.

Of course, in the long run everything depends on the future development of the international situation, which we cannot predict. A new European state of peace where many organizations cooperate and no one has a monopoly is the supreme objective of our alliance. However, this Europe will be mainly based on three pillars—the Atlantic alliance, the EC, and the CSCE. If we achieve this with the Soviet Union being involved, the question of membership becomes irrelevant. If we do not achieve this, things will have to be reconsidered.

[BERLINER ZEITUNG] Concerning the NATO summit in Rome, what will be the main points of the strategy and what is still open?

[Woerner] The first major point of the strategy is that it is based on the concept of cooperative security and, secondly, that it focuses on precautions against crises, crisis control, and solutions to crises, and no longer on defense and deterrence. The third main point is that we adopt new instruments, in order to cope with risks that come from all possible directions, no longer only from one direction as before. Then we will stress the multinational character of our units far more. We will become more mobile, we will change the structure of our armed forces with a view to more flexibility and mobility and—which is most important for the citizen—drastically reduce our armed forces. In 1995, NATO will be based on just half of its present armed forces if developments in the Soviet Union are positive.

[BERLINER ZEITUNG] After the implementation of Bush's initiative, will nuclear weapons still be deployed on German territory?

[Woerner] Yes, air-based ones, but a considerably smaller number of them.

[BERLINER ZEITUNG] Why do you currently not want a discussion on nuclear standoff weapons?

[Woerner] On the one hand, because the appropriate system, the only one that was developed, was abandoned by the U.S. President. And why are we supposed to discuss something that does not exist? Secondly, because a new system of this type is not planned at present. The option exists, but it would be useless to discuss it. We agree that a minimum of air-based systems will remain. Thus, the character of the nuclear weapon as a political weapon to prevent war becomes even clearer.

[BERLINER ZEITUNG] Would it not also be very difficult at present to explain to the public that there have to be new nuclear weapons?

[Woerner] There are no new nuclear weapons, but only the ones we have already. Moreover, their number will be reduced. The world is not nuclear-free, neither the Soviet Union, nor the Third World. In such a situation it is absolutely useful to maintain a minimum of such weapons, in order to make it clear to everybody how useless it would be to involve us in a war.

[BERLINER ZEITUNG] Do the European states need a military pillar of their own to clarify problems, such as in Yugoslavia?

[Woerner] You have to ask the Europeans. I can only tell you my private opinion. In their efforts, the Europeans can count on our political support. But they have to decide themselves how to settle this militarily. Personally, I am of the opinion that in such a situation diplomacy needs the support of a certain instrument of power.

[BERLINER ZEITUNG] In 1994 the last Soviet soldier will have left eastern Germany. Then NATO can extend its command area to the Oder. What does that mean for the five new laender?

[Woerner] I cannot answer this at present since we do not yet have concrete plans. It is certain that there will only be German troops. In contrast to today, they will be assigned to NATO. In practice, there will not be many changes.

[BERLINER ZEITUNG] The disarmament treaties that have been concluded so far have not managed to put curbs on the modernization of weapons. When will this be possible?

[Woerner] I do not think that this will happen because it virtually cannot be verified and implemented. If they permit one weapon, they also have to permit its modernization. Otherwise it would be better to abolish it. We thought it over, but it was frustrated by many considerations.

What we need in the next stage of disarmament is, on the one hand, a numerical limitation and, secondly, the definition of the armed forces' structure. That is to say, we have to see to it that armed forces get a structure that no longer permits offensive actions and restricts the capability of mobilization or deployment. This is the decisive question. At present, we are in the numerical stage. It has not yet been concluded. The second stage is more important for me because its objective must be to achieve by various limits that everyone can only maintain as many troops as he needs to secure his own area. If we achieve this, we will have permanently stabilized Europe.

If the Soviet Union continues to develop so favorably the real problem in the future will be to cope with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, export controls on conventional weapons, and the great problems of the Third World and the world as a whole. For me, disarmament as we are pursuing it now is the preliminary stage to something completely different, which must happen all over the world.

AUSTRIA

Speed of Gorbachev Response to Bush Initiative Viewed

*AU0610190991 Vienna ORF Television Network
in German 1830 GMT 6 Oct 91*

[Susanne Scholl commentary]

[Text] Gorbachev actually wanted to take time in answering the U.S. disarmament initiative. However, on the one hand, Boris Yeltsin was pressing for a speedy reaction and, on the other, the situation in the previous Soviet republics, which are now sovereign, became so unstable that Gorbachev was forced to act quickly. Precisely for this reason one of the main points in

Gorbachev's declaration is that the remaining Soviet nuclear potential will be placed under central control.

FINLAND

Foreign Minister Calls Gorbachev Response to Bush Positive

LD0810155691 Helsinki Radio Finland in English
0930 GMT 8 Oct 91

[Text] Finland considers positive the weekend announcement by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that the Soviet Union is to make large-scale reductions in its nuclear weapon stocks, this according to Finnish Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen. In a televised speech Saturday evening, President Gorbachev proposed the scrapping of Soviet nuclear artillery weapons and nuclear warheads on tactical missiles. In a statement issued Sunday, Finnish Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen described as significant, from Finland's point of view, the fact that there will be a reduction in the military presence in northern sea areas and that the Soviet Union is to unilaterally suspend nuclear testing for one year. Foreign Minister Vayrynen also noted that the removal of short-range land based nuclear missiles meets the demands of the new cooperation based European security structure.

FRANCE

Gorbachev Response to Bush Arms Proposal Hailed

Statement by Presidency

LD0710202591 Paris Antenne-2 Television
Network in French 1900 GMT 7 Oct 91

[Text] France has just made it known that it is giving a favorable welcome to the USSR's reaction on the disarmament matter. In a communique which has just been published, the Presidency confirms that when the time comes it will play its part in the nuclear disarmament process. It also expresses satisfaction at seeing Moscow and Washington really entering the path of the strategy of minimal deterrence, which France has advocated for some time.

LE MONDE Editorial

PM1010085691 Paris LE MONDE in French
8 Oct 91 p 1

[Editorial: "Race in Reverse"]

[Text] Mikhail Gorbachev is not in a position to refuse George Bush anything. The answer which he gave on Saturday 5 October to the initiatives taken a week earlier by the U.S. President in the nuclear arms reduction sphere lives up to Washington's expectations and even goes a little further than they do.

Disarmament is now one of the few spheres, if not the only one, in which the weakened Soviet president can still show authority. At a time when the republics are moving toward emancipation, the West needs an interlocutor at the head of the Union to deal with the most urgent business; in other words, to preside over the elimination of tactical weapons spread throughout the USSR's territory and regarded as the most dangerous and to establish the rules governing an arsenal whose geographical distribution makes the Ukraine, for instance, the third biggest nuclear power in the world.

However, the United States must make sure not to thwart the Union's possible internal changes for the sake of disarmament. That is why it expressed the hope that the republics would be involved in the discussions which will be opened on the subject and this is probably one of the reasons that George Bush deemed the idea of a summit meeting proposed by Mr. Gorbachev to be "premature."

Mr. Gorbachev's announcement that artillery and tactical nuclear weapons are to be eliminated, that all strategic forces are to be grouped under a single command, that heavy bombers and a number of missiles are to be taken off alert status, are sources of satisfaction for Washington and for the world. A taboo has also been lifted with Mr. Gorbachev's agreement to open discussions on the American proposals on ABM defense systems.

This is a considerable doctrinal about-face by the USSR president, who has always been hostile to Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" plan. The other Western countries, notably France, thinking that they detected in the U.S. proposals considerations which relate to market shares as much as a desire for peace, will probably be in less of a hurry to welcome progress on this point.

Mr. Gorbachev, going further than Bush's plan, is also proposing measures on airborne tactical nuclear weapons. However, in Washington's view, this category of weapons should eventually be the only U.S. nuclear presence in Europe. Even if he is only proposing a limitation, not an elimination, Mr. Gorbachev is reaffirming his old idea of the denuclearization of Europe and is likely to stir up a latent controversy in the Western camp.

Finally, on the question of nuclear tests, Mr. Gorbachev has taken the starring role. He knows that his initiative is not likely to be followed, at least in the short term, and that no nuclear power will agree to abandon tests if it wishes to remain a nuclear power.

Number of Annual Nuclear Tests To Be Reduced

AU0810180491 Paris AFP in English 1756 GMT
8 Oct 91

[Text] Paris, October 8 (AFP)—France is planning to reduce next year the number of nuclear tests it carries

out annually from the current six to four or five, informed sources here said Tuesday.

The proposal is part of a bill on military planning that must first be submitted for approval to the defense council, expected to meet under President Francois Mitterrand sometime during the next few weeks, the sources said. They said, however, that France did not intend for the moment to scrap the tests altogether.

French nuclear tests are conducted underground in French Polynesia, mostly in the South Pacific atoll of Mururoa, and have been constantly criticized by Pacific governments and international environmental groups.

The Defense Ministry refused all comment Tuesday, and no mention was made in an official reaction over the weekend to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's announcement that he was declaring a year-long unilateral moratorium on all Soviet nuclear testing.

In his reaction, Foreign Minister Roland Dumas had said simply that France would "take the appropriate measures ... (but) not abandon nuclear tests, which are indispensable to modernizing its nuclear weaponry."

France last year reduced the number of tests it carries out annually from eight to six, while at the same time deciding to announce each test in Paris.

Policy for the previous 15 years had been to maintain total silence on the tests, which were regularly reported by the New Zealand Government.

France has already conducted six tests of nuclear devices this year, ranging in capacity from 10 to 130 kilotonnes—compared to 15 kilotonnes for the U.S. atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima in the closing days of World War II.

GERMANY

Bush Disarmament Proposal Examined, Praised

AU0410111691 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German
3 Oct 91 p 1

[Theo Sommer editorial: "There Is a Silver Lining on the Horizon Now"]

[Text] It was eight years ago when Raymond Aron sighed bitterly: "We live in a world of virile weapons and impotent statesmen."

The Cold War still existed at that time; dozens of new missiles came off the assembly lines of the Soviet factories every month; in their visions the armament engineers of the Pentagon ventured as far as space; on both sides the planners were madly chasing the deathly utopia of security. Only over the past three years did the speed with which the armament spiral was turning begin to slow down. Disarmament was set in motion: Intermediate-range nuclear weapons were banned, conventional armed forces and strategic arsenals were greatly reduced.

And now, with his initiative last weekend [28-29 September], the U.S. President has set a landmark that might mark the beginning of the path toward a really new world order—an order that is no longer based on the accumulation of ever more weapons but would again subject military means to political ends.

"The world," George Bush said, "has changed at a fantastic speed. Every day writes a new page in the book of history, even before yesterday's ink has dried.... These dramatic changes are now also challenging our nation.... Now we can take steps to turn the world into a less dangerous place than it has ever been before during the nuclear age." What the U.S. President then presented in detail was indeed not the same old song about arms control. Mikhail Gorbachev, too, brushed aside the question whether this was a trick: "These are serious steps."

The step that was the most symbolic was the immediate rescission of the highest state of alert for the U.S. long-distance bomber fleet with its cargo of lethal nuclear bombs. For almost 40 years the alarm squadrons of the B-52 have been standing on the runways, ready for take-off. Now the normal service schedule is in effect again, the bombs have been put back into the depots. At the same time, the state of alert readiness of the 450 Minuteman-2 missiles, which are to be taken out of service in accordance with the START treaty, has been canceled with immediate effect.

Nothing could make the change in pattern clearer. No one believes in a Soviet missile attack out of the blue any more—in the same way as no one can imagine that the Red Army might start to advance toward the English Channel without any preparations. The Cold War is ending also in the minds of the strategists. "We saw how the implacable enemy of the past 40 years dissolved into thin air, a victim of its own contradictions, failed in its imperial ambition"—this is how Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Powell described the premise of the new U.S. policy.

A New Game Has Been Opened

Bush has viewed disarmament with different eyes since he can view the Soviet Union with different eyes. The Moscow coup of 19 August scared the President: The military hardliners almost managed to take over power. The failure of the conspiracy inspired him: Now the military men who were hostile to detente have been removed. Thus he offered Gorbachev what he had refused him before—not least, further disarmament negotiations. After the signing of the START treaty in July the Americans disseminated the view that such negotiations were no longer useful. Now they want to open a new game, because this is the only way to find out who has the say in the former Soviet Union. Secretly they may even hope that disarmament talks will serve the development and consolidation of reliable future structures of power.

The Bush plan is impressive, even if the President partly resigns himself to the inevitable. Some things contained in the package of proposals have long been demanded by U.S. experts. A number of planned weapons systems, which will be given up, would not have any chance in Congress anyway. Some concessions save, above all, new disputes in the NATO alliance. However, all this criticism cannot cover up the fact that Bush has managed to make a bold move. The President, who still has the reputation of being a master tactician without strategic vision, thus forces even skeptics and critics to concede him respect.

Of immediate importance for Europe—in particular for Germany—is the decision to withdraw and destroy all land-based tactical nuclear weapons. These battlefield weapons include about 3,000 artillery shells and warheads for Lance missiles. They were introduced in the 1950's to compensate for the conventional superiority of the East. It was never credible that they would ever be used: They would have destroyed what was supposed to be defended. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact they have become something completely crazy. The units that were supposed to be deterred by them have been withdrawn or are in the process of being withdrawn; the offensive system of the East has shattered. If the Soviets agree to Bush's proposal, it will come very close to the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Europe, which had been a taboo for decades. Nuclear weapons are to remain only on aircraft. However, even this will have to be discussed one day.

Bush also made an astonishing turnabout concerning naval forces. So far the Americans have defended themselves tooth and claw against them included in disarmament. Now the President practically offers the denuclearization of the U.S. Navy at the substrategic level. All nuclear weapons, including all nuclear-armed cruise missiles, are to be withdrawn from warships, submarines, and aircraft carriers—in total 1,850 warheads. The Navy is to keep only 18 strategic submarines with their missiles and multiple warheads.

In the category of long-range land-based missiles Bush offers something that is no less astonishing: destruction of the 450 Minuteman-2's more quickly than envisaged by the START Treaty; furthermore a halt to development work for the heavy train-based MX missile and the truck-based Midgetman missile. In addition, Bush suggests negotiations about banning multiple warheads on land-based missiles. This, however, will be felt to be an unreasonable demand by the Soviets, because they would have to abolish about five times more warheads than the United States; at least they will demand the inclusion of the missiles on U.S. submarines, which are armed with 8 to 12 warheads. Probably they will also not like the fact that Bush permits the continuation of the construction of the B-2 Stealth bomber and does not completely want to forego an anti-missile system (SDI), even though he is canceling its nuclear component. Here

the contentious issues of future negotiations become visible, but they do not reduce the value of Bush's basic approach.

What Motives Are Behind It?

Bush and his security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, wanted to publish similarly far-reaching plans some months ago, but Pentagon Chief Cheney objected. Thus, as late as in summer, the U.S. START negotiators stubbornly advocated the maintenance of weapons systems that the President has now renounced in one single television speech. What were his motives in the end?

Right at the top probably was the insight that more than 25,000 Soviet nuclear weapons might fall into the wrong hands during the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This concern also plagues those responsible in Moscow and in other places. Bush's plan can cover their flanks while they reduce their arsenals, by appeasing the skeptical Soviet military. The offer to work out joint methods to store and secure nuclear weapons might not be without appeal to them. The thought in the back of Bush's mind, however—namely to start new disarmament negotiations as quickly as possible in addition to a parallel action of unilateral but coordinated steps—will also not have been far from Gorbachev's mind. Such negotiations would stress the need to preserve or reestablish a minimum of central authority. Gorbachev's cautiously positive reaction is evidence of both the hope that he has and the internal difficulties that he sees.

Bush had in mind two more addressees when he published his plan: Congress and the Europeans. On Capitol Hill as well as in some European states there has so far been the impression that the Bush Administration—which still spends \$300 billion on defense every year—has not yet realized that the Cold War is over; that the arms race has lost all meaning; that the peoples have a claim to the peace dividend. Bush has taken the wind out of the sails of the U.S. parliamentarians and skeptical Europe.

The cloud of nuclear weapons has hovered over mankind for 45 years. Now there is a silver lining on the horizon. There will not be a completely nuclear-free world soon; for that there are too many ambitious people all over the world working on their own bombs. However, that which was still called "East" and "West" two years ago might now be moving toward minimal deterrence—let us say: 1,000 nuclear weapons on each side. Bush's initiative makes this possible. If Gorbachev, in return, really "balances the account," as he announced, the way would be paved toward a world in which weapons are impotent again and statesmen are virile again.

Officials Praise Soviet Response to Bush Initiative

Kohl: 'Further Decisive Step'

LD0610111591 Berlin ADN in German 1030 GMT
6 Oct 91

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Chancellor Helmut Kohl has praised the initiative for nuclear disarmament

announced by USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev as a "further decisive step toward more security and stability in Europe." It is of special import for Europe that the Soviet Union is prepared to withdraw and destroy the nuclear battlefield weapons, Kohl said in Bonn today.

Also, against the background of the Soviet Union's internal development, it is to be welcomed that all strategic nuclear weapons will come under a single administration and that the strategic defense systems are included in a single service branch [Waffengattung]. In that way, central control over these weapons will be further guaranteed. The latest Soviet initiative, the chancellor said, is "confirmation of the policy of the Federal Government, which for years has worked uncompromisingly for the equal reduction of arms in East and West with the objective of creating peace with fewer weapons."

Genscher: Proposals 'Important'

*LD0610161991 Hamburg DPA in German 1519 GMT
6 Oct 91*

[Excerpt] Haarzuilen (DPA)—[German] Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has welcomed the latest disarmament initiative of the Soviet Union as "an important step toward disarmament and the creation of cooperative security structures in Europe." Genscher said this at a joint news conference with his French counterpart Roland Dumas in Haarzuilen in the Netherlands at the conclusion of the EC foreign ministers meeting today. [passage omitted]

SDP Welcomes Plan

*LD0610201991 Berlin ADN in German 1430 GMT
6 Oct 91*

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Christian Social Union Chairman Theo Waigel says the Soviet president's announcement on reducing the Soviet nuclear and military potential in reply to U.S. President George Bush's initiative is correct. The finance minister said on Sunday that the immense expenditure on armaments that the Soviet political leadership is channeling into developing the national economy can now become reality. The worldwide disarmament process has gained new dynamism, and the threat in East-West relations continues to diminish. The strength now gained, Waigel said, should be used for developing a European order of free states.

Norbert Gansel, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party [SPD] parliamentary group, who held talks in Moscow in the middle of last week, welcomed the Soviet measures. They have come about under the difficult conditions of formulating objectives between the central and republican leaderships and represent an altogether adequate reply to the U.S. President's initiative. However, the Soviet Union has not "proved the intention or strength to accelerate the nuclear disarmament process through additional unilateral measures. To that extent, an opportunity has been missed," Gansel

said. He called on the United States to accept altogether constructively the Soviet negotiating proposals. This applies, above all, to a permanent nuclear test ban, the destruction of all tactical nuclear weapons, and a production ban on fissionable material. The SPD politician appealed to the Federal Government to work at the impending NATO summit for a comprehensive nuclear and conventional disarmament initiative.

Commentators Assess Bush, Gorbachev Initiatives

'Disarmament Express' Seen

*AU0710153991 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
7 Oct 91 p 1*

[Fritz Wirth commentary: "Disarmament Via Telephone"]

[Text] It took eight days to learn what changes George Bush had started with his recent bold nuclear disarmament initiative. The slow train, on which the two nuclear superpowers were leaving the nuclear world, has become a disarmament express.

During these eight days, a larger share of this nuclear cargo was thrown overboard than in the previous several decades. Moreover, it happened without the suspicious signalmen of the disarmament bureaucracy, without signatures and accompanying formal slogans such as "it is good to trust but better to check": Unilateral disarmament—via the telephone and television.

One side telephones Moscow or Washington and is able to deal with complete facts. That is what is really significant about the events of the last few days, more than the actual content of the talks. A ball, which for years had seemed to be unmovable and firmly stuck in the concrete of mutual distrust, has been set rolling.

It was George Bush who set that ball rolling one week ago, courageously and boldly calculating. What makes Gorbachev's response so promising is that he did not only react but even presented new questions and challenges, which have now again to be dealt with by Bush.

The logic of this nuclear "tit for tat" should ultimately lead to a nuclear-free world, as envisaged by Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik at the time. However, the unadorned reality of the new world order rather suggests that this will remain a dream.

Bush will draw the border line where essential parts of national security might be affected. One can only hope that these warning signals do not stop the disarmament express too soon. There continues to be too much superfluous highly-explosive garbage in this world of nascent reason.

'Epochal Significance' of Soviet Moves

AU0710145691 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU
in German 7 Oct 91 p 3

[“Aga” commentary: “Disarmament Race”]

[Text] Who would have thought only a short time ago that after decades of dogged arms races, which repeatedly pushed the world to the brink of nuclear destruction, there now might be a disarmament race, which reduces this danger and is no less dramatic? It would be interesting to think about to what we owe this in historical and philosophical terms: A late victory of collective reason, the collapse of one superpower—that is, objective constraints for action, which, however, might also have caused the opposite—or the sensible nature of one person, Mikhail Gorbachev, which then would be a historical coincidence. Probably all these theories could be used as explanations for this development.

After the big step taken by U.S. President George Bush, his Soviet counterpart, Gorbachev, has now taken an even bigger one. If the United States follows suit, there is the opportunity to scrap all tactical nuclear weapons of all kinds. This would immensely increase security in Europe and, above all, in Germany.

However, the epochal significance of Gorbachev's proposals lies in two qualitative aspects: Research and development of nuclear weapons are to be braked. In addition, closely linked to that, a nuclear test ban is to be agreed on—because without tests and continual modernization, nuclear weapons would become so much scrap metal in a few years anyway. However, the United States is (still) shying away from this step.

General Says Soviet Troop Withdrawal on Schedule

LD0810082891 Berlin ADN in German 1412 GMT
7 Oct 91

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany is proceeding as planned, according to Major General Ivan Konovalenko. About 134,000 persons, 95,000 of them military personnel, had returned to the Soviet Union by 1 October, the general from the High Command of the Western Group of Soviet Armed Forces in Germany said at a joint seminar of Soviet and Bundeswehr officers in Berlin-Wannsee today. Thus, over 80 percent of the withdrawal quota for this year had been met, while 600,000 tonnes of material and 27,300 pieces of equipment have been removed. Konovalenko said that 179 sites had been handed over to the German authorities.

Defense Minister: No Soviet Nuclear Arms in Country

LD0910110391 Hamburg DPA in German 1019 GMT
9 Oct 91

[Text] Berlin (DPA)—According to Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, the Soviet Army has no nuclear weapons left deployed on German soil. He sees no reason to doubt the Soviet claim that these weapons have been withdrawn from Germany, Stoltenberg said in an interview with NEUE ZEIT (Wednesday's edition), published in Berlin.

In hardly any sphere has integration of east and west worked as well as in the Bundeswehr, Stoltenberg said. In Stoltenberg's opinion, at least 16 billion German marks will be needed to bring the establishments of the former National People's Army of the former-GDR up to Western standards.

Expert Views Changing Nature of Arms Control in Europe

AU2110103991 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
19-20 Oct 91 p 4

[Burkhard Bischof report: “Wanted: New Security”]

[Text] Vienna—Ambassador Josef Holik, disarmament expert of the German Government, has drawn up a positive balance sheet of the second CSCE seminar on military doctrines, which concluded in Vienna on Friday [18 October]. The seminar, which brought together high-ranking military officers from the CSCE states in the Vienna Hofburg Palace for two weeks, “confirmed the fact that the East-West conflict and the thinking in terms of blocs have been overcome,” Holik said in his plenary statement yesterday. In connection with the Yugoslav civil war, the ambassador also noted: “New conflicts entail a considerable potential of danger to stability in Europe.”

The German disarmament expert submitted a number of future-oriented proposals to the participants in the seminar. He called for a discussion about a “new security concept.” Specifically, Holik gave the following example: “The previous concept of arms control mainly involved the idea of reducing equipment and personnel.... In the future, however, arms control will not deal primarily with the size of armed forces but with working out rules for dealing with military power, which is appropriate to the cooperative security system in Europe that we are all striving for.”

Holik also pointed out that the usual arms control was not aimed at regional crises, such as have developed in Europe recently. In this connection, there is the new task of conflict prevention. Therefore, he spoke clearly in favor of strengthening the Conflict Prevention Center, which is located in Vienna.

In this connection, one must also reconsider the relationship between the CSCE High-Ranking Officials Committee, which meets in Prague, and the Vienna Conflict Prevention Center. The question of adapting the CSCE institutions to clearly emerging needs must be the main topic of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Helsinki in spring 1992, Holik said.

NORWAY

Officials Welcome Gorbachev Response to Bush Initiative

PM0810133691 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
7 Oct 91 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Promising Signal"]

[Text] The political de-escalation of the Cold War is now being followed up by a dismantling of the military machines. The message contained in President Gorbachev's speech is very promising for world peace, Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst said.

"The work of disarmament has now entered a completely new phase. The lengthy and detailed negotiations have now been partly replaced by disarmament by reciprocal challenge. This has proved possible because the negotiating phase put in place a comprehensive verification system," Holst said.

"It is of the greatest importance to Norway that all tactical nuclear arms be removed from naval vessels. This also applies to sea-based cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. This would prevent an arms race which could have given rise to tension in the northern regions," Holst said.

He pointed out that there are several challenges in Gorbachev's speech, such as the proposal that naval tactical nuclear arms, which will now be withdrawn to stockpiles on land, would also be destroyed on a reciprocal basis. "The way is now being opened up for what was the aim of the work for nuclear-free zones," Holst said.

Defense Commission chairman Kare Willoch described the move as very significant. "This seems to be a full response to the U.S. reductions which President Bush has already announced. It is what everyone had been hoping and the majority had expected that Gorbachev would do," Willoch told NORSK TELEGRAMBYRA.

Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute researcher John Kristen Skogan said that it now looks as if practically all tactical nuclear arms will disappear.

SPAIN

Government Welcomes Soviet Arms Initiative

LD0810093191 Madrid TVE Internacional
Television in Spanish 1930 GMT 7 Oct 91

[Text] Through the Spanish ambassador to the Soviet Union, [Prime Minister] Felipe Gonzalez today told Mikhail Gorbachev of the interest with which the government has followed the announcement and content of the new Soviet initiative on nuclear disarmament, troop reductions, and confidence-building measures as a constructive reply to the initiative of U.S. President George Bush. According to a spokesman, the government welcomes the Soviet proposal which it described as important and opportune because, according to the government, it contributes to the constitution of a new strategic balance at the lowest level of forces possible. According to the government, this initiative is a great step in the common process of building a more stable, safe, and cooperative order in Europe.

TURKEY

Effects of Bush Arms Plan on Turkey Viewed

NC0710081391 Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish
1 Oct 91 p 12

[Column by Hadi Uluengin: "Reduction of Nuclear Arms and Turkey"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] President Bush's plans will have a bearing on Turkey, where the number of nuclear warheads will be reduced in line with the removal of short-range missiles in Europe. This will greatly reduce the possibility of Ankara being a target during any Soviet offensive. Turkey will also experience an era of peace.

The Nuclear Situation Will Also Change

Although never officially disclosed, it is common knowledge that the nuclear arsenal in Turkey is made up of nuclear mines; Howitzer artillery units, which have a dual capability; and nuclear bombs, which can be dropped from aircraft. The nuclear mines became obsolete in the 1970's. Plans have been made to remove the Howitzer artillery units from eastern Anatolia and Thrace. Turkey also has nuclear bombs, stored in various bases, that can be dropped from Turkish F-4 aircraft. A number of the nuclear bombs, which can be carried by U.S. F-111E aircraft, are stored in Turkey, mainly at the Incirlik Air Base. The use of these nuclear arms accords with "dual key system," subject to approval by Ankara and Washington.

When the U.S. initiative takes effect, nuclear arms in Turkey, except the nuclear bombs, will be removed. However, this will not mean that Ankara will no longer be asked to comply with new "nuclear demands," however remote they may seem. This impression has been created by President Bush's failure to mention TASM

[Tactical and Strategic Missiles] in his arms reduction speech. This has attracted attention. The production of TASM missiles, which will have a range of 400 km, has yet to begin. However, as far as a section of Washington is concerned, they will form the "backbone of Europe's defense."

What Will Happen to the Missiles in Turkey?

According to a report in THE GUARDIAN in April 1990, plans have been made to base 54 of the 471 TASM missiles in Turkey. According to the "British-U.S. Security Information" [as published], TASM missiles in Turkey could be used by U.S. aircraft because Turkey does not have the F-111E, F-5E, and Tornado aircraft to carry them.

The new era in international relations makes this project, strongly opposed by the FRG in particular, less likely than before. President Bush's silence must not be overlooked.

The new initiative for nuclear disarmament indicates humanity has taken yet another concrete step toward establishing lasting peace from which Turkey stands to gain. However, the time has not yet come for that. There is no new development on the classical nuclear arms stored at the bases in Turkey. And TASM's prospects remain vague.

Foreign Minister Praises Soviet Response to Bush

TA0910131691 Ankara Turkiye Radyolari Network
in Turkish 1100 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Text] Turkey has announced that the unilateral reductions declared by the Soviet Union in reaction to the recent U.S. proposals on disarmament constitute an extremely positive response to the expectations of the world public opinion.

In reply to a question during his weekly news conference today, Foreign Ministry deputy spokesman Ferhat Ataman commented on the recent Soviet proposals in the field of nuclear disarmament. Pointing out that these proposals are a turning point in the disarmament process, the deputy spokesman described the announcement that nuclear weapons will remain under the control of the central government in the Soviet Union as a factor for relief.

Answering a question on developments in Yugoslavia, Ataman expressed the hope that the sides will adhere to the ceasefire declared yesterday, thus paving the way for a dialogue. He remarked that Turkey is following with concern the clashes and the loss of life in Yugoslavia and stressed that the future of that country and its political system can only be determined by the peoples of Yugoslavia.

UNITED KINGDOM

Gorbachev Response to Bush Initiative Viewed

Prime Minister Major Welcomes Proposals

LD0610105491 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 0959 GMT 6 Oct 91

[Text] Prime Minister John Major today welcomed Soviet President Gorbachev's announcement of fresh nuclear weapons cuts. Mr. Major, who is at Chequers for the weekend, welcomed Mr. Gorbachev's statement "and his commitment to a further reduction in tactical nuclear weapons and a reduction in strategic arsenals," a Downing Street spokesman said.

The Government would study the latest Soviet cuts, announced by Mr. Gorbachev last night, "in more detail", he added.

Mr. Gorbachev said last night that he would eliminate all nuclear artillery shells and warheads for tactical missiles and remove all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and submarines. The Soviet Union was also introducing a one-year moratorium on nuclear tests, cutting the army and standing heavy bombers down from battle alert, he said. The cuts are being seen as a move to match the package of unilateral cuts announced by U.S. President George Bush last week.

Earlier shadow foreign secretary Gerald Kaufman described as "deplorable" the time Mr. Major was taking to welcome the Soviet announcement.

He went on: "It will not be enough for Britain to welcome President Gorbachev's historic announcement with vague words of commendation. Britain should now act to show our approval of what both Gorbachev and President Bush are doing to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Without any delay, the Government should consult the U.S. administration about matching Soviet suspensions of nuclear tests with a similar suspension of our own."

Mr. Kaufman went on: "If the French and Chinese can be brought in, all the better. But we should act beyond a simple suspension. Now is the time for Britain to take an initiative in proposing international negotiations to end all nuclear testing permanently by agreement among the relevant countries. Britain should also have early discussions with the U.S. about how this country could become involved in the further START negotiations on reducing nuclear weapon stocks, to which the Americans and Soviets are already committed and which President Gorbachev has urged should be carried forward here.

"Efforts should be made to bring in the French and Chinese. The opportunities for Britain and for the world are great. If the present Tory Government lacks the imagination to grasp them, then next year the new Labour government certainly will."

**Government To Study Implications on Tactical
Arms**

*LD0510211291 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 2055 GMT 5 Oct 91*

[By Alison Little and Chris Moncrieff, PRESS ASSOCIATION]

[Excerpt] The government was tonight waiting to study President Gorbachev's reported pledge to scrap tactical nuclear weapons. It will want to study the detail of Mr Gorbachev's plans and assess their implications.

But the Labour leader Neil Kinnock immediately praised the plans. He said: "This is a major stride in disarmament and a very positive response to President Bush's initiative. Obviously it needs further assessment,

but I hope that the United States will readily respond to the statement and to the further test moratorium."

In an official statement issued by TASS tonight, Mr Gorbachev said he would eliminate all nuclear artillery shells and warheads for tactical missiles. And he said Moscow would remove all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and submarines, Reuters reported. The cuts are being seen as a move to match the package of unilateral cuts announced by America's President George Bush last week.

A Downing Street spokesman said: "We are aware of the reports and we are looking forward to receiving official confirmation of them." The Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence had the same response. [passage omitted]